SGEAU

The Future of the Family to 2030

– A Scoping Report –

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Preface

Why should the future of the family interest policy makers? Because it offers them a prism through which both to consider how society might change over the coming decades, and to be better prepared for those changes. It is through the lens of the family that multifaceted developments can be explored -- and perhaps anticipated -- in housing, health, work, welfare, leisure, migration, finance, economy, technology, and so on, helping policy makers to identify upcoming issues and stimulate the debate on long-term policy strategy for society.

Since the 1960s the family in the OECD area has already undergone significant transformation. In many countries, the extended family has all but disappeared, and the traditional two-parent family has become much less widespread as divorce rates, re-marriages, single parenthood etc. have increased. With rising migration, cultures and values have become more diverse, with some ethnic minorities evolving as parallel family cultures while others intermingle with mainstream cultures through mixed-race marriages. Families have seen more mothers take up work in the labour market, their adolescents spend longer and longer in education and training, and the elderly members of the family live longer and, increasingly, alone. The repercussions of these changes on housing, pensions, health and long-term care, on labour markets, education and public finances, have been remarkable.

So what's next? What sort of changes can we expect over the next twenty-five years or so – the space of a generation - and how will those changes challenge policy makers?

Social structures tend to be slow-moving. Many of the gradual changes that have been taking place in OECD countries are likely to continue and in some cases intensify. Higher rates of female participation in the labour market, higher divorce rates, more single parents, rising and longer enrolment in education, growing numbers of elderly, higher numbers of foreign-born population and ethnic diversity, and so forth. But this does not necessarily mean "business as usual" for policy making, since the cumulative effect of all these trends is to put an ever greater strain on the traditional social fabric. Are there thresholds and "tipping points" in these developments beyond which situations take on critical proportions? For example: Will the continuing fragmentation of the family lead to chronic housing shortages and overstretched long-term care facilities for the elderly? Will it lead increasingly to a situation in which neither parents nor schools feel ultimate responsibility for the fate of young people, paving the way for a surge in drug abuse, alcohol abuse, obesity, youth criminality (and even shorter life expectancy)?

Of course, on a more positive note, time may see family relations reconfiguring on new, more sustainable foundations. We may increasingly see networks of loosely connected family members from different marriages, partnerships and generations emerging, who devise fresh approaches to cohesion and solidarity. Intergenerational transfers could take on a new, different life, with important consequences for social services, welfare and fiscal management. Growing, better integrated ethnic communities may help to instil more positive family values – old and new – into mainstream society. And medical progress, such as in remote health monitoring, may help alleviate the strains on families of caring for elderly dependants.

But beyond the steady trends, we should also be alert to new, potentially disruptive factors. By way of illustration, ICT and especially the Internet is now firmly embedded in everyday life. However, this is a fast-moving technology and recent innovations such as Facebook and YouTube give an inkling of its power to revolutionise social interaction, particularly among young people. How will this play out in future in shaping young people's involvement in education and the learning process in general, their values and behaviour, their views on migrants, their attitude to work and play?

Finally, just as changes within society will impact on government policies, so will government policies impact on families and young people themselves. While it is always difficult to predict how policies towards housing, education and training, taxation, social benefits, employment, health, media and entertainment etc. will influence family formation and outcomes for young people, the experience of the last fifty years or so of the welfare state may have useful pointers to offer for the future. Moreover, recent years have witnessed a plethora of new initiatives by governments to tackle population groups considered to be particularly at risk. These range from carefully defined sectoral measures to help children, youths and families, to broader holistic approaches to policy making at various levels of government targeting particularly vulnerable segments of society. Given the range and complexity of the challenges that young people will be facing in the coming decades, it seems reasonable to speculate that cross-cutting, integrative and co-ordinated policy approaches to help these groups will confront the current, predominantly vertical structures of governance in OECD countries with some interesting problems.

This report is in the nature of a scoping report. It sets out to assess whether there is value added to be gained from an exercise which would explore likely changes in family structures and relations over the next twenty years or so, evaluate their wider socio-economic impacts, and reflect on their possible implications for family policy and youth policy.

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1. Introduction

The modern debate about "the family" has evolved over almost a century now, accompanying various phases of transition in the structure and functions of families over the 20th Century, and more often than not attempting to address the continually resurfacing question of whether the family is declining in importance. Whereas early works, especially in the United States, were concerned with the transition from the extended family to the nuclear family, these were followed by studies hypothesising the decline of the modern nuclear family as a social institution – a decline said to be due to high divorce rates and a reduction in the family's primary functions, for example as an agent of socialisation. A further debate ensued in the literature around the increasing heterogeneity of family forms, of relations extending beyond biological or conjugal boundaries. And to this has been added the discussion around what might be termed the increasing importance of multigenerational bonds, i.e. relations spanning more than two generations, increasingly diverse in structure and functions, and enhancing - even replacing in some cases – the nuclear family form.

It is not the aim of this report to contribute to this sociological debate. Rather, it is a more prosaic attempt to look ahead and try to picture how the family landscape might change over the next few decades and consider what some of the implications for policy might be. The main body of the report is based on a preliminary review of what is a vast research and analysis literature, and on consultations with various government departments, foundations and corporations in a number of OECD countries: Canada, Finland, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States**.**

While the term "family" is traditionally used to denote a unit of one, two or more adults living together with at least one child, society has changed significantly in recent decades so that these days the members of a family group may not necessarily be living together under the same roof. It follows from this that the report will interest itself in the family not only as expressed in household numbers, size and structure, but also as a functional, interactive unit or network of relations.

Moreover, the main interest of this report will tend towards families at the younger end of the age scale, and to young people themselves (age bracket roughly 0-24).

The geographical focus of the exercise is on OECD countries. In some instances and, where easily available, aggregate data for the OECD overall are used; in others, the data refer to individual countries or to larger country groupings, e.g. the European Union, Scandinavia.

The chosen time horizon for the report is approximately 2030 as this encompasses a full generation; in some cases however, notably with population projections, the time horizon goes to 2050.

Finally, a cautionary word on this kind of foresight work is in order. Projections and forecasts are a highly uncertain business. They seldom turn out correct. Even in demographic forecasts, which are often assumed to be relatively reliable, errors have not become smaller in recent decades, and there is nothing to indicate that

forecast accuracy in developed countries will improve substantially in the near future[1]. In cases such as this report, however, projections and forecasts serve merely to outline directions that the future may take, and to shift the perspective towards the longer-term horizon and some of the issues that are emerging there.

The report is structured as follows. The first section offers a "snapshot" view of the family in OECD countries today, concentrating largely on the changed composition of households and some of the reasons for those changes. The second section examines the principal factors likely to shape the numbers, size and composition of family households in the next couple of decades and beyond: population size and ageing, fertility trends, marriage and divorce, migration, economic prospects, etc. and offers a brief sketch of what the typical young family's social and economic environment may look like twenty years hence. The third section explores some of the issues to emerge from this overview of social and economic trends shaping the future of the family – from family intergenerational ties and the cohesion of family units and networks to the role of new technologies in health and elderly care, and matters of statistical measurement. The fourth section examines the growing need for more integrative approaches to family policy and youth policy in OECD countries. Finally, the fifth section draws conclusions about the viability of follow-up work in the form of a project.

There then follow three specially commissioned papers which are an integral part of this report. The first, by Simon Forge and Colin Blackman, explores the interaction between changing family dynamics and new technologies (Annex I). The second, by Jeanne Fagnani, examines the longer term prospects for a more integrated family policy approaches, with particular attention to current polices in selected OECD countries (Annex II). The third paper, by Jo Kloprogge, takes issue with the question of policy frameworks for youth, assessing the current policy approaches in a number of OECD countries and assessing the prospects for more integration across different policy fields (Annex III).

2. A Snapshot of the Family Household in OECD Countries Today

Among the most striking features of family household composition across almost the entire the OECD area is the progressive decline in the average size of households, the rapid rise in one-person households, and the increase in single-parent households.

In the European Union average household size has been falling for some time. About 12 per cent of the population now live in one-person households, and over 4 percent are lone parents. In the United States, average household size has fallen from 3.29 in 1960 to 2.59 in 2000. Single-person households as a share of total households rose from 13 per cent in 1960 to 26 per cent in 2000, and the number of lone parent (primarily single-mother) households increased from 1.5 million in 1950 to 9.5 million in 2000. In Japan, average household size fell from 3.22 in 1980 to 2.56 in 2005. The share of one-person households rose sharply from 19.8 to 29.5 over the same period, and that of single-parent households climbed from 5.7 percent to 8.4 per cent[2].

[1] Keilman, N.
[2] European Commission (2007); Jiang et al (2007); Japan National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (2008).

These fairly universal trends can be largely explained by a combination of ageing of the population, lower birth rates, increasing divorce rates and break-up of co-habiting relationships.

Marriage and birth rates are declining across Europe, albeit at different speeds. Unmarried cohabitation and divorce are widespread and the number of re-constituted families is on the rise. However, rates of unmarried co-habitation vary widely from more than 20 percent in Sweden to between 1 and 5 per cent in Southern European countries. Births to unmarried people living together range from more than 50 per cent in Sweden and Latvia to single figures in Greece and Italy.[3]

Great Britain has witnessed an explosion of non-marital childbearing rising from 9% of all births in 1975 to 43% in 2004. Divorce remains the main cause of the rise in lone parent families, but the sharp increase in births to cohabiting mothers has also been an important contributor (due to the high rates of break-up of such unions). Also, a recent study estimated that about three in every 20 men and women aged from 16-59 are in a relationship best described as "living apart together."[4]

There is also an important ethnic dimension. Again, in Great Britain, household and family structures of ethnic minority groups tend to be rather different from the White group who made up some 92 percent of the population according to the 2001 census. Even after taking account of different age structure, Black and Mixed ethnic groups for example are much more likely to live as lone parent families, while those of South Asian ethnic background tend to live in larger units.[5]

However, despite the turbulences of recent decades, the family household has far from disappeared. In the United States around 70 per cent of all households are family households (albeit down from 85 per cent in 1960); in the EU-25 in 2004, over 45% of all private households corresponded roughly to the traditional notion of the nuclear family, i.e. 2, 3 or more adults with one or more dependent children (though this masks of course big differences among countries); and in Great Britain, most people still live in a family set-up (despite the growth in one-person households). In 2004, for example, eight out of ten people were part of a family household, compared with nine out of ten at the beginning of the 1960s.

Interestingly, in the US, while the change in household composition has been continuous since the end of the 18th Century, it accelerated after 1960. However, trends since the 1980s suggest a slowing in some changes in household living arrangements: very little alteration in the share of two-parent or single-mother households, stabilized living arrangements for young adults and the elderly, a slowdown in cohabitation growth, a decline in divorce, and an almost unchanged average household size during the 1990s. It is unclear whether this recent stability indicates a new sustained equilibrium or is just a temporary lull.[6]

[3] ESRC (2007)
[4] ibid
[5] ibid
[6] Jiang et al (2007)

3. Factors Shaping the Family Landscape to 2030

A range of interrelated factors will be at play in changing the contours of family composition and functioning in the coming decades. Key among them will be population change, fertility and mortality rates, and immigration, but also economic and labour market prospects as well as changes in policy. This section brings together an overview of a wide variety of long-term projections and forecasts in an effort to paint a broad-brush canvas of the range of influences shaping the environment for families over the coming years. It must be stressed however that they are projections and forecasts and that they will therefore inevitably turn out to be wrong, so great are the uncertainties surrounding even well-researched disciplines such as population projections. Nonetheless they provide a sense of the broad trends that are determining important features of family life as we move forward into the future.

a) Population

The last few decades have experienced social change on a remarkable scale. In particular there have been extraordinary gains in longevity in developed countries, with average life expectancy at birth rising from 66 years in 1950 to just over 76 years in 2007.[7] Life expectancy at birth could continue to rise by at least a further 6 years by 2050, leading to a big increase in the number of people surviving to the ages of 80 and 90.

This has had, and will continue to have, far-reaching implications for the composition of families, perhaps best grasped through a long-term historical perspective. In the United States, only one-in-five children born at the start of the 20th Century would have had any grandparent still living by the time they reached the age of 30. By contrast, nearly one in seven children born at the start of the 21st Century will have all four grandparents still alive by the age of 18, and by age 30 nearly one in eight will have at least one grandparent alive.

At the other end of the spectrum, the last few decades have seen significant falls in fertility rates. Looking across developed countries as a whole, birth rates have declined sharply. In 1950, the total fertility rate (TFR), i.e. the average number of children being born per woman, was 2.8, but by 2007 the TFR had fallen to 1.6, leaving many OECD countries well below the fertility rate of 2.1 per woman needed to replace the population at a constant level (the so-called "replacement level").

[7] United Nations (2007)

Chart 2.2. **Fertility patterns differ across the OECD**

Total fertility rates, 1970 onwards



Source: OECD

None of the high-income countries of the world is firmly above the replacement fertility rate, with only the United States, New Zealand, Ireland, Iceland and France above 1.9 children per woman.

[Outside of the OECD trends are generally moving in the same direction as fertility rates converge rapidly towards those of the high-income nations.][8] A slight improvement in total fertility in developed countries to 1.8 is projected by 2050. [9]

In European and in many other high-income countries, fertility is currently low for two reasons: first, women are delaying births to later ages, resulting in fewer births in the calendar years during which this delay happens (this is termed the "tempo effect"); second, women are not having enough births to achieve replacement level (the "quantum effect"). It is thought that many of these countries, and the EU as a whole, have recently entered a period of "negative population momentum", in other words, that their age structure will bring with it further population shrinking even if fertility were to instantly jump to replacement level (keeping mortality constant and assuming no migration).[10]

Not surprisingly therefore, projections for the developed world suggest that the population is likely to increase only slightly to 2050, from 1217 million to 1236 million.[11] There are of course important regional and country differences. For example, the population of Japan is already in decline and is expected to fall further in the coming decades, while that of the US is forecast to expand from around 300 million today to about 440 million in 2050. The total population of the EU-25 is projected to increase slightly (by 1.1 percent) between 2010 and 2030, but then to actually decline through to 2050 (after reaching a turning point in around 2025). However, the absolute numbers of young people are forecast to decline between now and 2030, in some cases quite sharply, as is their share of the overall population – for children up to 14 years of age by 8.5%, for young people of 15-24 years of age by 12%, and for young adults aged between 25 and 39 by 15.6%. In contrast, the

[8] Feyrer et al (2008)
[9] United Nations op.cit.
[10] Lutz et al (2005)
[11] United Nations op.cit

numbers and share of the elderly will rise dramatically, the 65-79 age-band increasing by 37% and the 80+ category by 54%.[12]

What explains the shift in women's childbearing patterns? It would seem to be a rich mix of familiar factors ranging from the wider use of contraception and increasing female labour market participation, to rising levels of female educational attainment and changing values and preferences, notably the disconnection between marriage and parenting and the development of co-habitation. (The list is not exhaustive.) The prevailing view could be characterised as follows: women want to finish their education, become established in a job, and find a reliable long-term partner before they enter the demanding life phase of raising children, which commits them for at least 15-20 years. Moreover, there seems to be a rise in standards, both in terms of what is considered to be satisfactorily established in a professional career, and in terms of what constitutes a sufficiently reliable partnership.[13]

It would seem that as educational attainment among women has risen during recent decades, the mean age at childbirth – at least in most European countries - has increased considerably. And at least as concerns the United States, this seeming (or real?) incompatibility between education and childbearing appears to have strengthened over time. Hence school-leaving age (at whatever level of education) and the timing of fertility have become more closely interlinked. Even in countries like Norway, where parental benefits make it easier to combine having children with being a student, enrolment in higher education strongly reduces the probability of childbearing.[14]

What is the future like to bring in terms of tertiary education, where these findings seem to be particularly relevant? New scenarios produced by the OECD suggest that, if entry rates continue to grow, enrolments of tertiary students in the OECD as a whole will rise from around 47 million in 2005 to over 54 million in 2025, an increase of some 16%. Women are already in the majority in most Member countries' higher education systems, and over the projection period, almost all Member countries will see the female share rise yet further – in some countries such as Austria, United Kingdom, Iceland, Norway, Canada, Sweden and the United States, to well over 60 percent.[15]

[12] Commission of the European Communities (2006)
[13] Lutz et al op.cit.
[14] Lutz et al op.cit.
[15] OECD Higher Education to 2030 (2008)



Other things being equal, this suggests yet more women are likely to delay the birth of their first child, depressing fertility rates yet further. However, the coming decades are also likely to see measures put in place to encourage earlier start to schooling and to reduce the amount of time spent on tertiary studies. For example, the impact of such initiatives as the Bologna declaration (1999), which harmonizes and in some countries compresses the duration of tertiary studies, is likely to increasingly make its mark. In the Italian case, for instance, it implies moving from 7 years spent in the university system to a more tightly structured system in which a bachelor's degree is earned in three years and a master's degree in two years. At the secondary level, the state of Saarland (Germany) shortened the duration of the academic track from 9 to 8 years in 2001 and other Federal states are implementing similar changes. There are also initiatives (e.g. industry-sponsored ones in Germany) proposing to lower the school entrance age to 4 and reduce the typical duration of primary and secondary education to 10 years, in order to bring forward the age at which children leave the educational system. There are of course other factors which influence the lag between graduation and first birth and the timing of subsequent births – these include the role of social norms with respect to the age at which a woman is expected entry to start work, financial support given to young individuals, and the degree of wage flexibility.[16]

More optimism about future fertility and family formation can also be drawn from the relationship between fertility on the one hand and female labour market participation on the other. Within the high-income countries, that relationship has changed markedly over the last 40 years. In the 1960s and even 1970s fertility rates and women's labour market participation rates were negatively correlated across countries. In the most recent data, the two rates are positively correlated.

[16] Lutz et al op.cit.

Chart 2.3. **Countries with high female employment rates now also have the highest fertility rates**

Total fertility rate and female employment rate, 1980 and 2005



Source: OECD (2007b).

[There is an interesting male counterpart to this same relationship: Demographers have established a positive correlation between men's employment and fertility in some Western societies, suggesting that the inclusion of men and/or fathers may lead to a better understanding of fertility and family dynamics.[17]]

One tentative explanation put forward for this is that there are three distinct phases in women's status generated by increased workforce opportunities: 1) an early phase that is characteristic of the United States in the 1950s/1960s, in which women earn low wages relative to men and are expected to shoulder all the child care at home; 2) an intermediate phase in which labour market opportunities for women improve but household status lags (i.e. they are still expected to do majority of child care and home production) and which corresponds broadly to the situation today in Japan, Italy, Spain, Germany, for example; 3) a final phase in which women's labour market opportunities begin to equal those of men, and in which increased participation of men in the household reduces the disincentives for women to have additional children – this corresponds roughly to the situation these days in Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, and the modern-day United States. [It is interesting to note that in high-income countries such as Japan, Italy, Spain and Germany where men do the smallest fraction of the household chores and child care, fertility rates are among the lowest.] The hypothesis therefore is that increasing women's status may eventually reverse fertility trends in Europe and Japan, notably where fertility rates are very low. In particular, men in all high-income countries appear to be taking on a larger share of household duties, which could lead to a large positive impact on fertility. Moreover, government spending on families (especially day care) which is positively associated with fertility, appears to be trending upwards in European countries.[18]

[17] Kreyenfeld, M., (2001), Employment and fertility: East Germany in the 1990s
[18] Feyrer et al op.cit

b) Union formation and dissolution

European countries and the United States shared a considerable marriage boom after the Second World War, whereafter general marriage rates declined – albeit less so in the US than in Europe. In some Northern European countries these rates have stabilised since the 1980s, while in the US they have continued to decline. Reasoned projections of future trends in marriage are few and far between. To the extent that the decline in general marriage rates is quite widespread, it would seem plausible to hypothesise that they will continue to fall in the years ahead. On the other hand, it is equally plausible that they could stabilise or even reverse, since in-built generational factors may come into play. For example, a US study of cohorts born in the 1950s and 1960s concludes that marriage will remain nearly universal for American women, so that general marriage rates may pick up again in the future once the effect of delaying marriage for educational purposes diminishes.[19]

Chart 2.1. **There are fewer marriages which are more likely to end up in divorce**



1. Countries are ranked in ascending order of crude marriage rates in 2004.

Source: OECD (2007b).

The decline in the general marriage rate has been offset to some extent by the rise in non-marital cohabitation, whereby the two may be linked. In Scandinavia and some western European countries, cohabitation tends to have the character of an alternative or substitute for marriage, reflected in the increasing number of couples who remain together without marrying. In the United States, cohabitation tends to be more of a prelude to marriage. These contrasting trends make projections over several decades particularly hazardous.

[19] Jiang et al op.cit.

As concerns union dissolution, there is again an interesting contrast between European and US experience. During the 20th Century, divorce rates were higher in the US than in many western European countries. But while the upward trend continued it Europe, it declined in the US and divorce rates there are now closer to those in European countries. The picture on cohabitation dissolution rates is quite mixed, too. Unsurprisingly perhaps, they tend to be higher than divorce rates. But looking across Europe as a whole, some countries have higher and some lower rates than in the US.

Where there does appear to be a widely shared trend, is that the combined result of divorce and cohabitation dissolution is a significant increase in the instability of unions, borne out by research in the United States, Canada and some European countries. Nonetheless, this is a social phenomenon whose pattern remains largely unpredictable one or two decades ahead.

Some countries have however ventured into this difficult terrain. For England and Wales, for example, latest (2003-based) marital status projections assume that current trends, which are pervasive across Western societies, are set to continue. These involve less and later marriage, more cohabitation and some increase in partnership breakdown/divorce, although with some slowing in the rates of increase of earlier decades. Increased breakdown and the number of births occurring outside marriage point to more single-parent families so that by 2026 the number of people living in lone parent households (mainly lone mothers) is expected to rise nearly five-fold. The trend will be fuelled by the rise in divorce and cohabitation, and the more complex arrangements such as reconstituted family households.[20] Projections for Great Britain also indicate that cohabitation will become more common than marriage in the prime childbearing ages of 25-34.

c) Future household size

Unfortunately, household projections are few and far between. No international organisation produces household projections for countries or regions of the world, as is done for population by for example the United Nations, IIASA, the World Bank, and the US Census Bureau. Instead it falls to the statistical offices of a few countries to generate their own projections for planning purposes in such domains as housing, household services, or support services for the elderly.

The principal determinants of future household size are changes in population age structure (ageing momentum), fertility rates and rates of household formation and dissolution, and as has been seen in the preceding sections, all three are evolving unfavourably in relation to household formation. Hence, official projections are unanimous in expecting that average family size in the developed world will in future not exceed 1.85 or 1.9.[21]

This is reflected at individual country level. In Great Britain, one-person households are expected to increase to 2026 for all age groups, not least for the under 25s and the 25-34 group (rising to around 1.3 million households for the two age-groups together), so that average household size is expected to decrease from 2.34 in 2004 to 2.11 in 2026 and 2.09 in 2029. The Australian Bureau of Statistics[22] also projects a quite steep decrease in average household size – from 2.6 (in 2001) to 2.2/2.3 in 2026. In Japan – average household size is set to fall from 2.56 in 2005 to 2.27 in 2030 as a result of deep-seated structural changes - one-person households up from 29.5% to 37.4%; couples with children down from 29.9% to 21.9%; single parent households up from 8.4% to 10.3%.

[20] ESRC op.cit.
[21] Coleman (2006)
[22] Australian Bureau of Statistics (2008)

d) Immigration

Historically, immigration has been an important determinant of many a country's national family profile, and given the prospect of continuing global migratory flows in the decades ahead, it will in all probability remain so.

In 2006 an average of 9% of OECD populations were foreign-born. Among countries, however, there are significant differences, with shares of foreign-born ranging from well over 20% in Australia, Switzerland and Canada, to around 12-14% in the US, Germany, France, Austria, Belgium and Sweden, and a mere 2.4% in Turkey and 1.1% in Japan. Within the foreign-origin populations, the proportion of "non-Western" people varies considerably – in Europe, for example, it ranges from around 40% for Austria, Norway and Sweden to over 65% for Germany and Denmark, and 77% for England and Wales.[23]

The age structure of the foreign-origin populations, particularly those of non-Western origin, is relatively youthful. For example, looking at the OECD area as a whole, about 60% of Indian, Filipino and Moroccan immigrant populations are aged between 15 and 44 (i.e. not even counting children).[24]

With respect to birth rates, the fertility of foreign-origin populations in industrialised countries has tended to converge to the national average, and in some cases to drop below it. But only in a few cases is that process complete. For instance, total fertility rates among Indians in Great Britain and among Caribbean immigrant populations in the Netherlands have dropped to roughly national levels, while Muslim and African fertility remains quite high but seems to be on a downward trend. Chinese and East African Asians in Britain exhibit fertility levels below the national average, while total birth rates of women born in Pakistan and Bangladesh are way above the national norm (4.7 and 3.9 respectively) as are those of African immigrant populations in Britain and Sweden. Thus, while the picture is mixed, it does suggest that increased inflows of "unacculturated" populations may serve to maintain or even boost fertility rates.[25]

It is against this background of relatively youthful and fertile immigrant populations that future migration flows to OECD countries attract particular interest for the purposes of this report, because they can be expected to exert a key influence on OECD populations' family composition.

In 2006 "permanent-type" gross migration flows into OECD countries amounted to about 4 million persons, up 5% from 2005.[26] There are many reasons for assuming that, for several decades to come, flows of migration into developed countries will continue at least at their present levels and in all likelihood are set to increase, whereby the balance will probably shift from migration from rich countries to inflows from poor countries. The drivers behind these likely trends are many and diverse: ageing populations and shrinking workforces in the Western world versus burgeoning young populations in the developing regions; persistent and substantial income differentials between developed and developing economies; the pull of existing migrant population networks in OECD countries; the attractions of quality education in Europe, North America and Oceania; and the prospect of environmental disasters, adverse climate change and worsening security in several developing regions of the world.

[23] Coleman op.cit.
[24] OECD A Profile of Immigrant Populations in the 21st Century (2008)
[25] Coleman op.cit.
[26] OECD International Migration Outlook 2008

Given the complexity of these drivers, attempts to project future migration volumes are rare, and where they do exist, they tend to be highly speculative, not least because the immigration policies of the receiving states play a decisive role and are especially hard to foresee. Nonetheless, interesting examples of projections exist which give a flavour of how levels of migrant populations might evolve in the future under certain, reasoned assumptions. Coleman performs projections for a number of European countries (Austria, England and Wales, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden) which indicate that the proportion of foreign-born can be expected to grow to a much higher level than today - to between 15 and 32 per cent of the total population in these countries by 2050. The share of foreign-born people of Western origin decreases in favour of rising proportions of non-Western citizens in the total population, as higher levels of such migrants and higher fertility kick in. Similarly, for the United States, minorities - currently roughly one third of the US population - are expected to become the majority in 2042; and already by 2023 minorities will comprise more than half of all children.

While these trends are of course not set in stone (zero-rate immigration policies for example would render them obsolete) they do point to a number of implications of rising levels of immigrant populations for the family of the future.

Firstly, such trends suggest that within a few decades, families in many if not most major European (and possibly also North American) cities would find themselves living in urban areas in which residents of non-Western origin predominate. Conversely, the older indigenous population would tend to be concentrated in suburban and rural settings.

Secondly, there is the relative youthfulness of the foreign-born populations. For example, in Coleman's overall projection for Britain, by 2031 all minorities together would compromise 27 percent of the total population but 36 per cent among the 0-14 age group. This preponderance of younger cohorts in the foreign-born population could have a powerful influence on perceptions and assumptions among young people at school and college. This is not necessarily a bad thing, especially if it involves the transmission of positive cultural values across different ethnic groups. For example, in contrast to white British households, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Indians tend to have stronger extended-family traditions of the older nurturing the young and the young in turn caring for the old. While it has been observed that Asian families are moving towards a looser structure in which several generations no longer necessarily share the same house, the ethos of caring for other generations remains and older family members retain their authority.

Thirdly, and in a similar vein, larger foreign-born population groups raise the potential for greater ethnic mix and new identities. Increasingly, it cannot be taken for granted that children of mixed unions decide in favour of one or the other parental group. Instead, many prefer to identify explicitly with a new identity of mixed race. In the United States the children of parents of mixed origin mostly describe themselves as being of mixed origins. Indeed, according to the 2000 census, 2.6% of the population described themselves as such. In the British census of 2001, over 1% of the population voluntarily identified themselves as mixed or were characterised as such by their parents. A simple probabilistic projection suggests that the mixed population could account for 8% of the British population by 2050, including 26% of infants.[27]

[27] Coleman op.cit.

e) Economic prospects

An important ingredient in the mix of factors that determine marriage or cohabitation patterns, household and family formation and fertility rates is the economic situation of the individual and the longer term economic outlook. In particular with respect to the so-called "fertility trap", the economic story would seem to play an important role. It goes something like this. "Lower fertility leads to faster population ageing and thus to deeper cuts in the welfare state, less job creation, and an expectation of lower economic growth in the future; at the same time, aspirations for personal consumption are still on the rise owing to parental wealth and fewer siblings; and the match of high aspirations and pessimism about the economic future will result in even lower fertility. This assumed economic mechanism has the potential to create a continuing downward spiral toward lower fertility." [28]

There can be little doubt that material aspirations of young people have been rising over recent decades as a consequence of increasing parental wealth, high consumption standards communicated by advertising, and possibly even smaller family size (so that youngsters have fewer siblings to share with). But can those aspirations and standards be upheld in the coming decades? A large proportion of young people in the developed world clearly do not think so. In the United States, for example, a 2006 Pew Research Center survey found that while some 45% of surveyed young people (18-29 years old) thought that children today will be better off than people now, full 40% of the same age group thought they would be worse off. Equally important perhaps, barely a third of adults expect the next generation of children to grow up better off than people are today.

Are young people justified in taking such a downbeat view of their future?

At a macro-economic level, they could well be forgiven for thinking so. Growth prospects for the developing world over the next couple of decades are modest to say the least. According to the latest version of the World Bank's "Prospects for the Global Economy", during the 1990s GDP in the high-income countries grew at an average of 2.5% per year and GDP income per capita by 1.8% per year. The projection for 2015-2030 is 1.3% per annum and 1.2 % per annum, i.e. a substantial fall on average in overall growth performance and income levels.

Part of the problem for the next generation of young people is that ageing populations will put increasing pressure on public spending (even though the situation will vary widely from country to country). In the OECD as a whole, health expenditures are likely to rise from an average of 6.7% of GDP in 2005 to double-digit figures by 2050, and pensions could climb on average by around 3 to 4 percentage points of GDP over the same period**.** For EU-25, for example, it is projected that age-related public spending will rise by 3-4 GDP points between 2004 and 2050, representing an increase of 10 percent in public spending. These upward pressures will be felt from 2010 onwards and will become particularly pronounced between 2020 and 2040. To the extent that especially pensions are financed largely by pay-as-you-go schemes, it seems clear that in some countries the burden of pension reforms will fall largely on younger generations.[29] Calculations by the Robert Bosch Stiftung Report "A Strong Family" (2005) show that for Germany, for example, by 2030 average contribution rates to the pension scheme could increase from their current level of 19.5% to 28% in 2030, health insurance contributions from 13.6% to 17.5%, and total social security contributions to 56% (equivalent to 30.3% of GDP).

[28] Lutz et al op.cit.
[29] See for example World Economic Forum (2008)

On the living costs front (i.e. energy prices, food prices, house prices, all of which are big items in young families' budgets) it can be argued that the prospects are none too rosy either. Oil prices will no doubt continue to fluctuate considerably over the next few decades, but latest projections by the World Bank (2008) for example suggest a longer-term stabilisation of oil prices around USD 75 by 2030 which assumes that demand for energy will continue to rise faster than GDP; however, should oil supplies develop only weakly and fail markedly to keep up with demand, prices could move as high as USD 122. Clearly, considerable uncertainty surrounds future energy prices.

Furthermore, the era of cheap food could well be coming to an end in OECD countries. *A priori,* based on long-term forecasts of population, incomes and historically rising productivity, the long-term picture is one of declining agricultural prices. Here again, however, there are a number of major imponderables: the impact of climate change in the coming decades; the determination of governments to remove agricultural trade distortions; the possibility that expanding bio fuel crops may push agricultural prices up; and the likely dietary changes in developing countries as a result of rising incomes and prosperity, which could raise worldwide demand for grain quite considerably.

Finally, and more positively perhaps, some relief on the housing front might be expected. This is already the case with respect to the short term prospects, as in many OECD countries house prices head downwards. Over the long term too, the news is – in theory at least – quite good. Work by Mankiw and Weil at the end of the 1980s on demographic change and house prices in the US demonstrated that demand for housing increases to the age of about 30, then flattens off up to the age of about 40, and then declines. They concluded that the combined effect of the ageing of the baby-boom generation and the onset of the baby-bust generation (of the mid-1960s and 1970s) would put significant downward pressure on housing prices in the 1990s and beyond. More recent analysis for England and Scotland[30] does indeed suggest that population decline and population ageing exert a depressive effect on house prices. The bad news for the next generation of first-time house buyers is, of course, that unfortunately for Mankiw and Weil, the opposite happened – average real prices of houses actually sold increased by some 27% over the period 1987-2005. In other words, there are important factors at work (changes in income, wealth, migration, household formation etc.) which may offset or even overwhelm the momentum of ageing and population decline.

f) Labour market and employment prospects

As documented in youth surveys around Europe, the expectations of young people entering the labour market today are not optimistic.[31]

Interestingly, this somewhat sombre mood among young people is not borne out by broader macro trends. Take the European situation for example. Recent projections by the European Commission (2006) show that: Firstly, younger cohorts are declining and will continue to decline through to 2030 and 2050, suggesting less intense competition among young people for jobs. Secondly, although the working-age population will begin to decline from 2010 onwards, the total number of persons in work in the EU-25 will continue to increase until around 2017. Thirdly, more than two-thirds of this increase will be a result of higher numbers of women in work, older women being gradually replaced by better-educated younger women with greater involvement in working life. Similar trends can also be observed in other non-European OECD countries, including Japan and Korea.

[30] Levin, E. et al (2008)
[31] Lutz et al op.cit.

However, youth unemployment is high in many countries and there are fewer secure jobs notably for women. As Fagnani (Annex II) points out, precarious jobs have been developing quite rapidly in Europe and Asia, not only in the form of fixed-term contracts but also in the shape of temporary agency work and involuntary part-time work. In Japan, Korea, Germany and Spain, these forms of employment are quite widespread among women and especially among married women and single mothers. Indeed, in Japan non-standard employment accounts for more than half of women's total employment.

g) Security and crime

Although not a major factor in shaping family structures, crime levels and drug and alcohol abuse can contribute to the general sense of security, influencing in turn decisions on whether to have family and where to settle. Forecasts of crime levels even at national level are very hard to find, so any prospective thinking needs to be based on existing trends amplified by any meaningful social and economic future trends that can be found.

Some internationally comparable crime statistics are available (from e.g. Interpol, UN, ICVS, EU ICS) though coverage is not complete and they remain, like crime statistics at national level, notoriously difficult to interpret. Nonetheless, for theft, robbery, sexual offences and assaults and threats (i.e. offences typically affecting the family), crime rates do on the whole seem to have declined over the last ten years or so in OECD countries. But will the trend continue? The last ten to fifteen years have seen significant rises in prosperity, perhaps a partial explanation of falling crime rates. Looking forward, however, the worsening economic climate over the next few years and its likely impact on youth employment do not bode well. Over the longer term, it may in fact be demographic developments that help reduce crime levels. The largest group of offenders tend to be adolescent males, and on most projections for many OECD countries this particular age-group is set to decline in numbers over the next few decades.

Trends in crime: average of one year prevalence rates for 5 property crimes in the 15 countries that participated four times or more. 1989-2005 ICVS and 2005 EU ICS***



* Source: European Survey of Crime and Safety (2005 EU ICS). Brussels, Gallup Europe.
** Australia, Belgium, Canada, England & Wales, Estonia, Finland, France, Netherlands, New Zealand, Northern Ireland, Poland, Scotland, Sweden, Switzerland and USA.

With respect to alcohol abuse, the general trend for OECD between 1980 and 2005 has been a gradual decline in alcohol consumption. But this trend masks two important features. First, the statistics measure consumption for people 15 years of age and older, and so fail to capture the recent growing trend in many OECD countries of alcohol consumption by young children. Secondly, there are strong country-specific divergences around the general trend. While for example alcohol consumption in Spain and Italy has declined quite steeply, it has risen quite sharply in Ireland and the UK.

Finally, on drug abuse, the rise has been undeniable and increasingly public. Surveys over the last ten years or so measuring the percentage of the population who have had contact with drugs-related problems in some form point very clearly to a rising widespread trend.

Very often and from time to time in contact with drugs-related problems; percentage of the population in 2003/04 in Australia, USA and 16 EU member states and earlier results from the Eurobaromer. 2005 EU ICS and Euro-barometer 1996-2000-2002



While it is impossible to predict the extent of future drug abuse, there are few signs that its spread is abating.

h) A sketch of the average family's world to 2025/30

Taken together, the various prospects outlined above offer a set of signposts to the kind of world in which young families in OECD countries could well be living 20-25 years from now. At risk of considerable generalisation, their environment could look roughly as follows:

- Many more grey-haired people will be in their vicinity than is currently the case;
- They will find themselves with at least four and possibly even five generations in the family alive at the same time, though not all under the same roof;
- Young families themselves will tend to be small, interacting with other small families; many of them will be single-parent and cohabiting-couple households;
- More young people will be preparing for higher education, especially girls;
- Young families living in urban centres will find themselves interacting much more with families of different ethnicity or of mixed origin; this will be felt especially at school and college as the numbers and shares of such children increase, exposing all children to a much richer range of cultural values and points of view (some consensual, some conflictual) in the classroom;
- The overall economic situation will not be conducive to expectations of higher incomes, with overall economic growth rates quite modest over the period in question; slow reform of pay-as-you-go social security systems will weigh heavily on young-people's pay packets, just as energy, food and possibly housing costs will weigh heavily on family budgets;
- Competition for jobs among young people will not be as intense as today, given the smaller cohorts, but there will be an abundance of more precarious job openings, so that competition for the "quality" employment opportunities will remain fierce;
- Security will remain a concern for parents in many countries, with alcohol and drug abuse increasingly an established part of the scene.

4. Challenges and Issues

What the previous sections broadly illustrate is that over the coming two decades or so one should not expect revolutionary changes in household and family structures, but rather evolutionary changes. Many of the features of the family in 2025/30 are already detectable now and will, for the most part, develop quite gradually over the period. Thus, for example, while in many if not most countries the importance of the traditional family consisting of a married couple and children will continue to wane, it is not disappearing and will continue to play a significant role in society. Nonetheless, there are a number of cases where the cumulative effects of past and current trends are very likely to intensify or accelerate to such an extent that they warrant increased monitoring and possibly new policy thinking. Several such "tipping points" or "critical thresholds" have already emerged in the foregoing sections.

1. One example is the *extremely rapid rise in the coming years of the number of elderly and very elderly* – estimated for example for Europe at +37% and +54% respectively by 2030 (and +44% and +171% respectively by 2050) – and the potential constraints this could impose on women's availability for employed work and their careers. Clearly much will depend on whether or not "healthy ageing" becomes a widespread phenomenon.

2. Another example is the *expected surge in some countries in the proportion of ethnic minority children* attending school or college, which will pose considerable challenges to teaching, curricula design and, more generally, the integration of such young groups into the school community.

3. A third illustration is the *very substantial increase in the number of lone parents* which is anticipated over the next couple of decades in some countries, and which will step up the strain on the relevant social services (child benefits, education, community childcare services, job market insertion, etc.)

4. A fourth is the rise in the numbers of couples who choose to live together but not marry -- so steep in some OECD countries that *cohabitation is eventually likely to become more common than marriage in the prime childbearing ages* of 25-34.

Aside from such "tipping points", other perhaps more slow-moving changes in family structures and interrelations will also give rise to a wide range of complex issues which will need to be addressed. Below is a selection.

5. *The potential benefits of family multigenerational ties:* As longevity extends yet further for men and women, and families find themselves increasingly with four and even five generations in their midst, the question arises whether multigenerational ties will play out to the advantage or disadvantage of the family in terms of its functions, adaptability and resilience in the face of socioeconomic change. There are in fact some very good reasons for believing that family multigenerational relations will become more important in the 21st Century. First, population ageing itself results in "longer years of shared lives"; second, the importance of grandparents and other kin in fulfilling family functions is expected to increase; third, as research spanning several decades has demonstrated, intergenerational solidarity remains remarkably strong and resilient over time. There will also be the added bonus of diversity stemming from family multigenerational relations, because of: changes in family structure involving divorce and widening networks of stepfamily relations; the increased longevity of kin; and the diversity of intergenerational "types" ranging from tightly-knit or at least sociable forms of interaction to looser, more distant or detached family network configurations.[32]

6. *Family networks and family cohesion:* As noted in the previous sections, while there is a trend to smaller, less complex households and family units, other changes mean that more and more people will have commitments and networks outside, both with more disparate kin and step kin and with friends and acquaintances. Other things being equal, time and distance constraints could be expected to result in less contact and cohesion within the family group. But modern technologies, mobile communications and computers, make such a future far less certain. Indeed, their impact is intriguingly ambivalent. As Forge et al point out (Annex I), on the positive side "children's communications with estranged parents following separation or divorce, inter-generational relationships, interaction with displaced relatives and with unrelated family members, expand in a space unfettered by distance or the organisation of physical meetings ". On the other hand, contacts with "external members" open up choices, and thus options of strengthening or weakening the basic family unit…." Young people often

[32] Bengtson (2001)

devote the largest proportion of their mobile phone time to talking with their parents or immediate family. Conversely, where family members have individual mobile phones, the collective identity of the family is diluted because incoming calls go straight to the individual rather than, as is the case with the fixed line phone, to whichever family member takes the call in the first instance. New ICT in the home can encourage shared activities within the family. Equally, however, a culture of separateness may emerge in which the family does different things often more individually and privately, and the young person's bedroom ICT centre can exclude other family members for hours of the day.

7. *The family burden of caring for the sick and old:* As noted above, caring for the growing share of frail and sick elderly will pose considerable challenges for families in general, and for the female carers in the family in particular, since it is they who will be bearing the brunt of the responsibilities. This in turn could prove a major obstacle to getting women into or back to work and developing career paths. Forge et al (Annex I) outline some of the ICT infrastructure and applications that are coming together in the next few years which have tremendous scope to improve support for the elderly and sick in the home and free up carers for other activities. Such applications include smart sheltered housing, intelligent/remote health support systems, mobile robotic assistants, and extending the hospital into the home via telemedicine and home health monitoring systems. To obtain an idea of the scale of human resources that could be at least partially freed for other activities, it is worthwhile to look at figures for the United States where it is thought that there are somewhere between 30 and 38 million informal care givers. Full two thirds of the non-institutionalized elderly with long-term care needs rely solely on unpaid help, primarily from wives and adult daughters. Indeed, almost three-quarters of the primary caregivers are women; over 30% of carers are in the labour force, and two-thirds of these working caregivers report conflicts between jobs and care giving.[33]

8. *The conflicting interests within the 21st Century family:* As modern-day families strive to improve their material position and at the same time to satisfy their non-material aspirations, the tensions heighten among the different objectives: for mothers or mothers-to-be, preserve and improve educational and training opportunities, find employment, build a career - but for the family as a whole, also promote the welfare of the children, ensure their biological rhythms are respected, allow for sufficient time with their parents, and so on. These are tensions which, in the light of the likely future developments described earlier, show no sign of diminishing in the years to come. On the contrary, some of the future trends such as expanding higher education opportunities for women and tighter family budgets suggest rather an exacerbation of the conflicts among the families various interests.

Some relief from this growing dilemma may be found in the coming years in the application of ICT, both in the form of telework and in its uses in distance education.

9. *Work/family life balance and new technologies:* Compared to a decade ago, some degree of home working with the use of ICT is increasingly considered normal practice in most OECD countries for a range of employment types, but especially for knowledge workers. According to Forge et al, the scope for further expansion of telework is considerable. They see it being driven by several factors related in part to advances in key technologies, near-zero communication costs, the spread of business networking and the high cost of urban housing, but also by the advantages to the family inherent in the technologies. Telework can help parents and especially women better manage the confluence of work, play and family logistics. Indeed, as a mode of work it holds out the promise of key support for single-

[33] Stone and Sanders (2008)

parent families, offering as it does significant opportunities for job search, paid work on-line, free-lance work, and so on.

10. *Parents' further education and training and the demands on family time:* New information and communication technology will have an increasingly important part to play in managing access to higher education. Its key asset is that it can render participation more flexible. E-learning is used primarily to deliver entire courses (in virtual universities) or specific modules by distance means, using interactive video conferencing, web networking for document access, interactive multimedia, enhanced computer-based learning, and so on. As e-learning opportunities expand, so should the scope for young parents to develop knowledge and skills at home, thereby improving the prospect of achieving a better balance of demands on family time.

There are other areas where the needs specifically of young people and families are set to grow in the future. Two examples are offered: childcare and affordable housing.

11. *Childcare to meet future needs:* As the OECD's "Babies and Bosses" project highlights, for many families the lack of viable childcare options is a major barrier to work – informal care through relations and neighbours is often not available, and formal childcare frequently lacking or beyond the financial means of the family. Moreover, for many families, support for children up to around 4 years old is insufficient insofar as parents of older children also face severe barriers to work. What is missing for them is the provision of continuing support as children grow up. For yet others, the missing link in the support and child development chain is integration of pre-school education with the childcare provision. In some OECD countries child poverty is remarkably persistent, and there is little to suggest that the future will see major reductions in child poverty levels. Indeed, the projected rise in young single-parent households, who in many countries are particularly vulnerable to impoverishment given the severe difficulties they experience reconciling work and care commitments, certainly points in that direction. Also, it should be abundantly clear from the above sections that in the coming years both family configurations and family circumstances are likely to become increasingly diverse, and this in turn means that for all the childcare issues addressed here there is no one-size-fits-all solution. The mix of support will increasingly need to be tailored to a widening array of specific, individual requirements and circumstances.

12. *Affordable housing for young people:* The lack of affordable accommodation is frequently cited by young people as a major obstacle to marriage and/or starting a family. Recent years have seen house prices and rental accommodation in many OECD countries rise steeply. While the last year has brought prices down quite sharply in some cases, and demographics seem to suggest (in theory at least) a longer-term easing of house prices, it remains unclear whether for young first-time buyers housing prices will approach affordable levels again in the foreseeable future. If England is at all a guide to such matters, in 2007 average house prices were over 8 times average earnings (a ratio way above the long-term average of around 3.6). Much as a result, it is estimated that nearly 40% of first-time buyers aged under 30 now depend on help from family and friends to get started on the housing market.[34] Clearly in many countries there is likely to be a need for increased recourse to new investment in affordable housing and to schemes to facilitate access to accommodation for young people, e.g. shared ownership schemes, shared equity homes.

[34] UK Department for Communities and Local Government (2007)

Finally, as has become evident from earlier sections, there remain some important issues of measurement, analysis and foresight research.

13. *Measuring change in the family:* Current statistical and analytical approaches to measuring change in the family still focus on "households" and "marriage" , neither of which is an indicator capable of capturing the multifaceted developments going on at the various levels described above. Despite the emergence of a broad consensus in recent years that what defines "family" is the presence of children and no longer "marriage", the tendency is still to define families by where they live and by their marital status, so failing to reflect the increasing blurring of frontiers between various forms of partnership. Moreover, even at the level of "household" there is in many OECD countries a dearth of projections (national and internationally comparable). As Kloprogge (Annex III) underlines, given the enormous public budgets involved in supporting families and raising and educating children in the 21st century, it is surprising that so little effort is expended on gaining better insights into future developments in family structures and family life.

14. *Measuring the impacts of family change on public budgets* and on the economy more widely: Anticipating changes in the number, size and composition of households is important for many issues of social concern. For example, the living arrangements of the elderly are a key determinant of their needs for socioeconomic, physical and emotional assistance. Older persons who live alone are more likely to be poor than older persons who live with their spouses, and they have greater needs for health care. Projections of household growth and its composition by size are also crucial inputs to the development of housing policy for many state and local governments. In addition, much research stresses the importance of household characteristics, especially those linked to household lifecycle stages, for understanding saving and consumption patterns which may have substantial macro-economic effects. Furthermore, shifts in the distribution of households by type and size, through their effects on consumption patterns, have environmental consequences – land use, CO2 emissions, household energy use, transportation and water use. This latter, emerging line of work moves beyond the traditional approach of treating population size as the only relevant demographic variable when considering environmental impacts.[35]

5. Integrative Approaches to Family Policy and Youth Policy

All member countries of the EU as well as many other OECD countries have developed programmes for providing support to families. Overall, OECD countries' investment in services and financial benefits for families has increased considerably, rising from 1.6% of GDP in 1983 to 2.4% of GDP in 2003. But levels of spending differ widely across countries. The generosity of

[35] Jiang et al (2007)

Chart 1.1. **Public spending on families has increased in many countries since 1980**

Public social spending on family benefits, 1980 and 2003, as a percentage of GDP



Countries are ranked from left to right in terms of the highest to the lowest spending ratios in 2003.
Data for Turkey concern 1980 and 1999.

Source: OECD

the Nordic countries, for example, contrasts strongly with the modest spending levels of some southern European countries. Moreover, the key objectives of family policies vary considerably across the OECD area, too. Priority may be an increase in fertility rates, or reconciling work and family life, or combating family/child poverty, or assisting with childcare and education or aiming to achieve a better balance between men and women in the degree to which they perform household duties.

Importantly from the perspective of the report, policy approaches for families and children remain for the most part fragmented, and few countries have adopted an explicit and comprehensive family policy. Instead, most countries have an amalgam of programmes, policies and laws that are targeted at families with children.

Yet what emerges quite clearly from the preceding overview of future trends affecting young families and young people is that they face a multitude of highly complex, often interrelated pressures and changes over the next two decades which are likely to necessitate an overall redesign of family policies. As Fagnani explains in her paper in Annex II,"Family mainstreaming" should (…) come to the forefront with the integration of the family perspective into every stage of the policy process (design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation)."

A similar picture can be seen with respect to youth policies, where there are also significant differences in the approaches taken by OECD countries. These differences start already with the age bracket to be addressed by youth policies – while international legal documents use a range of 15-24, countries like the Netherlands and the United Kingdom opt for a range of 0-24/25 years of age. They continue with the fact that in some countries youth policy is centralised and in others decentralised. Furthermore, while some countries prefer to set a broad overarching framework, others choose a more pragmatic, short-term problem-solving perspective. But as Kloprogge (Annex III) notes, there is perhaps a natural trend for youth policies to integrate since they extend

over such a wide array of issues and thematic content that integration may be the only direction they can go. Progress is unlikely to be quick or easy, however. Bringing together such diverse strategies as

- Improving compatibility of family and work
- Achieving better co-operation between youth welfare services and schools
- Enhancing social and occupational integration of young people (including of migrant background) in social hotspots
- Promoting the supply and take-up of possibilities for non-formal and informal learning
- Modernising the vocational training system and curricula
- Modernising and Europeanising higher education

Will prove enormously challenging, not least because of the still rather fragmented, compartmentalised approaches that currently prevails in the domain of youth policy.

A cautionary word on the desirable degree of policy integration is in order. As Kloprogge is quick to underline, "integrated youth policies are not always better or more efficient than less integrated youth policies. Depending on the scope of the policies, the quality of the social infrastructure and the availability of budgets, it may be wiser to choose a limited or less integrated youth policy. But (…) in the long term the importance of providing a good future for young people for the social and economic development of a country may call for youth policies that are as integrated as possible under the prevailing circumstances."

6. Conclusions and Further Work

The purpose of this report is to assess whether there is value added to be gained from an exercise that would explore likely changes in family structures and family relations over the next twenty years or so, evaluate their wider socio-economic impacts, and reflect on their possible implications for family policy and youth policy.

On the basis of the preliminary research and analysis carried out here, and in the light of consultations with a number of Member governments, foundations and corporations conducted during 2008, there would seem to be significant interest in a more detailed treatment of the theme. Interviewees (with one or two noteworthy exceptions) considered the topic highly relevant, timely and useful. Moreover, the search to identify similar projects on this theme going on or recently completed at international conferences, research institutes or in international organisations (see Annex IV) suggests that relatively little effort is being invested elsewhere to pursue this topic – quite surprising in view of the potential significance for government budgets, public policy and society more generally. The OECD – and specifically the International Futures Programme -- would appear to be well suited as the vehicle for implementing such an exercise given the Organisation's wide range of international expertise in relevant areas and the IFP's long track record in long-term foresight activities and multidisciplinary approaches.

The core idea – to be further developed – would be to launch a 1 ½ year project that approached the theme of The Future of the Family along two parallel strands: 1) a foresight exercise using projections/forecasts but also scenarios (to take better account of the major uncertainties of a long-term time horizon) aiming to piece together a more detailed and comprehensive picture of future family change in OECD countries, perhaps organised around more in depth analysis of some of the key challenges and issues identified in section 4; 2) in light of the changes emerging in the long-term family landscape over the coming years, and recognising the complex interrelations of the many issues at stake, consider what steps could be taken to achieve a more integrated response in family policy and youth policy.

The project would be financed by voluntary contributions from governments, foundations and corporations.

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ANNEX I

The Role of ICTs in Shaping the Family of the Future

A paper prepared for the OECD International Futures Programme (IFP)

by

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Contents

Overview

The evolution and increasing use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) has many impacts on the family including the structure of the family itself, relationships between family members, work-life relationships and entertainments. This paper explores the deep impacts on the family of future uses of ICTs, which by 2030 may change the family and its everyday existence in significant ways.

Certainly ICTs can have reinforcing affects in uniting families as well as possible introduction of more disturbing affects, outlined briefly in the final section. However what we would emphasise are some far deeper impacts on the future family's uses of ICTs, which by 2030 will change the family and its everyday existence in more significant ways. These are principally concerned with bringing the hospital into the home, telecare for the aged and infirm, distance education and teleworking. Other areas such as e-government have so far had limited effect, but may be amenable to new relations between the family and the government in the future, depending on the government's view of its role in relation to the citizen.

To a large extent today, the penetration of digital technologies is led by pricing for consumers, be it in services or for devices. The pricing of two major technologies – television and Internet access – at the most popularist level are today's drivers for ICT take-up and change and for the near future. However this will change over the next two decades, as remote digital working and use of ICTs in the home for organisational reasons, with teleworking, social networking, support, health and care come to the forefront, in hand with education of the mass of the population in more advanced applications and a much deeper use of ICTs.

1. The family and ICTs

The family is a fundamental building block of society. Its use of ICTs underpins the transition to a knowledge-based society. Innovative applications of ICT for use by the family as a unit create opportunities for the family to relate in new ways and also to experience and do things together. Similarly, a use of ICT to foster 'healthy' external relationships may contribute to the overall stability of the family. The questions and issues that arise from the interaction of the family and ICTs are examined below, including an understanding that there may be factors attributable to ICTs that threaten to destabilise the family and need to be addressed, as unstable families create long-term social and economic problems.

1.1 What is meant by ICTs in the family?

Over the past few decades, several general effects of mobile, Internet and other ICTs on family life and its structure and relationships, have emerged. Our analysis centres on the key ICTs in use in families, and then examines their impacts. We see family structure and relationships being changed by nine major types of ICT, among many other lesser forms, which may increasingly include services as much as devices:

15. Mobile phones

16. Internet access – but in concert with its access devices, such as desktop PCs and laptops, and now mobile phones and PDAs (e.g. Blackberry type devices) and with a multitude of web application services such as Facebook, MySpace, etc

17. Music recording devices

18. Image recording – digital photography and family video

19. Televisions and recorded video machines and media

20. Fixed line telephony in OECD countries

21. Embedded ICTs in home appliances, from fridges to vacuum cleaners to cars

22. Introduction of far more intense forms of ICT systems for specific purposes

23. Home working and teleworking ICT devices and applications

Often their use is still evolving, frequently in unexpected ways. Importantly, the major areas of ICT take-up for the family of the future are less significant in the purely consumer segments for convenience and entertainment. Instead they will be overwhelmingly in the introduction of far more intense forms of ICT systems for specific purposes (i.e. health, support for the elderly, education) as expanded on in the relevant sections below.

1. 2 Impact of ICT on definition of the family

Family culture is changing in terms of what people do: numerous studies have concluded that families do things differently as a result of ICT.[36] The blurring of boundaries between work-home-education-leisure is changing the nature of the family home as these functions expand. Therefore, patterns of family life are also altered. This raises questions about the subsequent impact on family culture, with culture being defined as being "the way we do things". Participants in a recent study did not believe that the family was a natural unit; instead, they felt it was one that is defined by action – 'by the things we do together'.[37] A family culture emerges that is rooted in activities being performed as a family, now activities related to ICT, which is a culture of information, information, difficulties and experience sharing, also pleasure-seeking but with more autonomy.

The questions remain of whether an ICT based culture strengthens the family unit or weakens it. The literature points to neither being universally true, but that impacts are case based. In particular the implications for the younger members of the family and their relationships within the family and between generations are of key interest. A culture of privacy and separateness may emerge, in which the family does different things, often more individually and privately – i.e. personal screens in personal spaces in personal worlds. In more and more homes, the child's bedroom becomes an ICT centre, excluding other family members and for far more hours of the day. It also may extend for far longer in life, as the rise in house prices in many OECD countries means that

[36] E.g., see Loos (2008) and Silverstone (2005).
[37] Ibid.

children reside at home for longer, or even return to the home – perhaps into their twenties and early thirties, e.g. in Italy, France and the UK.

Certain conditions and technologies lead families to converge around a technology such as an entertainment centre with stored media (DVD) while others such as mobile communications may tend towards divergence. Interesting parameters to research here concerning ICT usage in the home include: comparative analysis of how families spent their time before ICT usage against how they spend it now, with ICT in the home, i.e. use of conventional forms of leisure – television, stereo, radio, films and how they are changed by becoming more ICT based. Also of interest is how the tale up of ICT by families affects the way leisure time is used outside the home, e.g. time spent shopping in malls, on sporting activities, at the theatre and cinema, dining out, travel, and so on. More specifically, we need to understand who in the family uses what and for what and for how long.[38]

1.3 ICT shaping the family

ICT enables people to change what they do. However, a key question is whether it also changes who they are. If ICT continues to change the functional (or doing) aspects of family life, possibly it can also change individual members of the family. Ultimately, it is our value systems that define who we are and how we behave.

The visible aspects of cultures are behaviours. However, it is the invisible aspects – the underlying values – that influence behaviours. Therefore, a key question is what new behavioural and value models are likely to emerge in family cultures where ICT is a dominant force. Behaviours and values are thus of interest as the issue at a societal level is whether an imbalance of ICT use by individuals in the family will give rise to 'adverse' behaviours, attitudes and personal values that are inconsistent with healthy family values: isolation, withdrawal, disconnection, secrecy, addiction, including obesity and anaemia may be examples of this. Moreover, there is an issue of whether sub-cultures emerge and to what extent is ICT a contributor to what has been described as a 'cheating culture', i.e. a culture defined by anti-social behaviour, cheating and fraud. Does ICT therefore have adverse impacts on family values and on the socialisation of children? This has been the subject of widespread research in commercial, academic, government studies, surveys, statistics on the impacts of ICT on the family, specifically for:

- The psychological and behavioural impact on children, marriage and family
- Psychological impact of online communications and relationships
- Impact of games on children
- Internet fraud, bullying, violence, misrepresentations
- Healthy as against pathological uses of ICTs – 'cyber-addictions': cyber-relationship addiction, net compulsion, information overload, games addiction
- Cyber-psychology and behaviour

There is a large volume of relevant literature: in summary, the findings are generally that over-use of ICTs, especially in adolescence and pre-adolescence, can lead in some cases to isolation from the family,

[38] E.g., see Haddon (2005), also Loos (2008) and Silverstone (2005).

internalisation of feelings leading to failure to develop normal modes of expression. This can strain or break family relationships. The incidence of anti-social behaviour and even stimulation of violent behaviour is the subject of much research on gaming. This research has led to the ban in some OECD countries of certain violent games, although the research generally finds that there is no causal link between playing violent video games and increased aggression and violent behaviour in reality.

1.4 Family dynamics and relationships

The evolution of ICT in the home will inevitably reshape how families interact and relate to each other. Currently the shifts in traditional family roles affecting the dynamics between parents and children are being explored as they are redefined by texting on mobile phones, e-mail, social networking sites (Facebook, etc) leading to new parent–child models of relationships in the future. For instance, the 'family website' is one manifestation that has appeared since 2000, on which news and 'trophy' downloads are shared, but this is still relatively rare (Carmagnat, 2008). In France for instance, there are perhaps a few hundred thousand, often set up by the mother on the birth of a child and administered by one family member who tends to dominate the website contents and access.

New dynamic models of the family come from instances of ICT relationships created outside the family unit which then impact the internal family dynamics, in that the core family unit changes or expands as a result. For example, children's communications with estranged parents following separation or divorce, inter-generational relationships, interaction with displaced relatives and with unrelated family members expands in a space unfettered by distance or the organisation of physical meetings and the prohibition of other family members. Contacts with 'external members' open up choices, and thus options of strengthening or weakening the basic family unit, as the fostering of external relationships can threaten relationships inside the family. Some relationships are more conducive to being conducted with ICT. Others may be eroded by the technology.

Key issues highlighted by research include whether ICT in the home has the potential to divide the family, as well as to breed adverse behaviours and destructive values that undermine the family. Here there is a quite diverse literature including studies on impacts of ICT on extended families and their communication patterns of ICT usage within the extended family, use of ICT in post-divorce families and on families with geographical separation using the Internet – the patterns of communication in migrant communities.

1.5 Changing family relationships through mobile phones

Mobile communication is far more accessible than fixed line communication. The mobile handset is the telecommunications equivalent of the car, which can join the telecommunications 'highway' from anywhere there is coverage. And the service accessing mechanism, the handset, is in private ownership, a possession.

This is really the first time that such a technical device has become a companion for so many, a new facet of living every day, and it has happened so quickly. It has entered the personal sphere, of objects normally carried (e.g. keys, wallet, money, etc) but has a far more active and emotionally attached role. It gives users the impression that they are constantly connected to the world outside, and therefore less alone, so both physical and emotional attachment to mobile handsets is high.

Moreover, access is higher because rollout is far faster than for the fixed telephone, owing to the lighter physical support infrastructure. The local loop is instantaneous with base-station commissioning, and only demands construction of a fixed 'core' (or trunk backhaul) network, which can be quite rapid especially if an existing trunk infrastructure can be used to some extent. Thus, the trend in consumption of telecommunications and its supporting infrastructure is to ever more mobile communications.

In many OECD states, the total number of active mobile subscriptions now exceeds the population; on average in the OECD there are 80 mobile subscriptions per 100 population.[39] In some cases individual members of the family may have more than one handset, e.g. one for work and one for personal use. Over the past decade, mobile phones have steadily increased penetration among children and the age at which the first mobile is obtained has fallen. Now it is common for every member of the family to have their own mobile phone, from pre-teens to grandparents. The mobile phone signifies personality and has become a part of individual identity and increasingly people rely on their mobile phone as the main device to make phone calls. Italy has the highest number of mobile-only households at nearly 40%). Around a third of all households in Poland are mobile-only followed by a quarter of all Spanish households and a fifth of homes in the Republic of Ireland (Ofcom, 2008, Market report).

But there is another side to mobile service – originally seen as toy for the wealthy, mobile now signifies the opposite of rich affluence. Mobile use in the family has evolved in behaviour patterns towards high control of spending, especially for pre-teen, teen and younger adults in families and especially for poorer families with the pay-as-you-go mode of expenditure. This drove take-up of a previous luxury-only item and service into the mainstream of societies in Italy, Portugal, Spain and into the occasional users and lower middle and poorest depths in all OECD countries.

Increasingly, a further facet of the mobile phone is more important within the family than just communication – its digital camera. For both still shots and videos, downloaded to a laptop/desktop and printed, uploaded to a social networking site or family website, it forms an increasingly important tool for recording events and memories. Mobile phones bring instantaneity, immediacy and fun. They reinforce social groupings by giving a tangible digital record of inter-relationships, exchangeable between media types, storage types and presentation environments. The media form is far more versatile and thus ubiquitous than the traditional *argentique* of still photography or amateur film. It has brought the advantages of film and camcorders into the reach of nearly all families at low cost with constant availability as the camera instrument is always on the person. Interestingly transmission between handsets of videos and still shots via MMS (Multimedia Messaging System) is much rarer – there is an aura of expense around MMS that has kept them relatively unknown, compared to say text messaging via SMS.

1.6 The rise of SMS and texting

Driven by pricing and control of spending, a second and more important transition has occurred, from voice communications to mobile text messaging for many families, which was quite unexpected by the mobile operators (MNO), in traffic volume, or their incredible margins (typically over 600%). This is now a decade-old paradigm, especially aimed at the younger user (and not just as they have smaller fingers suited to mobile keyboards) for those who want asynchronous communications – as a less-disruptive communication mode – at low cost. SMS has bred a dedicated set of initially younger users but now far more age-groups, who use texting and variations with instant messaging (IM) continually, to form what has been referred to as 'thumb culture' (Glotz *et al.*, 2005).

1.7 The unwired home

We are also seeing the 'taming' of technology with somewhat different use, but perhaps more intensively than was originally anticipated. Trends in the home include multiple personal computers, increasingly networked wirelessly and to the Internet. In the past few years, as prices have fallen and as wireless technology

[39] OECD Key ICT Indicators,
http://www.oecd.org/document/23/0,3343,en_2649_34449_33987543_1_1_1_1,00.html

has become more reliable and convenient, sales of laptop computers have exceeded those of desktop PCs. Also, the laptop, with increasingly better media performance for full motion video displays, finer resolution screens and higher fidelity audio is gradually becoming the TV – or 'home AV media station' – in some families. For example when family members miss a programme they may then watch it over the Internet, possibly via a laptop, in a replay version, downloaded from the TV station's website where broadcast programmes are stored – as in the BBC's iPlayer service. Thus family members may watch less TV and less shared TV but are informed if something is good and then watch it, in deferred time on a laptop itself, or using the laptop to drive one of the home's large flat TV screens.

Moreover the home network makes it possible for the family to dispense with the home's fixed line telephone – especially for long distance – replacing it with VoIP (eg Skype). This is still uncommon as it requires a degree of technological competence that may not always be present but nevertheless it is becoming easier and it is a growing phenomenon.

Thus we see several drivers evolving in family use:

- Use of cheaper modes of communications, whenever possible – now based on high bandwidth networking
- Moving from broadcast programming schedules to personal schedules – expansion of choice and convenience
- Heavier dependence on ICTs, not as computing machines, but purely as entertainment display devices – a taming of what has been a highly technical and relatively powerful computer into a convenient leisure appliance.

1.8 Family Internet dependence

Behaviour patterns in the family are and will be changed through Internet access initially by the young but increasingly by other family members. The rise in Internet use has grown via technical catalysts which ease the difficulties of its human interface – principally the browser and to some extent, broadband connection – as well as some killer applications:

- E-mail, the first major application, from 1973
- Search engines, with the browser from about 1998
- Social networking, with media and video use, from about 2003
- Shared websites – community or family

The impact has been to modify traditional behaviours with respect to decisions and information searches, as well as socialising the Internet. Internet-triggered changes in family patterns of living include:[40]

- Education, health care and elderly care being revised by Internet access – as we explore in following sections.

[40] All figures, OECD (2008).

- Over 25% on average of Internet users ordered goods via the Internet; in Japan this rises to over 50% of all adults.

- Some 30% on average of adults in OECD countries use some form of Internet banking. In the Nordic countries this rises to over 50%. Thus family finances are increasingly managed in the Internet space today and so absolute Internet dependence rises.

- Some 18% of Internet users in the OECD, on average, have created their own content – as web pages – rising to one third in South Korea. This includes specific family websites.

- Internet telephony (VoIP) is growing rapidly – Skype users went up 50 times from 2004 to 2007 with 267 million users.

- Government relations with business and their citizens have changed using the Internet. In the EU-15, on average 43% of firms of over 10 persons returned government forms via the Internet, and over 70% in Finland and Greece. In the OECD in 2007, on average 30% of citizens accessed government websites, for information, or to exchange forms by the Internet. The figure below illustrates the growth of lifestyle changes for ordinary citizens:

Figure 1. Internet impacts in everyday life



The ICT environment in which the family exists is linked to how pervasive will the Internet become. Internet use is expanding into new social segments – for the elderly and for women in all countries – and where currently it is less prevalent to become similar to take-up by the younger generations, especially by children where take-up is currently fastest. Take-up by the elderly is hardly new – Internet usage studies of retired people in Los Angeles in 1993-1994 showed a strong drive to use email to combat loneliness and build an electronic community (Bikson 1995).

Across all the countries surveyed by Ofcom in 2007 (Ofcom, 2008) more women than men used the Internet. There may be a cultural divide in that some countries the social barriers for women in work and social access are higher. Some 56% of Italian women use the Internet compared to 44% of Italian men. Japanese and Spanish women follow at 55%, with the UK and France having an equal gender split. The Internet may provide equal access and thus an avenue to greater freedom to find information, markets and services, so notably, women in the USA, show a different pattern, at 48% compared with 52% of men using the Internet.

Most importantly the Internet is creating new jobs, whole industries and activities and new patterns of work such as telecommuting. Over 14% of Internet users in the OECD, on average, have used the Internet for finding a job, rising to 20% in Finland, Denmark and Norway. In the OECD community, three quarters of businesses of 10 or more employees had their own website in 2007. In Japan, Finland, Sweden and Denmark this rose to over 90%. It affects the family in two major ways – the channel that family members use to access to suppliers of goods and services and the use of the company website as a home working tool, examined further when we analyse the working environment and its family impacts. For many home chores requiring information seeking, the Internet is now key.

Thus of critical importance is the question of exclusion, of some people being left out – the poor, the elderly, the disadvantaged and women. If the Internet is gradually becoming everyone's constant electronic companion, then this raises all kinds of questions – for instance, *'what gender is the Internet'* even becomes a relevant and interesting one (McCormack, 1998).

2. Relevant new technologies in the pipeline for the family

A large range of new technologies is waiting to assault – or support – the family: broadband mobile communication as the Internet gateway for the masses; the Internet of Things in the home; the next generation Internet including accessing applications over the web in 'Web 2.0' mode for end-user constructed applications and services. Naturally the family may well also succumb to a tsunami of variations on device themes such as projected keyboards, as well as projection displays, HDTV (Starks, 2007), e-readers and e-paper, perpetual visualisation with bifocals meaning glasses split between real worlds and virtual reality environments and location finding and so on. In all of these we have to understand just why they might succeed. What will be the new technologies can be judged on three criteria that have been used in past studies of needs analysis of consumers and in the family if utility against cost and accessibility ie how easily is it available (including ease of use) and where is it available. This has been studied for telecommunications services (Forge et al, 2005), as shown below:

Figure 2. The take-up of telecommunications services historically depends on whether they move into the high take-up space on the three dimensions



2.1 A move towards more bandwidth in the home

There will be a trend towards higher bandwidth infrastructures, initially driven by the need for Internet access. In the UK for instance, the market-led offerings of broadband with mobile, using a USB transceiver for 3G mobile and a SIM card has led to 87% coverage of the UK, for an average of 130 Euros/month (£104) when bundled with subscriber pay-TV access (Ofcom, 2008; Bradshaw, 2008)). Multimedia will tend to replace plain vanilla voice to some extent, although this will be a slow transition. Voice and SMS will still tend to dominate, especially in the developing world, as they are the enduring basic services with key needs in the low-end market. Only a slow transition from these two basic services can be expected, into downloaded music, video games, both networked and downloaded, possibly limited usage of DVB-H TV video programmes, etc, over mobile broadband links as consumer disposable income rises in the most affluent customer segments globally.

In summary we see a move to broadband content which requires support for isochronous media (audio, video and data where packet order, and delays are important) requiring careful packet management in assembly and disassembly. This move to broadband emphasises what might be called '3-dimensional convergence' – that is the convergence of fixed and mobile communications, of audiovisual media with telecommunications and thirdly data with voice. The coupling of these three trends underlines all ICT development over broadband for the next two decades for the family. They expand the richness and utility of applications based. They make everything two mobile – decades of changing family life through ICT mobility.

2.2 The Internet goes mobile

One new facet that the original Internet never was really designed for was mobility of its interacting agents, both clients and servers. The mobile Internet market has been marked by hype for a decade, with analysts constantly claiming imminent take off. Finally this seems to be happening across the world, as it first did in Japan where mobile has been a leading Internet access medium for over five years with offerings such as NTT DoCoMo's i-mode. The mobile handset is now possibly on its way to becoming the dominant global Internet platform. In 2006, 28% of mobile service users worldwide browsed the Internet on a wireless handset. Japan leads the way, up slightly from 25 per cent at the end of 2004, with France and the UK exhibiting the strongest growth. In 2008, estimates indicate that that 15 per cent of users in the USA had accessed Internet content on their mobile phones. Eventually, as mobile network broadband capacity expands and data prices fall for mobile access, Internet access on desktop PCs and on mobiles may become equal, then mobile access may overtake. Today desktop Internet access and search exceeds mobile by a ratio of 3:1 (Salz, 2008).

Moreover there are many market trends in the mobile Internet segment as the pace of change accelerates with the somewhat late arrival of the mobile Internet over broadband links with HSU/DPA UTMS. These range from content issues such as digital rights management (DRM), to ease of mobile browsing, the role of mobile network operators (MNOs) with constraining strategies such as walled gardens, to the basics of just what is 'search' in a mobile context – and what should the search engine be looking for. The desire for instant Internet results may be far higher with mobile usage. Rather than just browsing for information, mobile Internet usages are likely to place more emphasis on providing services, e.g. pointing in geographic directions, and generally performing in a far more active manner than the static Internet. This is quite different to the passive web search on a desktop PC. In the real commercial world, the mobile Internet strategy becomes allied with the mobile network operator's struggle for new revenues in extended average revenue per user.

2.3 Other Internet trends

Looking out further we see many possibly significant trends. Software as a service, i.e. abandoning purchased applications, be it for games or office applications, has been promised for decades but now may appear, to bring new software balances of power over the Internet. This is the role of Google's Chrome web-browser, in loosening the hold of the dominant software publisher, where the web-browser becomes the operating system. It implies that the end of an era of software technology due to proprietary market dominance may be slowly coming. Issues include: open platforms v closed (e.g. Android vs. iPhone) for the domestic market; the future of television – HDTV, IPTV; novel networks– sensor networks of all types, body area networks, smart clothing and wearable computing, femtocells; what does next generation mobile (4G) promise and what will the industry actually deliver; ICTs in home appliances, including the car; evolution of key ICT components such as displays and new communications services and devices such as e-paper/ e-readers for home education; using technology in unexpected ways in the family – e.g. hacking the Wii gamer.

2.4 The future family and the Internet of Things

In later years, beyond 2015, an increasing component of Internet traffic is expected to be machine-to-machine communications and transactions over the Internet especially in industrial applications such as supply chain, process control and also in financial transactions for person to machine. An 'Internet of things' will grow up. Machine-to-machine communications for industrial and consumer functions and person-to-machine, for instance to make purchases, will be increasingly an everyday event. The impact on the family will be to increase its forms of automated contact with commercial concerns, in some ways 'the family's supply chain' as well as communications with family members.

The intelligent, caring fridge, the dialling washing machine and the worried car – desirable or dreadful disasters?

Machine to machine Internet links could have impacts on the family – mundane shopping might become automated to some extent – with a refrigerator that reads the RFID tags on its contents and detects their sell-by date approaching and gives warning and can also connect to the Internet to re-order items as selected by the family for delivery by the favoured supermarket.

A parallel development is the washing machine that detects from level detectors in the cartons of washing powders and conditioners, that they are low and new ones need to be ordered, communicated by a short range wireless link. So the washing machine dials up the Internet and place its online order with supermarket. The interesting question here is should such machines also pay for the order, by their own allotted stored credit, or from the family credit cards?

A further example is a car that tells you what is wrong with it now, what will soon go wrong in the near future and also what actually happened at the garage when it was serviced or repaired. Going further development, it could also dial the garage, make an appointment look for cheaper parts on the Internet, or a cheaper garage and order the parts for the garage.

This is all based on machine-to-machine (M2M) communications or the Internet of Things – possibly a technological revolution that it represents the future of computing and communications in some domains. But it requires further development in a great many fields, from machine comprehension of situations and reactive behaviour to wireless sensors and nanotechnology.

But what is the real *family* need for the Internet of Things – are these at all useful? Certainly they seem to be. But scenarios of analysis of these appliances acting as 'web agents' or netbots indicates that their use can bring catastrophe if their proxy power of intervention is too high – even ordering from the supermarket is fraught with problems. What if the new items have had their RFID tags annulled by accident, so the fridge re-orders as it cannot detect the presence of a new delivery on the inert RFID tags, or perhaps its own RFID reader has failed yet it still continues, as if nothing has happened, re-ordering into eternity. All these agent usages require strong failure detection and back-up checks, and perhaps back-up systems. However the car model might possibly be more useful to the family – for some family members, taking the car to the garage is ranked with visits to the dentist and for some, even divorce, as painful, stressful experiences. Alleviating the social (and financial) pressures of car failure by warning and easily understood information does have a role. The car industry is not so enthusiastic, preferring hi-tech gadgets to steer the car without driver intervention, presence locks that immobilize the car without its owner and advanced computer control of its engine ('telematics') while trying to make the car into an entertainment centre and website. All of these have a high profit margins while drastically increasing the mandatory obsolescence rates, as most sensors in exposed environments have a brief lifetime, usually 3-5 years, whatever is the warranty period, vs. the 16 year previous average lifetime of a car in OECD countries such as those in Europe.

In general, this is an 'agency problem' in a new light –really an active agent that acts by proxy for the family and could have the power to disrupt family life when things go wrong.

2.5 Further in the future – exploring new ICT interfaces for the family

One of the major barriers to the spread of technology has been its lack of accessibility – the need for some level expert knowledge. A car in 1900 required a mechanic's skills to start and drive it. We are still there, with computing and more advanced communication devices, despite a decade of hopefully advancing with 'web 2.0' technology – making a website can be done but most people would rather leave it a 'web mechanic'. But as the

technology advances, so the machine can transfer sophisticated technical knowledge from the user to itself. Effectively the machine is capable of handling its own complexities, so human-literate computational devices can replace computer-literate humans. Interpretation of human requirements is required at two levels – the mechanics of speech and sight and in the "ergonomic semantics" of the interface – literally making the HIFE simple to do a lot, far more than a first–time user could expect. The sum of these two will allow "naïve" users, especially the aged and children, to navigate in an electronic networked world now grown as big and as complex as the real world, and all accessible from a terminal device in the palm of the hand – perhaps an everyday mobile handset, with augmented HIFE devices for learning. Initially, requirements for improved access are with new sensorial interfaces – specifically speech recognition and translation, and perhaps scene interpretation and gestures.

Text entry by speech and spoken command interfaces have been advancing quite slowly for 30 years, with the WIMPS interface having changed very little over the last 20 years. The mainstream ICT industry itself is quite lacking in HIFE innovation – for instance Google's technical teams can think of future interfaces that include accelerometers as found in the Nintendo Wii for gestual input but their overall rethinking of interfaces is surprisingly mundane (Raman 2008). However a combination of several different approaches (neural networks and probabilistic algorithms) might lead to far better than the 98% hit rate of the best current schemes (6 errors per page of text). The second step, for more advanced developments in ergonomic semantics, lead on to understanding the user's characteristics, behaviour patterns, wishes, and motives and also requires that the machine be capable of training itself – so neural networks with other parallel probabilistic assessment mechanisms might figure highly in new interfaces. Only these access mechanisms will open the technology to all ages and all levels of education. Presentation interfaces may well advance more slowly but the next versions of virtual reality and holography as 3D TV might become important for immersive education – virtual training environments, virtual visits and meetings, perhaps after 2015/ 2020, brought into the home.

2.6 Taming ICTs – the family is the hacker for home-made services and devices

One of the great cries of the Web 2.0 hype is that 'mashups' from various Internet services. This can be done, but at the moment by programmers, and usually badly, especially in terms of security, standardisation and ease of use of the combination of software and services (Maximilien, 2008). The interesting question on progress in ICTs is whether such a concept could ever become much easier and accessible by all, especially the family, mixing services from various websites such as social networks e.g. combining Flickr photos, Facebook social lists with gaming sites perhaps, to form new social games for just the family. Devices could also be constructed from mobiles, games players, web-surfing consoles, if they were made functionally reprogrammable in a simple way. For example the Chumbly WiFi Internet access console has been hacked into a 'kitchen assistant' appliance for cooking timer, recipe base, music player, photo-frame, calendar etc (Bartholomew, 2008) while others have hacked the Nintendo Wii to turn into a gestual digital assistant.

3. Family cohesion

A major domain for social research is how existing and new ICTs affect social networking, including family cohesion. This relies on uses of social networking and also business networking – and with them come culture changes such as the drive in the use of ICT towards internalisation of everyday life, making the home the centre, yet at the same spreading the net of contacts worldwide, at low cost and high convenience. Against internalisation of the family, through global networking we have reinforcement of closeness even intimacy but over ICT channels. Perhaps the most striking phenomenon is the rapid appearance of the mobile phone at the heart of the family. Policies focused cohesion, on reinforcing family values of being and doing things together for instance, may strengthen a healthy family culture.

3.1 Mobile social networking and the family

For family cohesion, the mobile phone is very positive, for ubiquitous contact for security and comfort (Srivastava, 2004). It allows parents and children to stay in touch with each other throughout the day so that increasingly complicated lives can be managed effectively. It may also provide a support network in extreme situations, e.g. for abused children or spouses. It also extends and deepens family contact when children leave the family home. For instance, students away at college or university may now keep in regular contact with parents and family members in ways that were previously unheard of because of the previous lack of access to fixed line telephones and the inconvenience involved. Mobile phones also support migrant families not only by allowing regular contact but also enabling other services, such as easy and cheap remittance of money back home. They encourage new rituals of usage – such as texts or voice calls on arrival at an airport or railway station during a period away, or chatting via texting throughout the day, strengthening social bonds in the family (Ling, 2008).

The collective identity of mobile networks in their innate instantaneity becomes more pronounced. Mobile users are not only part of a technology network, but also of a novel social one. But in so doing, the collective identity of a family or people living in the same dwelling has been diluted through the use of member's individual mobile phones. With the mobile handset, a person is being called regardless of place, in contrast with the fixed line phone, where an incoming call rings in the home, no matter which person is being called. Thus the home or office is no longer the access point to the person – the person becomes the access point directly. Mobile phones thus enable family members to act in their own 'at-home' environment regardless of where they find themselves.

Today, each family member may be contacted directly and privately on their mobile phone, by their respective friends and the family, giving new communication freedoms. Each family member builds their own circle, choosing other friends and acquaintances to include in their network, and thereby constructing their own 'mobile network identity'. This social network in certain societies may be in constant evolution. For instance, an anecdotal example is the teenage girl in Japan – her mobile phone number may change every three months, because that is how fast her social network as a set of friends changes. Also, with a greater multiplicity of channels, the identity of the family unit becomes less about a single entity. Note that with the decreasing use of a central fixed line telephone, parents for instance, speak less to their children's friends and classmates, and vice versa for the parent's friends, than they did in the past. Thus, unity, but also individual family member isolation, due to perhaps a lower place in the phone-answering hierarchy within the family, gives way to a multiplicity of personalised parallel channels, with their multiple attendant social networks focused on each family member.

Soon after they appeared, mobile handsets became fashion accessories rather than simple communications devices, to be worn like accessories, either complete devices (e.g. the original Motorola Razr in Italy) or a Bluetooth earpiece. Since the early 1990s, manufacturers have offered a wide array of brightly coloured handset covers, to individualise and match the user's outfit. Whether in Japan Europe, Asia or the USA, some mobile users personalise their mobile phone with stickers and colourful beaded accessories. Fashionable wallpaper is downloaded to enhance the look of the mobile screen. Naturally, 'designer mobiles' soon appeared with sleeker appearances, perhaps embedded with precious stones and leather or fur covers, for every occasion and mood, with prices in the range of expensive jewellery accessories – broaches, bracelets, earrings, necklaces – because that is what they are now. Of course, these expensive handsets only appeal to a tiny minority but is indicative of a general trend in attitude towards mobile phone as fashion statement. It mainly manifests itself for typical users in a desire to have the latest and most desirable handset with more and better features. In Europe the average

replacement cycle of handsets is about two years, with one in four getting a new phone every year. For teenagers, about 40% replace their phone every year.[41]

Let us take a snapshot of the evolution in mobile ICT dependence for a next generation of users – for instance, teenagers and mobile. This is happening with mobile even in the USA (an area of ICT where the USA has tended to lag some years behind Asia and Europe):

Where are we going? – The teen social view of mobile in suburban USA

The mobile phone is now the second most important status symbol among US teenagers, behind clothing, according to a new study[42] spearheaded by the USA CTIA, a wireless industry association, which examined teen trends and tastes.

Almost all of the teens said they acquired their first mobile device while still in elementary (primary) school, with most now on their second, third or fourth new device. All rely on their phones to interact with their families as well as their friends. One in three teens now play mobile games or browse the mobile web, while one in five are social networking (note that in Europe or Asia, especially Japan, all figures would be much higher). The US teen view is that we are in the middle of a multi/omni-media revolution. Other findings of the CTIA teen study, conducted in association with Harris Interactive: 47% said their social life would end without mobile communications; 33% said they have used their phones to help others in trouble. The teen panellists criticised data pricing, battery life, premium download pricing and inferior user interfaces and devices' mobile applications, giving high marks to Apple's iPhone for this. The most desired features include shock and water proofing (81 %), endless power (80%), privacy screen (58%), flexible material that folds into different shapes and sizes (39%) and artificial intelligence (38%)

3. 2 ICT social networking

Learning to use a new technology is akin to learning a new language so it is not surprising that younger users – teenagers but even sometimes those under 10 years old, are first movers. They have an ability to absorb, learn and adopt more quickly, especially as there are no innate barriers of tradition or suspicion – this is ultimate in naïve users. Naturally this divides the family into more apt learners/leaders – those who are young adults, adolescent and pre-adolescent – and their older followers. It tends to construct or reinforce generational barriers. Older adults have to relearn how to learn a new language and a new world with different communication values. Generally, take-up of social networking is growing rapidly – some 50% of UK Internet users in 2007 accessed social networking sites, growing 11% over 2006 with 55% in Canada (highest in the world) (Ofcom, 2008). With the rising popularity of social networking sites, people are increasingly using social networking sites as a communications by finding medium, and then to stay in touch with other people, rather than using email or instant messenger services. At least half of all UK and Canadian adults use the Internet for social networking. Mobile social networking has also taken off in the UK and the US, with application developers adapting interfaces to suit mobile screens – 0.8m UK and over 4 million US mobile subscribers now access social networking sites on their phones (Ofcom, 2008).

[41] Telephia European Subscriber and Device Report, http://www.3g.co.uk/PR/May2006/3022.htm

[42] A panel session, with seven young people between the ages of 13 and 19 answering questions about their wireless behaviours. Trip Hawkins, CEO of mobile entertainment developer Digital Chocolate, moderated the panel at CTIA 2008, for panel discussion during the CTIA Wireless I.T. and Entertainment 2008 event in San Francisco, Sept 2008. "You guys should all text your kids," one girl advised CTIA attendees.

Unquestioning acceptance of Internet use for social networking is the norm among the young – the trust, or naivety, in the 'the net' is something that is only encountered elsewhere in quite closed business networks, such as Linked-in. It is a move that embraces the accessibility globally of participants, to form a new sort of community. Social networking tends to reinforce the globalisation of a generation that does not just count its friends as being in the same town or village but accepts they may also come from almost anywhere in the world, with new 'friends' met in online gaming or chat rooms, for instance. Low cost Internet chat, instant messaging and VoIP telephony with Skype laptop-to-laptop typically is becoming more common. In the coming years we are likely to see these behaviours spread more widely as communication costs effectively fall to near-zero levels, whether it be just to the next street, or across the Atlantic, for an hour with a webcam. The move is to strongly embrace low-cost communications in real time (voice and video), or asynchronously with a rich choice in messaging or in deferred time through website of personal promotions as a form of communication but also for job-seeking, partner-seeking etc. This is a dimension that seems to exclude the family by expanding the global expansion of external 'facetime' contacts but generally reinforces it as an extra internal communications channel. In the future more of the same can be expected but moving more to higher end mobile handsets so the iPhone, Google/ Android /Chrome G1, etc become the interface for the young and subsequently for all. Thus, seemingly, it is the young who dominate these electronic social networks. However, in fact given access and an introduction, the utility at low cost has been taken up enthusiastically by all ages. For older family members, these communication options enable them to pursue personal choices, e.g. retirement to a warmer climate in a foreign country, without feeling so isolated.

3. 3 Classifying family cultures with ICT and the range of family ICT environments

In classifying family culture with ICTs we may discern several distinct family types:

Table 1. Categorising family cultures and ICT usage

Type	Characteristics	Use of ICTs
Communications rich	The family is linked by all forms of communications, but each member has their own circle so there are many 'NY moments', of sharing experiences across continents. ICTs tend to be multiple cost cutting with IM, chat, SMS and Skype dependence high	High
Staying together through ICTs	Dispersed family maintains its links with mobile and low cost communications (e.g. Skype) – e.g. remarried mother in the UK speaks with both adult daughters in NY twice a day; or a mother manages family website for immediate and more distant family	Medium/high
Entertainments rich	Tend to concentrate ICTs on gaming, with music, video, films also – while communications are simple and their usage restricted.	Medium, simple usages
Experimental rich	Early adopters of anything new – small category with high disposable income	Medium
Future: care-rich	The family has to care for disabled, or elderly frail, or seriously ill members with ICT support. ICTs are seen as a prime care support and essential	Very high – in future (2012 - 2015 onwards)

In classifying families in a clear and simple way, inevitably many dimensions are not captured, e.g. it ignores such factors such as the divide between rural, suburban and urban families, as constrained by local infrastructures (Gilligan, 2005).

4. Aging: supporting the frail and elderly in the home

4.1 You are old said the youth[43]

So far we have examined general use of ICT in the family in general. Now we move on to the far more intensive usages coming over the next decade and aimed at the future largest family segment of ICT users – not the young but the aging, especially as single person households become dominant.[44]

As a whole, the OECD is rapidly aging, so in most countries a much older demographic profile compared to today's can be expected. Across the developed world, the population of the 60-year and older group has expanded from 99 million in 1950 to 248 million in 2000 expected to be 298 million in the year 2050. The 50 and older population from 2000-2050 will grow at a rate 68 times faster than the rate of growth for the total population.[45] The US population of 65 and over is projected to rise from 13% of the total population in 2010 to nearly 20% in 2030.[46] By 2020, the number of Americans of 85 and older will more than double to 6.4 million, and the number 65 to 84 years old will almost double to 47.1 million.[47] In the UK by 2020 over half of the population will be over 50.[48]

Different age groups have different needs and use ICTs in different ways. The population as a whole may have an older profile, but there is a big difference between the needs of 60 year-olds and those over 80 years of age. As the population becomes older, an increasing proportion will stay in work for longer. We already see that the productive capacity of those of current working age is insufficient to finance state pension schemes. The over-60 population will enjoy greater diversity in life style and leisure pursuits, and an increasing proportion of all wealth, but there will also be those who defer retirement. Retirement will be deferred for a variety of reasons (not just because of the costs involved) and so many people up to, say, 70 years of age, may have similar needs to those in the 40-60 age bracket. Indeed, with people living longer, higher rates of divorce and remarriage and second families later in life, those in the 'third age' will be significant users of ICT, particular for communication and managing their lives effectively.[49]

It is the 'fourth age', however, that will be the future heaviest users and consumers of the most advanced and intense ICTs. The demographic question is whether aging extends the third or the fourth age or both. In terms of health care and its costs, it is not age itself which is important but proximity to death, for it is the extreme decline in health before death that results in escalation in health care and costs. If an aging population results in an extended and fulfilling third age and a short fourth age, the health care costs may not increase as dramatically as some fear (Gray, 2005).

Nevertheless, there is tremendous scope to improve support the growing number of families and older people, as and when they need more help, because the utility and functionality of ICTs for a given cost expands rapidly and non-linearly at a certain threshold. It does not follow 'Moore's Law' but requires a minimal level of communications, sensing and processing power for a given cost, as demonstrated by the spread of mobile phones, much being driven by the needs of the family. For example, if we can detect and locate a cancer

[43] Lewis Carroll, *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*.
[44] In the UK today, one in three people over 65 years lives alone: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7701115.stm
[45] *Beyond Workforce 2020*, Hudson Institute, 2005.
[46] US Dept of Labor, 2004.
[47] US Census Bureau, 2000.
[48] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7701115.stm
[49] The third age refers to the period immediately following retirement and is characterised by independence and few – if any – restrictions in activities and health. The fourth age, the last phase of life, is usually a period associated with more disease and disability, leaving older individuals dependent on others to manage daily life.

formation anywhere in the body immediately it begins to form, non-invasively, for a monitoring cost of under €50 per year, there are few family members who would not have it, especially those of over 40 years. What it needs are the specialised sensing, transmission and processing/ alerting functions at low cost. The same technology could be used for heart ailments.

4.2 Structures in care of the elderly using ICTs

Many older and frail people will demand intensive care, and must be looked after in the appropriate category of care environment. A significant proportion could be more cheaply and happily supported in their own homes, if help from three innovative sources were present:

- The "smart sheltered housing" concept – doors, alarms, curtains, central heating, lights etc, all operated by remote control, with alarms for patient health, intrusion and abnormal events and accidents. The concept is not new and has been refined for older people. In the telemedicine scenario it would include passive, around the clock video surveillance of the elderly person to a remote centre to ensure all is safe, health monitoring of vital signs and normal activity. This would require open video lines to the smart house, probably using alternative wireless technologies, such as WiFi or WiMax with full motion or slow scan.

- Take-out restaurant and teleshopping services – local restaurants provide menus via online Web access, boosting local employment for restaurants and for private delivery services.

Figure 3. ICT organisational capabilities for sheltered housing support services



- The paid carer or local helper concept is being pursued in some countries as a way of increasing employment while providing care. In principle, a local helper is paid for part-time work to provide essential help for moving, lifting and cleaning as well as acting on alarms, for instance a window or door has been left open, or a health crisis is taking place and the helper can be first on the scene. This implies tele-monitoring alarms and video surveillance routed to the helper (via a wireless handset) as well as to a central monitoring centre.

The aging demography will tend to push telecommunications into new uses requiring augmented infrastructures. Trends in demand for support services and devices for the elderly and in health care are likely to seed completely new extensions of current infrastructures, especially in wireless – for the parts of life cellular mobile cannot reach. Some of the key applications will rely on various forms of sensor networks. Two major applications can be expected here – wireless local networks for health care and elderly care including linkages for the use of near field communications (NFC) technologies in body area networks. One of the major technologies for future care of the frail will be communications that are ubiquitous and low-cost. Novel radio technologies (NRTs) for many uses, be it body area networks over short ranges down to centimetres, or up to long range (Kms) will be the basis of many of these systems.

4.3 Assistive technologies for caring for the frail and elderly

Rapid development of telecommunications over last decade has made it possible to transmit a large volume of monitoring data at high speed, via wireless networks of various kinds for in-home surveillance, with video over wireless broadband, as well as health monitoring (e.g. ECG patterns). Thus transferring medical monitoring and procedures from the hospital into the home with telemedicine is one direction for NRTs to support more advanced health care regimes for the increasing number of elderly people, but keeping them as cared for people, not hospital patients. NRT based systems, due to their ubiquity, are now extending from physiological health into mental health as well. They can do this more effectively and at lower cost, owing to the independence and lack of constraints they bring, with five key areas of support:

Turning the home into an intelligent health support system

Future support for the aged and frail will depend on turning the home into an intelligent support system. The key ICT will be communications, over NRTs, to enable:

- An infrastructure for managing care in the home, to avoid future systematic overload of the hospital system, with real-time systems that give rapid indications for prevention of problems
- Better care provision at lower cost, for a population segment which is typically the most expensive to treat but in a preventive approach, and in a ubiquitous manner – the home, the car, the workplace – for maintaining physical fitness, early problem detection and diagnosis, maintaining social activity and cognitive engagement
- Consumerisation of health care, away from the physician towards the person in care and the family/ community network (Dishman, 2004) who build support links. Telemedicine and ubiquitous care for the aged can relieve over-burdened health professionals while also shifting the emphasis from curing after the fact to prevention before the disease or attack occurs, using real time diagnostics and alerts for professional care givers and medicos.
- Support for the autonomy of the individual to control and enjoy their own environment
- Linking the large number of computers that will be used in future home health systems, with machine to machine communications

There are numerous home care projects across the OECD community which point the way. For instance, the SWIFT (uSer oriented and Workflow Integrated FederaTion of service providers for the elderly) project studied the indirect use of ICTs with older people. Its original aim was to use the latest ICTs as a tool for integrating the provision of social, health and welfare services to elderly people living in their own homes. The project was co-ordinated by Derwentside District Council, in the UK. It proposed facilitating communication

between different service providers, enabling instant access to shared information about elderly patients/clients, develop systems for efficiently managing the workflow of social, health and welfare services and help elderly people and their carers to gain easier access to information and support.

Two sheltered housing ventures in the UK have acted as demonstrator sites for assistive technology. Both sites have been sponsored by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation and Scottish Homes. One site in Edinburgh has been developed in a flat owned by Edinvar Housing Association and the other site is in housing owned by the Joseph Rowntree Housing Trust in York. Although most of the appliances used are commercially available, they are not compatible. Edinvar/Joseph Rowntree have each trained a systems integrator to devise the technology or 'intelligence' to enable the different systems to work together, independently or in tandem, depending on the circumstances. Below are some examples of simpler assistive technologies employed in UK projects:

Functions of assistive ICTs in European Sheltered Housing for the elderly

- *Audible Reminders*- Voice emulation devices for reminding occupants of important dates or times. Useful for medication and doctor's appointments.
- *Pill dispenser* – known as 'Careousel' generates a reminder signal that medication needs to be taken. If medication is not taken within a specified timeframe an alarm call can be triggered.
- *Touchscreen Interface* – Enables devices to be simply controlled by pressing a picture on a screen. (i.e. turning on heating, locking/opening doors, opening windows). Can also be used as part of entertainment medium.
- *Pressure Pads/ Lighting Controls* Located under carpets at key areas to monitor activity within the home. Operation of pads will give a degree of insight into occupants' activity and can also trigger other appliances, such as lights. Lights can be programmed to react to a person's requirements, such as getting out of bed at night to go to the bathroom or in emergency situations, such as fire.
- *Door Entry System* – If the door bell rings, the television comes on (if not already on) and shows who is at the front door via a video link. If the television is already on the channel is interrupted to show who is at the door. The door can then be opened remotely.
- *Infra Red Bathroom Controls* – Washbasin taps, toilet flush and shower operation via 'no-touch' Infra-Red sensors. The control system times water flow to prevent potential flooding incidents and water is thermostatically regulated to reduce the risk of scalding. The toilet flush is used to monitor activity levels of the occupant.
- *Video monitoring* – constant links to remote centre may survey extremely frail people, for cases of fall, sudden attacks/seizures etc
- *Remote Control Door Openings* – Allows door to be opened from either outside or inside by means of a remote control keypad. Settings allow door opening to be fully automatic or power assisted and also has an emergency override.
- *Heat/ Smoke Detectors* – Heat detectors are located in the kitchen to monitor excessive heat output (e.g. cooker left on for a prolonged period). Can interact with smoke alarm and other equipment in emergency situations, including unlocking and opening doors, switching on extractor fans and cutting off gas/electricity supplies to appliances.
- *Fridge / Freezer Defrost Alarm* – Monitors core temperature of cold appliances to warn of defrost due to a fault, such as a door being left open or the appliance being switched off.

- *Heating Controls* – Temperature regulation. in each room with a thermostat, linked to motorised radiator valve.
- *Keyless Doorlocks* – Doors can be unlocked using a key fob swipe device, programmed to prevent access by unauthorised persons.
- *Central Locking* – Before leaving the house a green light at the front door will signal that all the windows are shut and the back door locked. A red light signals something is insecure.
- *Environmental Control Systems with Intelligent Monitoring* – for user control of immediate environment and household items by remote controls via infra-red or wireless – for audio-visual equipment, telephones and all of the above systems – with integration of assistive technologies.
- *Motorised Windows/ Window sensors/ Curtain Motors* – Windows and curtains can be opened or closed by use of either an Infra-Red remote control or by wall switches. External twilight sensors will allow curtains to close automatically at dusk. Windows can also be programmed to close when heating comes on, when the property is empty or if external temperatures fall below the optimum.

For those with severe disabilities, all the systems above for an assisted sheltered dwelling are becoming available in the UK through the National Health Service. A guide to the cost of these assistive technologies is less than €3000 (£2,000) per home, for two or three of the devices.

The ACTION project (Assisting Carers using Telematic Interventions to meet Older person's Needs[50]) in Sheffield, UK with the UK National Health Service, involves the use of multimedia applications, such as video conferencing and the Internet, as models for education, advice and support but for the carers. Areas covered are:

- Caring in daily life – How to handle emergency situations
- Claims and benefits – Respite care choices
- Planning ahead – Coping assessment and coping strategies

Carers are provided with a PC or television with video conferencing facility and a remote control handset. Most of the older people wanted a PC so they could also surf the Internet and e-mail their grandchildren. The video conferencing facility provided them with immediate contact with a district nurse, a social worker, a hospital or their local health centre. Initially many of the users felt self-conscious using the video conferencing facility, but as with a lot of technologies, familiarity makes people feel more comfortable using them. All of this (so far) is a fixed wireline project, although it could easily change to an NRT basis.

Another EU project for carers involving ICTs is DISCUS (Distance Information, Support and Communication for European Carers). DISCUS aims to provide an Internet based information/ training, support and communications system for carers in more remote areas. This will allow the carers to exchange ideas and benefit from the knowledge base of other professional carers across Europe, and also increase the efficiency and quality of care by making knowledge, skills and experience more accessible to care providers.

4.4 Aging in place projects – sheltered homes and houses with assistive ICTs

There are numerous aging in place projects in the USA aimed at helping the elderly just to maintain their independence, using instrumented sheltered housing and based on intense use of NRTs. These laboratory mock-

[50] http://www.durham.gov.uk/durhamcc/usp.nsf/pws/86B2B22525A6217380256CD7003F27AC?opendocument

ups are still in a pilot study phase lasting over several years. For instance, the Georgia Tech Broadband laboratory in the USA – also known as the Aware Home – is a 5000 square foot, two-storey facility at the edge of the university campus Mynatt et al, 2004). Its aim is to support the aged to 'age in place' by creating an environment and devices that compensate for physical decline, by physical means and supporting care by family members as specifically in aiding memory deficits. Effectively it is laboratory for interdisciplinary development and evaluation of domestic technologies for caring for older people at home.

This is aimed at savings in care costs (Tang and Venables, 2008) as well as better care with more autonomy for aged individuals. The activities of daily living are monitored and supported for memory lapses and other deficiencies, with all activities being recorded, and the records used as guides for completing everyday tasks. A number of special artefacts have been created for the environment monitoring such as a wearable pendant computer for gesture recognition, which is wireless enabled. Using hand gestures the pendant wearer can give commands to the intelligent 'aware house' for controlling doors, lights, taps, and washing machines, etc. It also monitors the wearer's activity levels and can indicate mental deficiencies due to ageing, such as early indications of neurological decline, due to conditions such as Parkinson's disease. Another artefact is the 'digital family portrait' that uses activity recognition sensors to guide everyday actions.

This is not the only such project in the USA. Several leading university-based projects are cutting new ground to develop care in the home for the aged and infirm:

Table 2. Aging in place projects in the USA

MIT Media Lab, Changing Places Consortium	Links between home and medical facilities, workplaces, learning centres and the community in a joint project with the Department of Architecture's 'n_House', to develop wearable and environmental sensing software for computer generated proactive health communications.
University of Michigan, Dept Electrical Eng. & Computer Sci.	Handheld devices for cognitive decline – the autominder – constructs rich activity models to detect anomalies in behaviour
Carnegie Mellon University with Universities of Pittsburgh and Michigan	Pearl, robot assistant to the elderly (uses technology from autominder, above, for cognitive functions as its software component) – a 'nursebot' ; has wireless Ethernet, laser range finders, sonar sensors, differential drive system, two on-board Pentium PCs, microphones, for speech recognition, speakers for speech synthesis, touch-sensitive graphical displays, actuated head units, and stereo camera systems[51].
University of Rochester, Centre for Future Health	Smart tools for consumer health management based on NRTs, with testing in the 'Smart Medical Home'
Oregon Health and Science University, Biomedical Engineering Dept	Early detection and remedial care measures for aging changes using intelligent bio-sensors which monitor movement and detect cognitive impairments in inter-disciplinary project.
University of Washington, Assisted Cognition Project	In a retirement community that is state–of-the-art, has developed a proactive memory aid, the Adaptive Prompter, which is a sensory network using AI techniques to decide if it should intervene to support an everyday task.

Source: Dishman, 2004.

[51]AAAI workshop, Automation as eldercare, AAAI Press, Martha E. Pollack , et al, Pearl: A Mobile Robotic Assistant for the Elderly, http://www-2.cs.cmu.edu/~nursebot/web/papers/umich/aaai02wkshp.pdf

The principles of a robotic approach from CMU, in collaboration with other two universities are shown below:

Figure 4. Robotics for aging in place



Pearl – mobile robots for the elderly

Pearl is built from off-the-shelf autonomous mobile robot navigation systems, speech recognition and speech synthesis software, fast image capture and compression software for online video streaming, and face detection and tracking software with a WLAN, wireless Ethernet. Pearl is guided by software modules that support provision of timely reminders and navigation. The software component to provide the cognitive functions, called Autominder, has three main components: a Plan Manager (PM), to store a client's plan of daily activities, also responsible for updating it and identifying potential conflicts; a Client Modeller (CM), which uses observations of the client's activities to track the execution of the plan; and a Personal Cognitive Orthotic (PCO) module, which analyses any differences between what the client is supposed to do and actual activities, and makes decisions about when to issue reminders.

Source : *Pearl: A Mobile Robotic Assistant for the Elderly*, http://www-2.cs.cmu.edu/~nursebot/web/papers/umich/aaai02wkshp.pdf

Intel in California has invested in its own projects to help elderly and disabled people with memory loss due to diseases such as Alzheimer's, in its Proactive Health Strategic Research project (Dishman 2004). Its Center for Aging Services Technology has built prototypes using sensor networks based on 'smart motes' (small detectors and RFID transponders, with a CPU and battery developed with UC Berkeley) to monitor progress in everyday activity and support sequences of actions. The sensory network examines activity with pressure and motion sensors in the home furniture and in clothing. They have found that such disabilities can provoke social inactivity, due to memory loss of friends and relations, which leads into depression, and accelerate cognitive decline. Current efforts are towards cognitive assessment of everyday activities, using wireless sensor networks to detect sudden cognitive decline.

4.5 The overall effects

These kinds of advance are likely to change how long people can maintain an independent status. It will tend to increase independent life expectancy perhaps initially by some ten years and eventually perhaps far longer – over fifteen years – and so make working life lengthen as well. The economic implications are profound, as they include:

- On the 'supply-side' the impacts may be to relieve state funding of care homes – they might even become a relic of a past era of elderly care.

- On the demand–side (for the aged) home care is likely to be enthusiastically received as long as real meaningful progress can be made which genuinely advances independent living.

- Moreover on the work front, (both demand and supply in some senses) such environments are most suited to knowledge work. This implies that some people would have to perform career changes. This in turn indicates that distance learning late in life could also be necessary – a reversal of current thinking on education in the early years only.

- Also on the work front extending working life could have significant impacts on the availability of workers still in active life. Employment numbers would increase, if distance working is tied in. Many economic parameters could change: the total population in work; the demography of the population; the type of economy – as it would tend to favour a knowledge-based society, especially for vocations where experience and judgement are called for.

4.6 Implications for the family

For the family we see three key effects:

- Incorporation of an older generation back into the family, so a more traditional structure returns as the eldest generation, previously thought of as distant and unconnected, may participate in family life again but perhaps in new ways – for instance it may that for ICT education the young teach the old for the first time

- Family members previously taken up with full-time or part-time care of an elderly family member may free some time to pursue other activities. More women especially will be in work, enhancing the family's total income, perhaps considerably. This is a significant number – for instance in the UK there are some 6 million family and friends carers, who are unpaid, that is some 11% of the population over 5 years (NSO, 2006). Some 5% of carers were over 85 years themselves, while 114,000 were children aged 5 to 15 years. Most carers were women.

- As the elder generation is now more active and earning, the family will tend to have even more money and resources, coming from a longer active life for all members, and also home carers for younger children, so that both parents can work.

5. Health – ICTS and the home hospital

Perhaps the most intensive use of ICTs in the family of future will be in bringing the hospital into the home. Health care is advancing partly as a result of ICTs, especially the Internet, in many countries, for forming a linked-up systems across the various care entities, eg in Canada and the Czech Republic, both for GP access to

medical data, insurance processing etc, as well as for hospital usage for the logistics chain, for ordering and paying for medicines (OECD, 2008).

5.1 Health systems and telemedicine

Over the past four decades, total expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP as been rising significantly towards a median of 8% for OECD countries, as shown below, but with the USA exceeding 12% of GDP (Saritas and Keenan, 2004).

Figure 5. The cost of health care in the OECD



Today's systems face problems of high inflation in treatment costs, scarcity of trained personnel leading to deteriorating standards of care and challenges from particular medical trends – cardiovascular disorders, cancer and an aging population. Moreover the management bureaucracy surrounding health care is a significant portion of total cost. Telecommunications could provide relief in two principle areas:

- *Telemedicine savings on health care insurance and management* – electronically integrating the various management and payment processes with a new health industry structure. The aim is to closely integrate all players into a new medical record and inter-payments structure, so that savings would come initially on the non-clinical side – in the support systems, medical insurance and payments systems. For the American model, this would amount to perhaps 5% of total costs, near to $40 billion for the USA. The USA's HMO arrangements and similar systems could be replaced by an electronic market in health care in which individuals and organisations such as employers, insurance companies or pension funds contract directly for services on a long term or spot basis.

- *Telemedicine savings on clinical treatment* – increased health levels expected on the clinical side from advances in telemedicine use – especially as health care crosses borders and poorer countries may obtain distant consultancy services at low cost. The core question is then to assess the effects in national economic terms of increased health levels. Effects are twofold:

    - Savings on national budgets as less needs to be spent to build a viable health system, plus the productivity increases

    - Less lost working days to the economy and insurance restitution costs.

Will telemedicine bring any help in moving to a lower cost model, and if so in what areas of health care? Telemedicine promises advances in seven distinct areas:

- *The sharing of medical expertise across a country and across national boundaries, with improvements in quality and costs*. Accurate assessment of the seriousness of illnesses can be estimated, which non-specialist staff often cannot determine. For instance, a two-way video link between Atlanta, and St Petersburg in Russia has allowed American doctors to advise Russian surgeons. Equipment was provided by UNM (United Medicine Network) a direct dial videoconference network created for global telemedicine. In France, a panel of 6 specialists reviews patients suffering specific skin diseases all over France in one afternoon, so patients get 6 opinions, not one, using video links and a consensus on treatment can be reached.

- *Promptness of essential care from a specialist whenever necessary for emergency cases*, with the facility for local doctors to obtain an expert opinion not physically present. For instance, when a three year-old child fell off the refrigerator and opened up a deep wound with no bleeding, a remote nephrology consultant was requested. The specialist carried out an interactive video examination at the local clinic and found transport was safe for the specialist surgery required (source: American Telemedicine Association).

- *Avoidance of travel for treatment for patients, saving lives, cutting costs and preserving beds in remote hospitals*. Also, increased efficiency is possible for medical staff by avoidance of travel; they may work from wherever is convenient and serve more patients in a given time. For situations of health security, Telemedicine provides the isolation necessary, for quarantine cases and for remote mental institutions.

- *Remote hospital care in-home, for the sick, aged and infirm, with surveillance and advice* on self medication, etc., where possible, or advice to local helpers present, with monitoring by alarms and video perhaps combined with the concepts of the "smart house". This development will be essential to cope with an aging population as expenditure on health care increases with age:

Proportion of health expenditures for over 65s is increasing[52]

	1980	***2040***
Sweden	51%	65%
Belgium	22%	30%

	1990	***2025***
Japan	38%	58%

- *Remote teaching or guidance and education, for medical staff, students, and patients* or for those under treatment or special care such as expectant mothers, widening the reach of teaching and avoiding travel.

- *Increased efficiency, through electronic document management (EDM)* for the major overheads in patient clinical, and above all health insurance and payments, paperwork (public and private).

[52]Health for all in the 21st century?, OECD futures studies, Paris, March 1994.

- *E-Commerce and supply chain management (medical EDI) for ordering supplies* with better inventory control, plus capital savings and lower security risks for stores of drugs. Moreover, an electronic market worldwide in medicines could also drive down prices, especially as bulk buying with comparison of world prices becomes universal.

- *Creation of a single integrated health care system*, in which patient records, health insurance and payments, and information such as laboratory reports, admissions, beds free, etc are available to each type of medical operator in the system, on an authorised, secure basis. Telemedicine can bring together the GP, clinic, nursing home for the aged, hospitals and external specialists with outpatients (the patient at home) and the ambulance on the road.

- The maximum savings introduced by telemedicine might appear to be in OECD countries with overburdened health budgets seeking a higher quality of care at lower cost. However the major applications may be in those countries with poor or stretched health infrastructures – the NICs. One study in North West Russia outlines this case.[53] It found that using remote consultations, the expenditure on in-patient treatment could be reduced by half by means of shortening the treatment terms and using small local hospitals with telemedicine links to centres of expertise. This result depends on sharing far more skilled regional centre staff, who have the expertise that is lacking in staff in the district and local health care centres across North West Russia.

5.2 Extending the hospital into the home – telemedicine environments

Modern society, as far as the family is concerned, is also turning into the *carer* society and the OECD family is often becoming one that cares for a relative – there are some six million carers in UK. Thus extending the hospital into the home, as well as providing elderly and frail care as dealt with in the last section, is a future major issue.

One case study of this form of care is being pursued in South Korea, as the development of a comprehensive home health monitoring system ('uHouse') in a pilot project by the Interdisciplinary Program in Biomedical Engineering and the Department of Biomedical Engineering, College of Medicine of Seoul National University, Seoul.[54] This continuous real time system is used for patients who have mobility difficulties, such as the frail and elderly who live in rural areas.

The uHouse system is intended to monitor the person's daily activities and state of health in an unconstraining manner.

[53] Elena Dzedzelava and Trine S. Bergmo, 'An economic evaluation of telemedicine in north-west Russia' National Centre of Telemedicine, University Hospital of Tromsø, available at
http://www2.telemed.no/publikasjoner/nedlastbare/economic_evaluation.pdf

[54] Seoul National University, Korea, 2004, Interdisciplinary Program in Biomedical Engineering, Seo, Jin Woo, and Park, Kwang Suk, College of Medicine, Department of Biomedical Engineering, The Development of a Ubiquitous Health House in South Korea

Figure 6. The home as hospital



The uHouse environment monitors a patient's bio-signals and activity for extended care beyond the hospital for ill, or aged and frail people. It follows studies undertaken on these wired/wireless bio-signal measurement methods which have the advantages of being unconstraining for the patient, who is not aware of any monitoring, for instance, development of an ECG monitoring method using conductive bed sheets (Tamura, et al, 1998). Several types of sensors and devices are installed to monitor bio-signals, specifically the vital signs of bedside ECG, weight changes, and movement patterns. Bio-signals are measured by adapting common devices for signal acquisition, ie, beds, toilet seats, bathtubs, etc so that signals are gathered without the patient being aware of the monitoring. For example, only lying on a bed is required for ECG and only sitting on a toilet seat is required for weight-change and ECG monitoring. So taking measurements with the sensor network is unobtrusive, and leaves the patient free to conduct his/her daily life. The uHouse's network uses Bluetooth, which transmits the monitored signals via an ADSL fixed wire link to a main server in a remote hospital through a home server.

The complete uHouse system, termed the Health Integrated Smart Home Information System (HIS2) is the basis of the activity monitoring. HIS2 is designed to be controlled by the patient. It employs sensors and devices installed in the home which include:

- Bed monitoring for ECG, respiration & weight change
- Monitoring Camera in the living room for mobility, falls and accidents
- Device for measuring blood glucose, blood pressure, body fat

- Magnetic switch for monitoring doors left open
- Flame Sensor
- CO2 sensor for safety
- Movement Detection Sensor
- Toilet Seat for ECG & Weight changes
- Bathtub ECG monitoring for health indications

The uHouse project points towards the non-intrusive measurement of daily bio-signals by using devices in the home. The wireless technology basis offers many advantages over conventional bio-signal measurements. For instance, in previous bio-monitoring systems, activity monitoring was a major issue. However, with the uHouse system, bio-signals and patient activity can be measured together. Therefore, an observer can almost immediately determine the patient's state of health, with detection of symptoms before disease onset. In general, patients do not visit a hospital until they have recognized symptoms. However, the project team has found that an illness can be detected before it develops into a serious condition obvious to the patient, as it is recognized earlier by the HIS2 sensor network. Daily activities and bio-signals are stored and analyzed by the hospital server and if an abnormal condition arises, the server can inform the patient.

Most bio-signal measurement systems require contact between electrodes or test strips and patients, in contrast to the HIS2 sensor network using the NRT remote data gathering. In fulfilling the objective of the uHouse project 'to obtain quality data without interrupting the patient's daily life', no interruption to a patient's daily life should occur.

5.3 The overall effects

This kind of advance is likely to change how health care is provided, to the benefit of the patient and health service:

- On the 'supply-side' the impacts may be to relieve state funding for long-term stays in hospitals of all types and especially for recuperation/rehabilitation centres – essentially this could deliver better quality of care at lower cost
- On the demand-side (for the patient) the hospital in the home care is likely to be enthusiastically received as long as real meaningful progress in recovery can be made which genuinely advances independent treatment over that in the hospital. The patient also may benefit both in having an environment of familiarity and serenity. Moreover, in those countries where the patient must bear the costs of hospital care, the financial burdens should be lower. This could lead to lower health insurance premiums in countries where the national health services are based on private health insurance plans.

5.6 Implications for the family

For the family we see the key effects as being integration of the injured or sick family member into the home, be it the family home or the home of an independent family member in a separate dwelling. This tends to remove problems of separation, be they emotional or economic (i.e. travel to hospital regularly and even stay in

the hospital at the bedside, or near the hospital, normal in some OECD countries such as Italy). The same financial savings for the family, which may be bearing the costs of hospitalisation, may also apply.

6. E-government and the family

6.1 The failure of e-government

Using ICTs for online administration provision of government services is now common in the OECD. Today, the USA has 1,629 state and federal web sites,[55] which cover taxes, driving licence renewals, permits to fish, benefits calculations, even adding money to lunch-cards for schools. In Australia an e-census has been successful, with 9% of households, some 780,000 people, using it in the 2006 census.[56] The New Zealand Department of Child, Youth and Family Services has an information and communication link for children in need of care and protection.

However there is confusion within government about what the Internet is for and moreover just what e-government is all about. Today e-government is at best really i-government not e-government, i.e. it is just information, not services. Because largely it is seen by government as a one–way information flow, like a shop window, not the interactive dialogue that the citizen may need. Government's mental model is: "we disseminate, you, the family, receive – and perhaps fill in this form, or else".

Thus families are kept at a distance as e-government websites make government transactions work in the ways the government wants – not the way the family may need (Smith, 2008). All that the family receives in terms of interactions is just encoded forms that encode policy, without dialogue, so they tend to become less relevant. Most e-government websites have a lot of information – the shop window – perhaps even too much information online, as departments dump everything on to their website without giving any real knowledge of what is going on, or what is needed – a data overload that nobody wants. Hence low utilisation is typical. For instance, in the EU, the UK is one of the most advanced in both Internet usage and e-government offerings yet, in 2005, only 15% of the population or 24% of Internet users had accessed any e-government service (Sourbati, 2008).

Government aims here are really to cut the costs of their administration but in so doing, they produce problems for families – and most family members are unaware of what actually exists, except perhaps for filing national income tax returns in some countries such as the UK, USA and France. Furthermore heightened access with meaningful interchanges in more sophisticated services suffers from both difficulty of access and most importantly, of trust on both sides – government and the public – the government has a fear of malicious misuse and the public fears:

a. 'Big brother' surveillance

b. That any details given are probably highly insecure (in the UK the government lost media with the details of 25 million family members in 2007) and so will probably be lost or shared with other departments inappropriately, or even sold commercially, as happens in the UK with electoral rolls.

[55] Elizabeth Wasserman, 2008, The online family, *Using E-Government*, www.theonlinefamily.net/momtalk/egovernment/index.html.
[56] Australian Government Excellence in e-government awards, Sept 2007 Finalist case studies

6.2 What is the future place for e-government in the family's lifestyle?

If e-government is to have any place in the family, it needs to provide family friendly services. It also needs to be able to reply to niche, family level needs and privacy and security concerns if it is to become relevant. Moreover, too often the minimum threshold of technical competence necessary excludes the many, especially those who may rely on local and central government support.

What today's digital government might become after a major rethink is possibly to give a more active role to the family:

- A dialogue centre – whether this is just email, or involves far more – video conferencing, perhaps with administrative departments and importantly, with the key legislature representatives – the political side, an emphasis on the representational side of e-government, still to be explored
- A decision channel in which all family members may express views, perhaps vote on issues (i.e. national referendums at low cost) that is e-participation, again still to be explored.
- A notice board function allowing government and citizens to advertise to each other.
- Search services for government facilities in the sense that the government is the servant of the public and particularly of the family and its help and support must be made openly available.

7. Work and ICT – home working and teleworking

7.1 The family and work

As opposed to a decade ago, home working, using ICTs, is considered normal in many OECD countries for a range of employment types. This is especially for knowledge workers in the services sector, where one or more days per week at least at home are considered a minimum – and an advantage. This means two major social changes, perhaps advances, are under way that modulate a family's lifestyle:

- The acceptance of a working member of the family at home and therefore of the physical accommodation for this in many ways, be it the spatial allocation within the household, social acceptance of working styles of behaviour, or the need to reduce ambient noise during teleconferencing or concentrated working, and interruption of social interactions, such as meals, e.g. by being summoned to take calls.
- The mixing of different social and mental worlds – work, play and family organisation. Home working may well have advantages in that it can make the confluence easier to manage for parents, especially for women. In fact this mode of work may be a key support for a single parent family with small children, so working life becomes just part of family life. It implies a new balance must be made achievable. This extends into patterns of job seeking, as work is sought either for permanent positions or for transactional freelance work, from the home using search techniques, electronic submission of CVs and applications etc.

The effect on women of using ICTs in the home is especially important, as a way of more successfully integrating family responsibilities with an income stream. There have been some well-organised initiatives here

as well as the far larger, more ad hoc trend. For example, to support rural communities in a time of hardship for smaller farmers, EDF in France created a specific home working programme for farmer's wives. This required the wife to process EDF bills and accounts using a PC and simple dial-up connection, so that work could be outsourced, providing a second source of income for the family through work in the farmhouse.

There are also some fundamental changes in working responsibilities and management techniques engendered by home working. Most importantly is the psychology of management, in a company or public sector organisation, which must change from presence in a set workplace to deliverables against a deadline, with freedom to work unsupervised. This matches the greater freedom and autonomy expected in society as it progresses from command and control structures of family and working towards individual responsibility and self-determination of aspirations. However there are cultural barriers which vary by country – for instance, managements in France, Italy and Spain tend towards and prefer multi-level hierarchical structures, oriented to supervising presence, so home working is more accepted in cultures such as the UK and cultures with similar flatter hierarchies (Trompenaars, 1993). Home working also encourages portfolio working, the self-employed, the autonomous outside agent, and the temporary worker, of in some form of transactional assignments with multiple employers and clients perhaps, to spread unemployment risks.

7.2 The technology of home working

The home as office means the emulating office processes of working, meetings and personal contacts by using ICTs for connection and work processing. Communication for the future is likely to be increasingly based on broadband packets to the home, even in rural situations. Here, the digital divide is likely to met by high-speed packet access mobile or fixed radio services as the connection of choice, for lower cost and faster roll-out. Naturally the frequency of connection is key here, both for reasons of range of propagation and for penetration of brick/ferro-concrete structures – so the UHF band will be sought after (especially in the 400-900MHz range – if the digital dividend on release of analogue TV spectrum, is allowed to support this requirement[57]). Network protocols may be WiMax or 3.5G UMTS (with high speed uplinks and downlinks) initially with the 3G successor, IMT2000 LTE or perhaps unlicensed bands in the further future with more advanced mesh protocols and collective use of spectrum (white space usage with CR perhaps). Home access at high data rates will enable low cost VoIP for voice and also connecting via a single physical line for all services into the home. These would include – Internet, business lines and a mobile connection for each family member, as well as for IPTV, for packet mobile TV services. Future home networking architectures will be via radio (fixed or mobile) links to a femtocell hub within home to provide broadband everywhere plus fusion of outdoor and indoor communications. Signal distribution over power cabling within the home may work in the future but high speed signalling for wide area networking over power cables that enter the home has not worked well until now, despite many attempts by the utility companies in the UK, Japan, France and the USA on 'mainsborne signalling'.

The basic ICT technology for teleworking can be as simple as a fairly low-speed link (as low as 30 – 200kbps) for a laptop with local office productivity applications and email. It enables document processing and accessing other remote workers and or an organisation's VPN. However with faster data-speeds it may also be connected to far more exotic tools such as Web 2.0 second life environment's meeting-collaboration avatars. For example, IBM uses this currently based on the Second Life environment for meetings. It is seen as ideal for forming a simulated office from any remote location, including the home. IBM has over 30 'islands' in cyberspace, for staff induction, research and internal meetings and its Virtual Business Centre, staffed by IBM

[57] The switch over from analogue to digital TV provides the opportunity to reallocate all or a substantial proportion of this band for advanced mobile services. For further discussion of this see www.digitaldividend.eu.

sales engineers speaking Portuguese, Dutch, German, Spanish, French Italian and English, and a rehearsal studio using avatars (Hayes, 2008).

Such tools fall under the heading of collaboration environments or applications, and are of many types, from those which enable dissemination and questioning (the tutorial type) to meeting structurers with for arguments or for creative work, the latter with anonymisation of suggestions so bias is not shown in favour of more senior staff.

A further set of tools for teleworkers, especially in large organisations for clerical work, fall under the heading of Workflow. The processing of documents across a dispersed team is a typical application, for insurance companies, utilities billing, shipping and logistics and any credit-rating purchase, from industrial goods to mortgages, etc. The workflow application typically applies automatic processing of certain fields in a document, with filling from remote databases, checking, validation and authorisation procedures, across a team of workers in a repeated procedural flows, with conditional branching.

The future user device for the teleworker is perhaps a mobile handset, rather more than a Blackberry type of email agent and phone that covers the laptop functions, and can be used from anywhere in the world. It may have an e-paper pull-out screen, as in an e-reader, or projection of the screen display and an external keyboard, or perhaps projected keyboard and finger gesture recognition for typing.

The user interfaces for the home office would also include document readers – e-readers that require no power when displaying a page of text, only to paint a new page. Possibly there may also be some form of more advanced voice recognition for text entry, based on several techniques at once – the holy grail of the last 30 years. E-readers would be used for all the office documents, manuals and papers circulated in an office, while voice entry of text could accelerate document production.

Media storage will be key to local working, with ever-larger sizes for multimedia documents. Unimaginable five years ago, the average family may store up to a terabyte of data locally with TV, films and music. The teleworker would have this but quite separately form child-access, with possibly remote automatic back-up.

The future key technology areas of advance that will be needed for greater ease of home working include:

- Home networking – inside to outside with ubiquitous communications for a single device, for documents as well as communications. Home networking may include mainsborne signalling and VLC in both visible and invisible spectrum regions

- Far more reliable networking using multi-path/ multi-system wide-area alternative routing of packets into the home

- Authentication and remote working – signatures, security and verification in simpler, more secure approaches[58]

- Semantic interfaces – recognition of meaning, for input and output (using AI with a range of techniques) including text entry by voice recognition

[58] See for instance: Schneier, 2000, for a discussion of the problems.

- Advances in Web usage in more sophisticated and secure ways than "Web 2.0"– for setting up own web presence and stations (websites), collaboration at low cost, sharing information interactively and broadcasting (personal webcasts) by mixing services and creating new ones

- Telepresence – currently holographic or 3D TV projections- is the next step from video conferencing. But is it really needed? A laptop/mobile pull-out screen or projection/desktop video conferencing is simpler and effective.

- Scanning documents and image recognition and OCR with lower cost printing may become simpler, although substitution by electronic ink in e-readers may make the home printer largely obsolete

- Collaborative environments to structure meetings, (e.g. allow anonymous contributions so free thought among equals possible). For collaboration, the support software varies by meeting type – new creation, comparative arguments, agenda setting, etc.

- Mobile handset videoconferencing – use of projection in the future

- There may be a move away from local held applications towards networked access over the web, following the ideas of software as a service (SaaS). This would tend to make home teleworking devices much simpler and lighter in processing power, memory and electrical power consumption, despite the poor revenue model for its suppliers taking years to break even.

Putting knowledge workers into the home can also be a form of ICT substitution for offices, to save on infrastructure costs. IBM France for instance has shrunk in office space enormously over the last 15 years. Apart form large customer centres, the few offices remaining locally are used for the 'hotel functions' with hot-desks, for organisational meetings and presenting to customers. Many staff work from home or are visiting on customer premises. Operations are based on teleconferencing, document exchange via project and division websites, webcasts and email.

7.3 The pressures for teleworking

Change to family cultures, modulated by business networking, is also being driven by house prices – and despite currently falling prices – the pressures are likely to continue in OECD countries for the next two decades. The cost of proximity to work in terms of house prices, by introducing scarcity rents of being in daily commutable distance, is extremely high for many families, especially the growing segment of single-parent families. This high cost of proximity introduces a structural impediment to employment – which distance working, from the home, can solve. With low cost telecommunications, workers may be hundreds of kilometres from the employing entity, out where house prices are perhaps a third or less than the major urban, commercial and industrial centres.[31]

Furthermore, commuting distances are inversely proportional to housing prices, so there is also coupling with the global price of oil. Acceptance by consumers of residence further from centres of work has been driven by lower house prices as long as workers could afford the physical commute cost. This has been a noted trend over past decades. For instance, in the USA, for the extensions of suburbs (to 'exurbs') commutes of 100 miles per day and more are common. Looking historically, going back to 2005, as fuel prices reached $3 a gallon in the USA, the price of a 100 mile commute in a typical American vehicle with combined cycle of 16 mpg rose from $231/month in October 2003 to $407/month in 2005 (Magnusson et al, 2005). Recently in 2008, this rose to US$678/month. However US fuel prices may be approximately only 38% of the price in a European OECD member state such as the UK, although vehicles tend to consume far less. Any solution in teleworking of some

form would offer relief – the combination of housing costs and fuel prices will tend to drive teleworking. Alternative public transport solutions are not a choice, as they do not exist for many countries.

Teleworking is also likely to expand through two other social forces:

- Older workers need to stay in work longer – yet counter physical impairment, so teleworking via ICTs from home makes sense, also as a way to compensate for restricted finances. The combination of an aging demography, higher house prices closer to centres of work and the failure of pension plans make this trend appear inevitable.

- There is also the need, now being recognised, to form a second community outside the office or work centre after retirement and a second career through teleworking may help to mitigate the phenomenon of death on retirement, recognised in many large organisations as well as help form a social networking infrastructure.

8. Education – The promise and real delivery of distance learning as e-learning

8.1 The link between education and average wage

Education and lifelong learning are key factors in the development of our future economy. However, education and its success really starts within the family, set by its aspirations and attitude. It is increasingly recognised in both developed and developing countries that the family as much as the learning centre is the key catalyst in achievement. The family's mental model of education sets the child's view at an early age. A generally positive family view, that education is of high value, means the number of young people obtaining secondary and tertiary level qualifications is growing. At the other end of the age-scale, in OECD countries, educational attainment also continues to grow among the adult population for both retraining in new vocations and in pursuit of academic qualifications. Over the next two decades, the widening of the wage gap between the qualified and the less-qualified will become more obvious[59] highlighting the link between education and average wage. Families will press for more education, so ICTs supporting that will become a major category of ICT use in the family.

8.2 Education, ICTs and the financial crisis in education

Education is being slowly revised by ICTs – often by Internet access. In Spain, the Netherlands, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Denmark, USA, Korea and Australia, at least 80% of secondary and primary schools had Internet access in 2007. Distance leaning as an educational tool is also growing – in 2007 over 20% of Internet users took formal courses in the UK, the Netherlands, Finland, Hungary, Greece and Turkey. E-learning for industrial training was also used on average by 25% of enterprises in 2007, in OECD countries.[60] By 2006, nearly 3.5 million students were participating in online learning at institutions of higher education in the USA (Sloan, 2006). Many higher educations, for-profit institutions, now offer online classes. By contrast, only about half of private, non-profit schools offer them. The Sloan report, based on a poll of academic leaders, says that students generally appear to be at least as satisfied with their online classes as they are with traditional ones. E-learning can be formal or start off as informal – a random search for information and references, on a search engine, or more focused as in Google's Scholar application. Homework is increasingly helped by web searches

[59] *Education at a Glance: OECD Indicators 2005*.
[60] OECD, 2008.

for many secondary school children in OECD countries. Thus the family may gain understanding of the powers and limits of Internet access through its children of school age.

Progress in higher education is more mixed than for secondary school advances, although the total numbers of graduates in OECD countries are increasing slowly. Graduation rates vary widely – from less than 20% in Germany, Austria, Turkey and the Czech Republic, to over 40% in Poland, Australia and the Nordic states.

Thus, to increase participation and graduation rates, education systems must offer more education to more students and pupils but, too often, with less funds per student. Yet they must increasingly also support education through life in most OECD economies. What are needed are new types of less formal structures but with better courses in higher quality learning environments.

At a time when most educational institutions are coming under pressure economically, there is also a general change from learning by wrote towards creating individual learning environments. These are richer in content and suited to the pace of each student, for a more thorough, relevant and interesting education.

8.3 Solutions in tele-education

Telecommunications can augment standard educational facilities with distance learning, or e-learning. Access can be instant to all forms of education far more cheaply, at a time when the pressure for higher education will increase, there is growing realisation that traditional solutions alone will not succeed. Recruiting sufficient staff and building enough facilities to educate everyone is financially impossible. A fundamental re-evaluation of teaching and education is therefore required, especially in higher education.

Thus many universities are expanding through ‘electronic extensions’. No major US university has been without some form of online extension for a decade. Numbers of purely online ‘universities’ and courses expand almost daily. We are far beyond the first versions, using TV, such as the UK’s Open University in Milton Keynes, often providing adult learning for first degrees and now with online web access. Now, and in the future, components of learning environments could include:

- Teaching via interactive video conferencing and narrowcast transmissions
- Web networking for document access and circulation, and messaging
- Interactive multimedia course materials and documents
- Computer-based learning (of a richer, more advanced kind than that seen in the 1990s)
- Document and multimedia bases with capacity for large numbers of simultaneous network accesses

All of these together are being considered to address the four major areas of the education 'business':

- The education process
- Learning resources
- Learning resource access
- Management of the support framework

Several ICT advances may modify basic learning modes, bringing a live education process into the home, while going further than homework carried out in isolation, and also being made available to any family member for any level of course:

- *Looking and learning via computers* – applicable to both primary and secondary schooling as well as higher education – and becoming far more developed with experiments that go away from right/wrong question styles of instruction to richer learning environments with interactive environments as well as document creation, access and storage functions. Such context immersion environments are fairly well established, although expensive. They now stretch back more than a decade, early examples include those of the MUSE project at MIT's Centre for Educational Computing Initiatives (CECI) which developed an early interactive textbook as a multimedia document, for Spanish and French language courses in the 1990s. Although limited today, the future is greater access at home, as much as at school or college, so the home becomes a much closer learning extension of the school, or college.

- *Interactive videoconferencing via broadband* – provides distance learning, in a narrowcast mode, to share teachers, tutors and lectures and to reach remote college students or school pupils. This seems more applicable to higher education, although networked programmes over the Internet are fairly successful in secondary schools, but without a live interactive element to animate and make them work, they appear to be far less effective. They need a live tutor. Quality education can then be made affordable to anyone interested at minimum costs, making it much more accessible to the poorer family. A further one-way channel is the use of television, so successfully used in the UK's Open University courses but now and in the future via the web as IPTV, so students may choose their learning time and be far more interactive.

Such techniques depend on fairly high volition and motivation for students, and so may be more applicable to graduate students and retraining adults. However, futures forms of 'edutainment' tools for younger and adolescent students may teach effectively, via form of gaming.

What we can expect in the future is the evolution of an online learning community, perhaps e-schools as well as today's e-colleges. Today's standard learning supports, of face to face in-class education and textbooks will never disappear. But increasingly, families may turn to online learning environments – which may be given in the language of choice- and possibly offer far richer experiences than today's ICT supports in scope and depth of experience.

Such specialist ICT education aids may become especially important for the disabled and for children with special needs. A narrowcast specialist education can be provided at far lower cost, without the constraints of a physical classroom and school entry being imposed, so entitlement credentials should be lower.

8.4 Specialist teaching aids

E-learning environments will tend to evolve with 'e-learning platforms' and also specific ICT devices:

- The e-book or e-reader typically replaces or augments the textbook and the PC/laptop for traditional learning from text based on e-paper, in which some technologies can maintain the page image without power, by using reflected ambient light. The Kindle e-reader from Amazon and the Sony Reader are just two models out in 2008, with more appearing from the likes of Polymer Vision and Irex. These devices may store hundreds of books and a single charge will last for thousands of page turns and many days. A further development will be use of large display screens, again using the e-paper of e-

readers perhaps for very large displays – possibly video walls to display images up to life-size, for immersion courses, akin to virtual reality.

- Online educational institutions are turning to collaboration tools, sometimes termed virtual leaning environments (VLE). Such tools today are not just for meetings but are specifically aimed at online presentations, delivered live, as virtual classrooms based on an online learning platform. Collaboration platform examples are WiZiQ, used by the British Council or Moodle course management, which are free open source software, to be used by an educational institution. Another is Cisco's Webex, a proprietary web meeting and collaboration platform. Webex has been used by educational institutions as it offers real time collaboration via VOIP technology that allows audio and video sharing augmented by an interactive whiteboard and chat. In distance learning, Internet security features are needed when replacing the classroom– these are included in the Cisco collaboration environment. Webex is not a free platform – fees are paid per use of a classroom or a meeting. In the USA, Webex has been employed by a diverse range of education providers such as the Minnesota State Colleges and Universities, the Fox School of Business for Temple University, and others. Another real time collaboration environment is WebTrain, used by a group representing some seventy Canadian and US business schools for virtual live classes, homework assistance, tutoring, teacher aid assistance, student technical support, lecture broadcasting, board meetings, virtual labs, faculty meetings, student association meetings. It is even used for anonymous drug, rape and depression counselling.

- An interesting further development of the social networking websites such as Facebook could be a move into freely available VLEs. This could be on a voluntary basis of any 'expert' giving a web class – i.e. peer to peer content creation and teaching, as much as by educational institutions. Thus very niche skills could be taught that the family might be interested in but that are unlikely to be available from an educational centre.

- Projection technology for video and 3D video may perhaps be useful for far larger images as part of these environments. Also, haptic feedback HIFEs to give a hands-on feel with virtual reality immersion have been successfully used in training in specialist centres for surgery and pathological dissection (Hayes, 2008), aircraft pilot training, complex industrial machine training, tanker navigation and steering and even in molecular modelling for chemistry, physics and biology.

8.5 The overall effects

The home has the potential to become a fairly technically well-equipped centre for education and vocational training. Distance learning will tend to reduce exclusion from the ICT culture, as ICT literacy is taught as a by-product of the essential learning experience. The range of educational courses could also expand as narrowcast teaching in a specialist subject can be spread over a global classroom, literally, which should hold enough students to justify the course specialism. Tele-education's ease of access to courses could have many effects, not the least of which may be to enable faster learning of languages and cultural assimilation for those new to a country.

8.6 Implications for the family

Tele-education could provide education of high quality at low cost – which would tend to widen educational access, especially to higher education and especially for the more deprived in society. This in turn will tend to increase the average level of educational achievements throughout the family. It may also tend to being an equality of access for all members – so differences of gender and age will tend to disappear. Family members would be more likely to have similar levels of educational achievement. This could be driven by

greater aspirations of the family as a whole, as its horizons are widened by contact with different perspectives, attitudes and cultural norms through ICT usage. That will tend to gradually set higher target levels of educational achievement for all the family. Moreover, tele-education could also be better adapted to the different rates of learning of each family member, so that all can learn at their own pace and so perhaps assimilate more thoroughly.

9 Future family entertainment with ICTs

9.1 Entertainment and social structures in the family

ICTs seem to form much of the basis of today's family entertainment. What we see continually are predictions of the PC-based 'home –entertainment centre' dominating next year, every year from analysts. Perhaps it is becoming more true, but not yet universally true, despite the fact that ICT-based devices, systems and artefacts transform the home into the centre of entertainment life for the family. Such an environment can reinforce collective activities such as watching TV and videos but many ICT-based entertainments driving personal use – music is listened to over headphones perhaps, gaming can be shared by several competing family members. However, heavy gaming is immersion in a personally (created) world, although web-based competition with remote players may increase, as some game player manufacturers with major Internet presence sincerely hope.

9.2 Major trends

Future trends in media use seem all to be ICT based, for example:

1. The home as entertainment centre

In many OECD societies, the home becomes the 'Fortress home' – a centre for living as a refuge from a harsher external street environment in which children are increasingly restricted in their liberty to play outside. This trend is both served by and reinforced by ICTs as substitute for external experience and play. Thus time spent with each entertainment category tends to go up, but in different ways to balance with '*disposable time'*– so games go up, and TV remains fairly high but descending with variations by country. TV use varies by culture – 4- to 6 hours in the USA and UK by day – but especially for younger people may descend with music, social networking, gaming, etc. TV is increasingly watched on a laptop via the Internet in deferred time, after the broadcast, perhaps with the laptop feeding a TV display, while in the UK, 30% of the population listens to the radio at home and 37% in France. The home offerings increasingly bundle TV subscribed channels and broadband access, as a way to sell both in many OECD countries such as the USA, UK and France, which tends to drive broadband take-up in the home – some 60% of households in 2007 in the UK[61].

2. Recording technologies as the entertainment ICT basis

The trend is to storage and downloading of music and videos – with storage growing to Terabytes. This reinforces the above point as the home as entertainment centre, with off-air and CATV programmes recorded on digital video recorders (DVR) such as TiVo in the USA and Sky Plus in the UK, for later viewing[62]. In the UK, viewing in deferred time, via the BBC, the iPlayer Internet service is (surprisingly) successful – usually on a laptop. Perhaps disturbingly it also points the way as a business model: start free – charge later when take-up is

[61] All figures Ofcom, 2008.

[62] Already in 2007, some 30% of UK households had a DVR, 21% in Italy and 20% in the USA and Canada and with rapid growth - but only 7% in Japan. Across the seven largest OECD economies, pay-TV homes doubled in DVR take-up from 14 to 28 million over 2006 to 2007 (Ofcom, 2008).

solid. This is about to be enacted. From 27 November 2008, real time broadcast of the two BBC main channels will also be on the Internet – but only for viewers paying its licence fee. The general trend, as seen in Korea with mobile TV, is for TV viewing to be dispersed to other devices than the conventional large TV in the main living room and bedrooms and also to be a recorded version, as stored media in CD and DVR.

Naturally, digital recording challenges and conflicts with the media industry traditions of content distribution and control. Industry reactions, of horror have given way after the Napster experience to a reluctant acceptance of a new distribution chain forced by the consumer, with its business processes, shaped by the iTunes model from Apple of databases of stored media. Newer mobile technologies, such as 3.5G may often have business models largely based on the sale of media downloads, so the often touted convergence of media and telecommunications perhaps really only happens in the home entertainment sphere. But 3G has failed to take off.

Recording technology may move from being local media storage in the home to remote storage – from ISPs such as Amazon, Google etc. Their initiatives in 'cloud computing' with NAS, mean that the family of the future may only hold 'virtual storage' only – a list of where its preferred digital media assets reside. However, remote storage conflicts with the consumer's desire to 'own' and control media content. Virtual storage will also encounter the innate distrust of the network link, especially if streaming (ie VoD) rather than download to local media player is the mode of playback offered, if network capacity can be dimensioned for the many simultaneous streams that would imply.

3. Future trends in ICT-based entertainments – directions in gaming, music, radio and TV

The trend to increasing hours of gaming by children, adolescents and adults is now apparent, for instance, 55% of UK households have game consoles, the highest in the world outside Japan. In 2007, men were more likely than women to claim weekly use of a games console, or also a portable music player. Games and video dominate Google search terms in absolute numbers. This would tend suggest reduced TV viewing in general but watching TV over the web may grow[63].

Thus generally the trend is to more hours online.[64] Concurrent media use, (or "stacking"), is also becoming common in the OECD and this will tend to expand.[65] Moreover as gaming devices are now physical with motion sensors (e.g. the the Nintendo Wii) so shared physical games within the family (Mileham, 2008) are possible (such as simulated driving competitions, with each family member having a Wii 'steering wheel'). Advanced users are even the hacking motion sensors to produce new and different interfaces. This indicates that new ICT 'games' may appear, for example one could be physical workout classes, using the gaming device for assuring muscle exercising. These types of activities could bring shared family experiences into ICT entertainment, based on such motion sensor remote pointing devices.

Music tends to be downloaded (the i-Tunes model) today[66] and appears to the future for video too. Growth of mobile broadband connectivity has already created a thriving market for music downloads to mobile

[63] In 2007, US consumers downloaded the most TV streams per head (26), with UK consumers next (8). Growth in volume of downloads was 131% in France over 2007, and 69% in the UK (Ofcom, 2008).

[64] Today in the USA, Internet users spend the most time online – 15 hours online each week; those in Spain spend the least amount of time online, at just 7.5 hours per week. UK users rank second behind the US, at nearly14 hours per week. Internet use per user has risen the fastest in the UK over the last four years, at an average annual rate of 30%. (Ofcom 2008).

[65] Between 70% (Italy) and 83% (Japan) of consumers in the top OECD economies claim to access the Internet while watching TV. In the UK the figure is 74% (Ofcom, 2008).

[66] Audio downloads (e.g. music tracks and podcasts) were tried in 2007 by over a third of internet users in Canada (40%), Italy (39%), the US (36%) and the UK (35%) and just under a third of people in Japan (31%). It was less prevalent in Germany, where just one in five (18%) claimed they had downloaded audio (Ofcom 2008)

phones.[67] Online distribution also allows people to listen to audio service on demand rather than live.[68] While the Internet offers a new distribution channel for radio services, it can also be a substitute service for some.

4. Self-content generation – myth or reality?

Family members, especially the adolescent and young adults will generate their own content themselves, and exchange it. Already in the UK by the end of 2007, some 43% of the UK population had uploaded digital photos to a social networking website such as Bebo or Facebook, with 59% of the UK population using the mobile phone as their digital camera. As an interesting indicator, web search terms, the fastest-rising search terms on Google are exclusively concerned with user-generated content sites like 'Facebook' and 'Dailymotion' (Ofcom, 2008).

The rise of peer-to-peer content in all forms of media (video, audio, text) is expected to grow in importance, as much as commercial sale of content (TV, music, etc) from the industry players – the content providers and aggregators. This will tend to increase the bandwidth required, and make the use of asymmetric networks (where only download speeds are high) far less viable as many customers will want to upload content as well. Also personal and family tracers form a most important part of 'Self' and self-content generation and publishing, on the Web – especially the immediacy and constant presence of the mobile handset's still camera, or as a webcam, for the social networking sites.

5. Edutainment and infotainment – the services entertainments can provide for advancing the family

A more important educational tool for the future is not quite here yet. These are games and entertainment that teach while amusing, allowing people to learn through examples. Generally they combine experience of entering a story world and manipulating the features or characters in an animated instruction environment in the form of a game or story, as pioneered by US Army in 1940s. The classic example perhaps is a hands-on children's museum to tutor in a specific subject – or a game on a specific subject, e.g. geography – *Where in the World is Carmen Sandiego?* being one of the best known. This can be a group activity and also stretch to any age. It may also be used to treat issues such as health in a way that is not menacing.

Typically ideas of stories and gaming are central, with simulation to create a learning environment that is entertaining as much as learning – i.e. *gaming in learning*. Typically such programmes have a strong element of natural language semantic analysis combined with computer gaming, conversation management, gestual interpretation and virtual world graphics – far deeper than early children's educational games. They may also take into account a child's behaviour and speech patterns for conversational speech recognition.

Most of larger higher education institutions have been working on these as part of distance learning. The difference is a much higher game or entertainment ingredient. Today, some of the projects on edutainment content, that may not produce their complete results for some years are being pursued in MIT, Stanford, UC Berkeley, and Duke University. Typically they may use podcasts and recent web platform initiatives (such as iTunes U) have been conceived for this culture, more akin to the family's use of ICTs. There are also some

[67] In 2007, it accounted for over half of all digital music revenue per head in France and Italy, and 90% of the total in Japan; in the UK the figure stands at just under 30% (Ofcom, 2008).

[68] More than a third of the population in Italy, Canada, USA, and UK claim to download audio (e.g. music tracks and podcasts), but in Germany, less than 20% make the same claim. While the Internet offers a new distribution channel for radio services, it can also be a substitute service for some. Of the seven large OECD economies surveyed, on average almost one in four people (23%) said they were listening to less radio, whilst around 13% said they were listening to more radio, since getting access to the internet at home. Within the nations, a third of people in Japan and France said they listened to less radio, while one in five in Italy claimed to listen to more. (Ofcom, 2008, Market report)

European initiatives. Such research projects tend to be extremely sophisticated in their analysis of the learning process (NICE D9.3, 2005)[69] despite, in the NICE case, being based on using *fairye* tales to teach English and Swedish. A typical iTunes U podcast lasts under 5 minutes and, for instance, shows the ecological issues in everyday life to a child or adult.

In the family, edutainment could act as a tool for three major groups:

- Young children pre-school – 2- 6 years – and early school – 6-10 years
- Special educational needs for children and adults (e.g. used in prisons in the UK for literacy improvement for prisoners with no command of reading, writing or numeracy)
- Higher education – especially those in distance learning for adult education, and perhaps vocational training – some Open University (UK) content is available as iTunes podcasts.

9.3 Future technologies in entertainment ICTs

Future ICT-based entertainment will tend to evolve with a mix of standalone ad hoc devices and 'entertainment centres' with environments that allow one device to be 'plugged into' another, be it at an information or electrical signal level, and may include:

- Home entertainment centres – networking and better displays – projection, OLEDs, TVs anywhere on any piece of furniture or appliance with e-paper
- Immersion and virtual reality, with surround -TV walls– taking the family from spectator to actor to pseudo life. The ideas of TV walls may come to life with e-paper in the far future. Higher definition TV beyond MPEG-4 – and possibly 3D TV.
- Audio, TV and media futures via Web for replays and live programmes as TV and radio stations become websites with broadband access
- Mobile handset as entertainment centre
- Gaming consoles: future directions are graphics rendering with GPUs as higher power processors – beyond the IBM/Sony 'cell' processor
- Gestual and physical interfaces – significance in games, exercises, etc
- Most electronic toys become hybrids, with half on Internet to tell stories to their owners and also robotic pieces to act out theatre
- NAS and automatic back-up – perhaps no storage locally for downloaded media industry
- Home content generation – creativity as well as passive reception, using mobile phone cameras
- Second life type living games
- Aspirational entertainment – Infotainment, and edutainment for advancing the family

[69] A collaborative EC/ IST consortium project with CNRS, Liquid Media, TeliaSonera, NISlab and others

- Use of virtual-reality scenes in household rooms as décor

- Active wallpaper responds to inhabitants' moods, etc, using Internet access for colours and scene selection. Noise walls – ambience in the home – playing e.g. sounds of the sea or wind in trees from anywhere

- Participative telepresence in family events with haptic feedback for touch – a myth too far?

Collectively, many of these technologies will tend to form an even more intense concentration in the home of entertainment activities. Implications for the family are perhaps the generating of a greater family cohesion through interactions in shared ICT activities – be they games or edutainment that incorporate games. Moreover, they could take the family beyond passive watching of a wide variety of media, on a range of displays, with ever more immersion in virtual escapist worlds. They could also enable family members to stay fit through physical exercise games as well as providing education. They move well beyond the traditional limits of PC-based gaming. Instead we may have a wider definition of 'entertainment', embracing 'well-being' and education with a broadening of cultural horizons and experiences, aimed at meeting the aspirations of the family in progressing socially.

10. Where and how ICTs fail the family

Where and how ICTs fail the family is also a subject for concern as they become the warp and weft of mundane family life – the problems of security, privacy, ease of use, stress, alienation, etc, that inhibit use and take-up of ICTs more widely in the family, and a complete absence of need for some devices needs to be explicitly reviewed.

10.1 Technology push typically fails to meet family needs

The ICT industry is littered with technologies that nobody really took up – ISDN was supposed to form the next generation of network in business and homes in the mid 1980s but despite some limited success in business applications in France and Germany became known as 'idiot services user don't need' in the USA and UK. Here we look at a few failure over-optimistic technocentric wish lists

The failure of car intelligence and telematics – The modern car contains between 20% and 50% of its value at purchase in electronics, the largest item being an EMS (engine management system). However few of these systems have the design intention of lasting longer than three or four years and certainly not the average life of a car, in Europe, say, of some 16 years. Basic management systems from the engine control to door locking to air conditioning rely on sensors and integrated circuits whose lifecycles in a harsh outdoor road environment are likely to be below 5 years, at the price point of components for volume car manufacture. Effectively, this makes the car into a planned obsolescent appliance as basic operation of the vehicle is in doubt beyond this timeframe. Moreover the use of the car as a family entertainment centre with LCD screens on the back of seats, music consoles etc, may be fine for a short vehicle life, not for the longer term.

iPod jackets – Some of the current *hype du jour* about smart clothing is that it will extend beyond useful applications, for the emergency services, military and medical uses (such as warning monitors for onsets of attacks such as asthma, stroke and epilepsy) into entertainment. While the former are useful, and perhaps medical sensors in clothing will be essential for some family members, the addition of electronics into clothing as a way of listening to music or watching a film on 3D glasses with the image projected in the lower half of the lens seem less than useful or attractive.

Intelligent agents – Despite the prognostications of techno-optimists, giving responsibility for lifestyle decisions to intelligent agents or even allowing proxy agents to possess detailed information (especially of a financial nature) is a disaster waiting to happen.

The smart house **–** Periodically over the past 100 years, the smart house as a general environment for all homes returns as the object of (perhaps misplaced) awe. Be it 1910, 1930, 1950 or 1990, electronically drawn curtains as the sun sets have not caught on in a big way, nor even robot vacuum cleaners. In this regard ICTs have failed the family for reasons of non-utility against expense – the lack of sufficient need to computerise the physical infrastructure of the house, despite the dreams of the appliance manufacturers with periodic requests for EC funds to finance research projects in 'domotique'. Really the smart house has stopped functionally at the automatically opening garage door, a 1950s technology. The derisory satire of 'Mon Oncle'[70] is as valid today as 1958. The only interesting directions here are not really in complex home automation perhaps but in energy conversion with financial savings for the family – better layers of heat insulation, use of solar panels for electricity, using sunlight to heat water, etc with quite sophisticated control systems for energy management. This is more in line with the trend in most families to greater ecological awareness and a feeling that the environment matters.

10. 2 Alienation, addiction and reading impairment

Digital technology is making an enormous amount of digital material available to the family in forms of high-impact visual, audio, graphics and text, which must affect mentalities and behaviours. A common theme in the literature on social impacts of ICTs is whether and to what extent ICTs can be addictive and lead to alienation from other members of the family. Adolescence and earlier is the main period in which these behaviours of immersion and perhaps 'dehumanisation' may occur, usually through persistent gaming to the exclusion of all else, including watching TV. Whether playing violent video games is associated with an increase in violent behaviour in reality is a controversial subject. There are a few published studies that make a link between children who watch violent television shows and play violent video games and more aggressive behaviour in the playground, and there are concerns that this may lead on to violent behaviour as these children become adults (Lynch, 2001).

Conversely, other studies conclude that there is no causal link between violence in video games and real aggression. A review by psychologist Jonathan Freedman of over 200 published studies found that the 'vast and overwhelming majority' did not find a causal link (Freedman, 2002).

Beyond gaming are the virtual worlds (or metaverses) such as Second Life (Kumar, 2008) and environments between games virtual worlds, such as SIM City. Unlike online games, these metaverses offer a seamless persistent world where users can transparently roam, as avatars of themselves, without predefined objectives. As such they may be more addictive and compelling, while anti-social behaviour may be encouraged, being hidden behind the avatar proxy. In contrast with these closed worlds, the Internet's openess and some of its social networking may turn the family member (typically young) away from the family to an outside set of 'web friends. But this is not necessarily alienating – it may be opening up the social world and sharing experiences, despite the hazards.

There is also the charge that the Internet is dumbing us down. In many OECD countries, children's homework is increasingly a collection of Internet material found via search engines (Carr, 2008). Also when we read online we may become mere decoders with less ability to interpret text, which bodes ill for popular learning, especially as much content on the Internet is informal, although it appears to be reliable in a 'media is

[70] J. Tati, tournage 1956, Specta Film, Alter Film, Gray Films, release, 1958

the massage' type of syndrome of credibility – the reason for which phishing spam is so successful in netting up the family's banking details.

10.3 Privacy

Concerns over family privacy and data protection are increasing, particularly with ICTs that use sensors and smart tags which can track users' movements, habits and preferences. Family privacy in an ICT environment is about personal data and its protection. However this strays into areas of security with identify theft. Increasingly there is a conflict between the Internet commercial industry (web advertisers, ISPs and various tracking intermediaries) and its users, brought about by intrusive industry practices for tracking user preferences and personal details, for commercial ends. The family, as a fairly naïve user, usually has little defence against the installation of tracking cookies, let alone more malicious software such as key loggers, although both are the basis of identity theft. Google and Yahoo place cookies which track and report every access by every user of their search engines.

Furthermore the family has no control of how personal data collected by commerce and government is guarded/protected, used, or handed on to others, be they benign, commercially avaricious, or criminally so. For instance in 2007, Facebook launched a system called Beacon that revealed all its users' online purchases to their friends, as defined in your Facebook contact list. Finally this was made easier to opt out of – but not withdrawn – after Facebook users protested in large numbers and stopped using the website (Ante, 2008). In 2008, NebuAd in the USA was accused of privacy violations by a US Congressional committee over its service for ISPs of tracking online purchases for targeted advertising, to provide behavioural targeting for ISPs. Generally users want far more control of the data available about themselves (Dyson, 2008). Such concepts about usage of personal data on the Internet is set by the norms of the family, and also friends, in their ideas as a group of what is safe and permissible.

Distrust by the family of the Internet is likely to be the eventual result. It applies equally to government attempts to harness the Internet, as governments are as bad as private commerce at treating electronically gathered data without responsibility or care.

This distrust is amplified by the Internet industry's policy of applying data gathering and its resale without permission, unless the user opts out, which is difficult to do sometimes, especially if the user is unaware of it being in operation. A change to having an opt-in only policy is the sole approach to countering suspicions growing ever stronger. Data gathering must be declared and made transparent, with what will happen to the data and the dangers explained. Then the user has to positively give her or his acceptance of the tracking. The no-reply case is a rejection. Moreover the length of time that such data can be kept should be scrutinised – Google has reduced this from two years to nine months but there are questions of why so much data is held for so long – what is justifiable must be clarified, if the user does accept the data gathering.

The questions raised by privacy problems for ICT usage eventually will be seen not just from the point of view of the economic damage but also from the social and ethical damage, which will drive the legal/regulatory measures required to respond:

Figure 7. Privacy problems need to be seen from a social as well as an economic viewpoint



Such dangers also apply to other ICT areas of networking such as mobile phones. For instance, in the UK, tracking physical locations of customers may be carried out via cell-ID or other method, usually simple triangulation. The data may handed on to those willing to pay for it, without the mobile user's knowledge or consent as there is no specific legal protection. Only the commercial policy of the MNO dictates how freely such data can be sold. With social networking on the mobile phone, ISPs such as Facebook, GyPSii and Bliin are most interested to buy this data and so gain the location of users, in order to track them in real time for localised advertising, and perhaps alerts for proximity to friends and even potential dates for dating services. Some 50 million people at the start of 2008 used mobile social networking (NY Times, 2008).

Tomorrow's data protection will have to be far stronger if the family is to participate willingly in the knowledge society. The sheer scale and technical capacity of the new technologies will magnify this problem. Who will ultimately control the data collected by all the eyes and ears embedded in the environment surrounding us?

10. 4 Family insecurities and ICTs

Coupled with the fears over loss of privacy is a trend is towards an increasing lack of security felt users at several levels – for personal safety as well as for identity theft, a financial fraud through a widening variety of mobile and Internet scams as well as transaction insecurity for shopping and banking. Here we have to ask – what is the ICT infrastructure that the family will depend on and how should they be protected?

Secure Internet access requires rethinking the Internet technically and in a functional sense – all the layers of addressing, session control, authentication of identification of senders and receivers. Thus ICT infrastructure in world of 'man-in the middle' attacks and other more sophisticated fraud mechanism needs a layer of in-built security for authentication and authorisation with audit for access control. There various main threats via Internet access, from a PC:

- Identity theft
- Malware
- Phishing
- Website impersonation
- Character impersonation
- Stalking
- Spam
- Cyber attacks, personal, corporate or large-scale, eg on Baltic states

These threats are likely to be expanded in new ways with mobile access to the Internet, for instance:

- Blocking viruses which dial premium rate or even emergency services –e.g. Japan
- Tracking location for physical stalking
- Call-back scams

Such failures in confidence are likely to multiply in the future, as 'the Internet of Things' comes into its own, if more and more mundane objects become intelligent, in some limited way. Invisible and constant data exchange between things and people, and between things and other things may occur, quite unknown to the owners and originators of such data. For instance, public concerns and active campaigns by consumers have already been raised over commercial trials of RFID tags by major retailers, and also for RFID usage in passports, which may be read by commercially available devices in proximity to travellers.

How does this impact at a family level? The attitudes learned within the family as group-think may act in the security precautions taken. However, there is a dilemma for many families. Between many parents and children a major gap exists between some parents' knowledge of the Internet and its dangers, let alone how parental controls can be used, or how efficient they are. Thus the dangers of unsupervised child access without any parental guidance have already led to problems of child security, especially with social networking websites. Here we see the issues of a balance between the responsibilities of ISPs, parental Web education and children's Internet freedoms not being adequately met. Pornography and highly violent material on the Internet is increasing, so that in 2006, Internet pornography revenues were estimated at $97 billion (Joyce, 2008) – more than the revenues of Google, Microsoft, eBay or Amazon in that year.

10.5 Added complications of ICTs in family life

Stress through ICTs – The literature is rich in studies on the additional stress brought about by mobile phones and email as family members are increasingly contactable at any time in any place in their working environment, and by family members and others they may not wish to speak to. Free time seems to have telescoped down while family members are not sure if they really do more – a common theme that emerged in the research. There is a wider literature on time stress, especially North American, also expressed as 'time

famine', 'the time squeeze' or the 'harried leisure class'. This might be seen as an apparent paradox in that while data on the family's time budget has demonstrated that those in employment have gained slightly more leisure time (or rather 'non-work time'), the new technologies allow people more multitasking activities. Hence they may incite a frenetic and stressed state of mind. One first qualification is that there are national variations in perceptions reflecting perhaps not just different objective circumstances but also different expectations. For example, in surveys asking working people if they felt rushed, 25% said yes in Germany compared to 11% in Spain (Garhammer, 2006).

The failure of the HIFE – in using ICTs, older family members especially have major problems not so much in accepting ICT usage but in using it, because the human interface environment (HIFE) is so poor. Low-grade programming is usually the problem combined with lack of ergonomic understanding – 'Korean VCR syndrome', for instance, refers to the Korean VCR of the 1980s which was impossible to programme to record a TV programme off-air automatically. It extends now into many mobile phones, so that there has been a reaction to ever more complex handset interfaces, including physically smaller keyboards, to much better human interfaces with touchscreens – the iPhone from Apple has to the surprise of the incumbent manufacturers redefined the mobile market through its HIFE.

ICT literacy levels needed – In 1998 the whole of Asia suffered a financial crisis, which South Korea was particularly touched by. As part of its recovery programme it put in place a set of short courses for adult education in ICTs aimed at upskilling some of the workforce and also hoping to increase the take-up and thus sales of ICTs. Eventually this programme ICT educated some 10 million people (Forge, 2008). In consequence, two effects were claimed – that Korea did advance towards a knowledge-based society and that the economy did benefit in consumption of ICTs.

This highlights a key question for ICT production for the family – do we have a digital divide, i.e. in the sense that there is an environment for the young of acceptance of ICTs and a failure for the older family members in learning ICTs as it was not part of their early life. This must form a barrier. Possibly the solutions are in two directions. The first is the explicit – making ICT services and devices intuitive to use. This is massively successful in the market as Apple's Macintosh has shown, forcing the largest software player to move towards easier interfaces, such as WIMPS. The second is implicit – if the family environment is one in which family members demonstrate to each other a) that something is useful and b) that it can be mastered, there will be a diffusion of skills and education. Inevitably in some (not all) families this may be from the younger to the older members.

10.7 ICTs, sustainability and the family

The family's behaviour often acts as the expression of social norms and concerns. One of the most significant recent trends is how people – as a family – view the world, in their perception of the environment and what their interaction with it should be. Learned behaviour through the family, as 'group-think' expressed in habits, perspectives and attitudes colour people's environmental concerns and patterns of reaction throughout their lives. ICTs in the home thus become a subject for environmental consideration as families begin to realise that consumer electronics are a major contributor to greenhouse gas emissions through the power they demand. For example, in the UK, by 2020 near half of all the domestic electricity supply could be taken by consumer electronics in some of the worst-case assessments, unless ICT technology improves. It is expected to rise over 50% by 2010 (Edwards, 2008) from 17.4TWh in 2005 to 27.3TWh in 2010 and then 37.5 TWh by 2020 with 40% of the total being for domestic TVs alone. With other ICTs such as laptops with 80% of their power going to TFT-LCD backlights, the same technology as LCD TVs, this could rise to over 50 TWh. However the ICT device / service and its use is embedded in the design. In the home, ICT advances in two areas could cut this – firstly in the microprocessor's electrical power demands (Forge, 2007). However new microprocessor and

semiconductor technologies (at hardware and software levels) could make a reduction but the real power savings are more likely to come from advanced display technologies, such as OLEDs and e-paper replacing the current LCD transmissive technology[71] and its backlight. Impacts on families in a social sense may be underpin the major 'green' trend, towards purchasing devices which consume less electricity and put out less heat. There is also the recycling side be it for devices or disposables such as cartridges for inkjet printers. Ecological responsibility will drive towards less wasteful and more re-usable designs and technologies in ICTs within the family.

10.8 Conclusion

When everyday items come equipped with some or all of the five senses, combined with computing and communication capabilities, concepts of surreptitious data collection and ulterior usage requiring the family's consent risks being ignored by a combination of industry pushing government. Far more concerted efforts are needed to ensure that informed consent, data confidentiality and security are safeguarded. This will involve all government, civil society and private sector players to protect these values. Development of more intelligence in the everyday objects that the family uses will be held back if irresponsible practices are not prevented. Note that these extend into the very architecture of the Internet.

It is only through awareness and monitoring for security of these technological advances, and the challenges they present, that a safe and user-centric employment of ICTs will appear for the family to feel secure in. To promote a more widespread adoption of such ICTs, these principles (of informed consent, data confidentiality for privacy and security) must be safeguarded. Moreover, protecting the family will need to go beyond technical and market-based solutions, to be part of regulatory and socio-ethical measures in law.

Because the Internet is so fluid, *international* measures are needed to combat the spread of the most immediately damaging effects – fraud, privacy and other threats to the family – if society is to take its responsibilities seriously, and ensure that family interaction with the Internet is made safe.

[71]SCF Associates is currently researching these two display technologies and their disruptive significance for the European ICT industry for EC/JRC/IPTS and has noted that significant power savings may be available in the future for laptops, TVs and mobile handsets but that many technical issues need to be resolved before these technologies can become mass market contenders.

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List of abbreviations

3G	Third Generation Mobile
3.5G	Extension of 3G – higher speed data, up/down link (hopefully 10MBps or more)
CDMA	Code Division Multiple Access
CR	Cognitive Radio
DSL	Digital Subscriber Line
Flash OFDM	Flash Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing
GPRS	General Packet Radio Service
GPU	Graphics Processing Unit
GSM	Global System for Mobile Communications (originally Groupe Spécial Mobile)
HIFE	Human interface environment
IPv6	Internet Protocol Version 6
ISDN	Integrated Services Digital Network
LTE	Long term evolution – an ITU supported mobile standard for an evolution of 3G UMTS
MIMO	Multiple Input Multiple Output
MMS	Multimedia Messaging Service
MNO	Mobile Network Operator
NAS	Network attached storage
PSTN	Public Switched Telephone Network
RFID	Radio Frequency Identification
SMS	Short Message Service
UMTS	Universal Mobile Telecommunications System
UWB	Ultra Wide Band
VLC	Visible Light Communications – using light beams for network signally as an alternative wireless technology – may use modulation of voltage to electric lighting fixtures

VLE	Virtual leaning environment
VoD	Video on demand – video access, usually from remote storage, usually over a network
VoIP	Voice over Internet Protocol
VPN	Virtual Private Network – a form of closed user group network, based on public connections and perhaps Internet services
W-CDMA	Wideband Code-Division Multiple-Access
WiBro	Wireless Broadband
WiFi	Wireless Fidelity
WiMax	Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access – a mobile /fixed radio Communication standard
WIMPS	Windows, icons, mice and pull-down menus systems
xDSL	Refers collectively to all types of digital subscriber lines
XHTML	Extensible HyperText Mark-up Language

ANNEX II

The Future of Integrated Family Policy. The Long-term Prospects: 2025/30

Scoping Paper

October 2008

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Introduction

Clearly, in most of the OECD countries the responsible authorities have recognized, more or less explicitly, the fundamental role families play in upholding social cohesion. An enormous amount of literature has already been dedicated to cross-national comparison of family policies or to policy approaches that specifically target families (see list of references in Annex). The interactions between financial support to families, childcare policies, women's employment patterns and fertility levels have also been widely documented.

The main goal of this scoping paper is, therefore, to identify key trends and current changes that will challenge policy makers. It will also explore what will be at stake in family-related issues in the near future along with further investigations into the tensions and dilemmas policy stakeholders are likely to encounter. To achieve this goal, I will draw on a review of the most recent literature[1] and on the results of my own research.

The paper is structured as follows. Section one will briefly investigate whether there is a trend towards convergence in family policies and will partly answer the following questions. How, and to what extent, are some 'family policies' integrated and well structured? Why are others fragmented and poorly coordinated? In section two, the impact of more or less integrated government policies will be assessed (through the lens of fertility outcomes, poverty, mothers' participation in the workforce, or gender equality). Upcoming issues and challenges will then be identified and described. Consensus and disagreements among "experts" over those issues will also be reviewed. To conclude, we will try to assess the odds of the adoption of a more integrated and coordinated approach in family policies. For a more in-depth treatment, three countries would make excellent candidates: Germany, France, and Sweden.

1. Policy approaches that specifically target families: a growing convergence…

Factors that have triggered some convergence: similarities between OECD countri*es*

- An overall increase in mothers' labour force participation rates (the so-called "Quiet Revolution", Goldin, 2006) that has marked the demise of the male-breadwinner model: reforms to enhance work/life balance have gained momentum in many Western European countries since the 1990s. The Nordic countries and the Netherlands (with a large share of women working part-time, however) were already by 2007 well above the Lisbon target (68 percent or more) while in Spain, Italy, and the former socialist countries this target has not yet been met.

- Increase in levels of female educational attainment: this has gone hand in hand with changes in value systems and preference shifts. Women of childbearing age now seek to be financially independent and to protect themselves against any risks linked to economic uncertainty and marriage instability.

- Decline in fertility rates: below replacement levels (except in the US, France, Ireland, and Norway) in most advanced industrialised countries, hence the average family size has become smaller (Chart 5, p.14).

- Rise in the median age at which men and women first get married and have children.

[1]Given the vast literature in the fields investigated in this paper, I restricted this review to the recently published documentation.

- Disconnection between marriage and parenting and the development of cohabitation, (both of which have gradually spread across all social groups): this mirrors the phenomenon of "family de-institutionalisation".

- Increasing importance of gender equality issues on the policy agenda: promoting or at least paying lip service to the equal sharing of domestic and family responsibilities between partners in order to ensure women's access to professional life.

- Changes, albeit slowly, in the attitudes and behaviour of young fathers.

- The process of "social learning"[2]: widespread across OECD countries with the Nordic countries as "ideal models".

- Growing concern about social cohesion: this goes in tandem with controversies over the role that families can play.

- The role of European legislation: the politics of work/family life balance are backed by EU legislation (Orloff, 2006, Häusermann and Palier, 2008) (see, for instance, the Directive on Parental Leave). The Lisbon target of achieving a female employment rate of 60 percent by 2010 also plays a significant role in creating incentives to develop work/family programmes.

Yet countries differ in their policy responses to those changes and country differences persist in the timing, pace and direction of those changes (Hantrais, 2004, Hantrais, 2007). For instance, France and Sweden demonstrate high rates of birth outside of marriage whereas in Southern Europe, Germany, and Austria, although they are increasing, these rates remain comparatively low.

In social policy for families and children, fragmented approaches remain mostly the rule…

Few countries have adopted an explicit and comprehensive family policy. Instead, most countries have an amalgam of programmes, policies, and laws that are targeted at families with children (Thévenon, 2008). They may also exhibit similar objectives but with different priorities which include but are not limited to: promoting women's employment, fighting poverty, enhancing gender equality, and targeting population groups at risk.

A large consensus has been reached, however, about how to define the "family": it is the presence of children and no longer marriage that defines "family" whether in same-sex or traditional households. As far as child benefits and family or childcare allowances are concerned eligibility criteria are largely "neutral" in regard to the status of the parents (i.e., married or cohabiting).

…and strong disparities persist: the European patchwork

The following points are important to take into consideration:

- To gain a better understanding of disparities between countries the institutional setting; historical background; and value systems or cultural norms should also be taken into account. As pointed out by

[2] Which Peter Hall (1993, p. 278) defines "as a deliberate attempt to adjust the goals or techniques of policy in response to past experience and new information. Learning is indicated when policy changes are the result of such a process".

de Henau et al. (2006) "the major element determining the conception and design of policies remains the set of prevailing cultural values, social ideas and historical legacies".

- Though they share common trends in demographic and social development, OECD countries differ substantially in the timing and degree to which these developments occurred and are still occurring. They also differ in their explicit or implicit focus on family-related issues.

- They diverge in their emphasis on social investment in those (children) who promise "returns" (Esping-Andersen, 2002).

Nonetheless all member countries of the EU as well as other OECD countries (e.g., Quebec in Canada and Japan) have developed programmes for providing financial support to families but levels of spending in this domain also differ considerably between countries (Charts 1, 2, 3 in annex). The remarkable generosity of the Nordic countries, for example, contrasts sharply with the modest contributions made by countries in the Southern bloc of member states: Greece, Portugal, Italy and Spain (Fagnani, Math, 2008, Thévenon, 2006, Bradshaw, 2006b).

When it comes to expressing family/children expenditures as a percentage of GDP (Chart 2, p.8), Denmark tops the table at 3.9 per cent while the Netherlands and the UK (both allocating less than 2 per cent of GDP) bring up the rear (Fagnani, Math, 2008). Nordic countries also top the table in the category of benefits in kind: from 1.5 per cent of GDP in Sweden to over 2 per cent in Denmark. These benefits in kind are governed by the principle of universality which provides families with access to services regardless of income.

Some countries give priority to the fight against poverty: irrespective of the size of the family, the UK is by far the most generous in terms of providing assistance to low earnings families among the EU member countries. Austria, however, is far and away the most generous country when it comes to cash provision to families. Bringing up the rear at the opposite end of the spectrum is the Netherlands.

Family Policies in France, Germany and Sweden: a more in-depth treatment

France and Germany are part of the cluster of countries whose welfare regimes are qualified 'conservative-corporative' (sometimes also termed 'Christian democratic', 'Continental', 'Corporatist' or 'Bismarckian', Arts, Gelissen, 2002). They are each marked by high levels of spending and of payroll tax financing. Both also provide unemployment benefits which depend mainly on former contributions and status. As far as the main social insurance programmes are concerned (i.e., pension, health care and disability), both welfare states are consistent with this description.

Family policies, in particular, have much in common. Both are linked in several ways to employment policy, and both are explicit, clearly-defined and generous in terms of cash benefits. In Germany the appointment of a Minister and in France of a Junior minister responsible for family issues demonstrates the importance given to this issue. France strongly differs, however, from Germany with regard to childcare policy and public support to working mothers.

Sweden is classified as a member of the 'social democratic' cluster. Family policy places particular emphasis on public social services which are by any definition extensive when compared to other countries (excepting the other Nordic countries). The issue of gender equality is high on their policy agenda and they provide crucial support for women's participation in the labour force.

France: a hybrid system characterized by ambivalence and inconsistency

Who are the stakeholders? Who decides? Theoretically the social partners, in reality the government

France's policy for families is 'explicit' insofar as it is overseen by institutions and the subject of official reports produced annually. The 'family' as such is legally recognised as an institution that plays an important role in the maintenance of social cohesion. A special branch of the social security administration is devoted to family policy of which the principal administration is carried out by the CNAF (the National Family Allowance Fund) which covers 92 per cent of all recipient families. As representatives on the Executive Board of CNAF it is theoretically the social partners' responsibility i.e. representatives of trade unions and employers along with the family associations (represented by the *'Union Nationale des Associations Familiales'*, UNAF), to periodically examine the orientations in the social protection sphere for intervention in family policy. Indeed, the president of the Executive Board is traditionally a member of the tiny CFTC ('Christian Trade union'). In practice decisions have been made by the government, whether approved or not by the Executive Board of the CNAF, in the last decades.

Where parental leave policies are concerned the government is also a key actor in the decision making process. 'Family laws' are drafted and ratified through legislative organs and an agreement, known as the *'Convention d'objectifs et de gestion'*, (COG), is made for a four year period between the CNAF and the State. Additionally, spending by the CNAF is tightly controlled by the Ministry of Finance and the *'Cour des comptes'* (Court of accounts). Another body, the *'Haut Conseil de la Population et de la Famille'* , established in 1985, is a committee restricted to a purely advisory role which produces reports and provides recommendations to the government on family issues and demography. Finally, the *'Conférence de la Famille'* is a meeting held annually since 1994 and provides a platform for exchange between the government, family associations, and various social partners. It generally serves as a platform for the government to announce new measures. According to new plans, this conference is set to be replaced in the future by a permanent council on the family ('*Haut Conseil de la Famille'*).

The UNAF is a powerful lobby which gathers together several family associations or federations. This very influential actor has exerted a strong influence on family policy since the establishment of Social Security in 1945 and is mainly funded by a percentage of the total amount of family benefits[3]. Despite a certain ideological diversity inside the UNAF they have always promoted 'familialism' and, on the whole, emphasized the stay-at-home option for mothers having a child aged less than three.

Employer groups, primarily MEDEF (*Mouvement des entreprises de France)* which represents large enterprises but also 'CGPME' (small to medium-sized companies), have never much focused on family issues and have demonstrated little enthusiasm toward parental leave schemes. This comes as no surprise when we take into consideration that it is mainly the social contributions paid by employers which fund family benefits, an anathema to management in this age of cost cutting and efficiency. When decision was taken in 2002, for instance, to extend paid statutory paternity leave from three days up to two weeks it was strongly opposed by MEDEF who complained that the plan was "unfunded" (i.e. they were concerned that this leave would be funded out of contributions levied on pay.)

Because of France's traditionally low rate of union membership (only 6% of the overall workforce rising to 10% in the public sector) and high degree of fragmentation, unions have been neither able nor strongly willing to demonstrate any real influence on the outcomes of periodic reforms to family policies.

[3] Family Associations receive a sum equal to 0.04% of the total amount of family benefits allocated by CNAF.

Despite the fact that 123 CAFs (Local Family Allowance Funds) play a pivotal role in the policies providing support and services in kind to families in numerous areas, a large number of administrative departments, stakeholders and social partners (like the family associations) are involved in these areas. For instance, in childcare provision for pre-schoolers, care responsibilities are shared between the state (CNAF, Ministry in charge of social policies, Ministry of Education, local authorities) and social partners (mainly the UNAF). Unlike the UK, enterprises, non-profit/voluntary organisations, and the market still play only a minor role in comparison to the state. Currently however, for-profit providers are increasingly being considered as real partners in policy development and service delivery in France. These services are, nevertheless, poorly coordinated. The most recent report of the National Audit Office (*Cour des Comptes*) released in July 2008 therefore recommended to "reinforce the coherence of their respective intervention".

Cash benefits and benefits in kind

The French system of transfers has its roots in a long-established *natalist* tradition which continues to favour large families. The taxation system (*Quotient familial*) still favours married couples where only one of the spouses is in paid work. This is at odds with the objective of promoting gender equality on the labour market and indicative of the ambiguous gender assumptions underpinning the French welfare state. Recent analysis shows the growing hold that employment policies have had on family policy since the beginning of the eighties (Fagnani, 2007, Fine-Davis and al., 2004). Contrary to Germany, France has failed to make its parental leave policies more egalitarian in their approach and remains a laggard country. Indeed, French family policy has not said 'farewell to maternalism' (Orloff, 2006):

In stark contrast with Sweden (see further), French family policy pursues multiple and heterogeneous goals: fighting against poverty, tackling social inequality, encouraging parents to create employment (by subsidizing childcare arrangements), helping parents in 'combining' family and working life, etc. The visibility of family policy has often been lost in the multiplicity of allowances and benefits (27 in all, regulated by 15,000 eligibility clauses).

Despite these shortcomings, France remains a successful country insofar as fertility levels and mothers' employment rates are concerned. A complex bundle of factors helps to explain this phenomenon:

- France has a well-established and long-standing early childhood system dating back to the end of the 19th century. This helps to explain why *crèches* and nursery schools enjoy such widespread popular support.

- The existence of a large and family-friendly public sector where the job is for life and where women, who are overrepresented, are provided with various perks which include, but are not limited to, flexible schedules and generous sick leave for children. About 25 per cent of employed women in France are working in the public sector (of which they make up 55 per cent).

- Public expenditures towards the development of child care arrangements and parental leaves have dramatically increased over the last three decades. Despite the overall background of cost containment, the system of public *crèches* has suffered no funding cutbacks.

- Family policies and cultural norms have interacted: early socialisation of young children is socially valued and French women don't feel obliged to choose between maternity and a job.

Germany: a paradigmatic shift but still a segmented approach

In Germany, family policy is under the supervision of "*Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend*", (BmFSFJ). The Federal Constitutional Court plays a key part in the development of family policy. It can insist that the Government adopt measures likely to have a decisive impact on public finance, such as, for example, an increase in child benefits (*Kindergeld*).

According to the principle of subsidiarity (the idea that social services should be provided for at the lowest possible level in the community, public authorities playing a role only in the event that churches and families are unable to do so) the family was long considered as the best environment for raising a pre-school age child. Only if the mother or members of the family were in difficulty should a child be under the care of a public authority. Thus for a long time the public authorities confined themselves to a supervisory role, with denominational organisations playing a central role in the caring sector and religiously based voluntary associations being assigned substantial responsibility in the administration of social services, a situation dating back to first half of the 19th Century.

Pre-school childcare (for children aged between 3 and 6) provision has improved significantly since the progressive implementation of the 1996 law that put local councils under the obligation of offering places in kindergartens to all children in this age range. The *Länder* were held responsible for giving grants to local councils to enable them to fulfil this duty.

Decisions on the different responsibilities are in effect made by the State and local councils according to constitutional law: the former defines the key orientations, but leaves responsibility for dealing with the consequences to the latter. To this end, local councils have to work in co-operation with voluntary-sector providers, most often the Churches. In 2005 an additional law came into force ('*Tagesbetreuungsausbaugesetz'*) which stipulates that 20 per cent of children under 3 be provided with places. When it comes to children *below* the age of 3, West Germany is actually near the bottom end of the EU, with a quota below 5 per cent.

Since the end of the nineties far-reaching changes in family policy have, however, been introduced. Legislators have increasingly distanced themselves from the traditional model of the male as 'sole breadwinner' and recently introduced radical changes in the domain of parental leave and child care provision (Fagnani, Math, 2007, Klammer, Letablier, 2007). Indeed, concern over the low birth rate, and the political will to attract qualified women into the labour market have refocused attention on family policy in recent years (see Chart).

Germany has made significant strides forward through the recent adoption of new regulations on parental leave, which share many similarities to those found in Sweden. Since 2007, parents who interrupt their employment to care for a newborn baby get a parental leave benefit replacing 67 per cent of their net income from work (up to a ceiling E 1,800 per month) for up to 14 months (two months of which are reserved to the father). This new tax-financed scheme can be interpreted as a significant reorientation in German family policy. The benefits provided during parental leave therefore no longer target poor parents but rather seek to compensate working parents for a temporary loss of income. One of the aims was to give well-educated women incentives to have children, since a growing number of them remain childless in Germany and also to provide incentives for mothers to return faster than before to the labour market (in particular those who are highly qualified).

Despite these changes the taxation system (as in France) still favours married couples where only one of the spouses is in paid work which is inconsistent with the goal of encouraging qualified mothers to go back to employment after the one-year parental leave. Moreover, due to the high rate of West German mothers working only part-time, many women in (Western) Germany only contribute a small share to household incomes and

still depend economically on their male partners. In addition, child care norms remain rather traditional: in 2002, 55.8 per cent of West Germans surveyed agreed with the view that 'a pre-school age child is likely to suffer if his/her mother goes out to work' compared to 32.7 per cent of East Germans and 42.4 per cent of French respondents[4].

It is noteworthy that from 1995 onwards there has been a dramatic increase in family targeted social protection spending and cash benefits in Germany whereas in France this percentage has decreased (Chart 3, p.9). This huge increase has had no impact whatsoever on fertility level.

Sweden: a coherent and integrated approach, a successful regime

It has been largely documented that the welfare policies of the Nordic regimes aim to ensure full employment of *all adults* by means of activation, work-care infrastructure, and public sector employment. The high level of these activation policies provides the means for the large scope of tax-financed welfare (Kvist, 2003, Häusermann and Palier, 2008). Research has shown, however, that the national schemes developed by Nordic countries to support parents of young children differ from each other in several important aspects (Eydal, 2005, Leira, Saraceno, 2008).

In stark contrast to France, the Swedish family policy is very coherent: The principle of universality underpins the system of family allowances and *horizontal distribution* is applied: "child benefits" are neither income-related nor means-tested. The parental leave scheme is insurance-based and paid at 80 per cent of the former salary for one year (with a father-quota).

The main objectives of this policy are promoting gender equality both in the family and in the workplace; ensuring child's welfare; and providing people with the opportunities and financial means to have the number of children they desire. State support for an extensive childcare programme is aimed straightforwardly at supporting working parents and hence at improving gender equality.

As far as the tax regime is concerned, the presence of children plays no role in how income tax is calculated. The tax regime was created with the sole objective of *vertical redistribution*. Taxes are assessed on an *individual* basis with the result that the partner earning least, usually the woman, is not penalised for this fact (unlike France and Germany).

Hoem (2005) has claimed that it is in fact the whole political culture of Sweden, as opposed to specific policies, that makes the friendlier country toward promoting the needs of families, children, and women. Indeed, the Swedish family policy proves to be effective in terms of its impact on fertility behaviour (1.85 in 2007, see Chart in annex and Table), gender equality and mothers' participation in the labour market. Moreover, as demonstrated by Coats and Lehki (2008) "if the EU 15 countries are analysed on the basis of their welfare state regimes it becomes clear that the Nordic model generates superior performance on the dimensions of both job security and job quality".

[4] Source: 'International Social Science Programme on Family and Changing Gender Roles', 2002 Survey.

2. Taking Stock: the Impact of Family-related Social Policies

Family policies are encapsulated by a wider set of social policies. Frontiers between different social policy areas are not always clear-cut and it is sometimes difficult to disentangle the outcomes of the various sets of measures implemented. With this in mind we must consider the impact, whether direct or indirect, of policies on fertility and women's employment patterns, in particular for those having children. To accomplish this we have the benefit of an enormous body of research which allows us to document the clear association between high fertility rates and mothers' participation on the labour market.

Women and part-time jobs: wide divergence between countries

Some countries place strong emphasis on part-time work as a means to better combine paid work and "unpaid work". In this way the Netherlands is classified, according to Welfare states typologies, as belonging to the cluster of countries qualified as representing the "one and a half breadwinner model" together with Germany (Tables 3 and 4, p. 13) and the UK. More specifically, the Netherlands is rather atypical in regards to the patterns of female participation in the labour market. According to Eurostat, in 2006, this country exhibited the highest share in the EU of female employees working part-time (74 per cent) of which 57 percent worked less than 20 hours. The volume and concentration of part-time work among mothers in the Netherlands distinguishes this country from any other[5].

Nevertheless, Ireland, Italy (where the proportion of women working part-time has historically been very low), Spain, Germany, Austria and Korea all witnessed a dramatic increase in the share of women working part-time from 1990 to 2005[6]. In Japan, from 1986 to 1996, part-time employment[7] accounted for 93 per cent of the growth in women's employment and was widely spread among married women with children (Gottfried, 2008) (Table 7, p.19 and table 8, p. 20).

In France, the norm for employed mothers is still to work full-time although part-time jobs have been increasing over the last three decades due to a regulation favourable to their development (Afsa and Buffeteau, 2006). It has been largely documented, however, that while policies regulating working time can help to free up parental care-giving time, they also have some potentially problematic consequences (i.e., an associated rise in nonstandard-hour scheduling and the possibility of negative effects on gender equality).

Childcare provisions: still patchy in most of the OECD countries

Where children are concerned, marked differences emerge on how caring responsibility should be divided between State, market, voluntary associations and family. Childcare policies are deeply embedded in a set of cultural values and norms. Indeed, Castles (2003, p. 225) concluded in his article on below replacement fertility in 21 OECD countries that "the only aspects of family-friendly public policy associated with fertility outcomes are formal child-care provision and the proportion of women reporting that they work flexi-time, both of them variables measuring aspects of the policy environment cutting across the public/private divide".

[5]The proportion of employed mothers (with children under 12) who worked part-time in 2005, varied from 78 percent in the Netherlands (with 18 percent working under 15 hours a week), 61 percent in Germany (with 27 percent working under 15 hours a week), 59 percent in the UK and 52 percent in Austria.

[6] See OECD database on Usual Weekly Working Hours, 2007.

[7]In Japan, a part-time worker is considered anyone whose weekly hours fall below those of regular workers in the same establishment.

Against the background of an increase in female employment, the development of public child care provision is a key trend. For instance in the UK Lewis and Campbell (2007) indicated that the statutory duty "to ensure that childcare needs are met" was to be imposed by the British government from 2008. The government has increased the number of care spaces available for 3 and 4-year-olds and has incrementally increased the available free hours and weeks of early education. The eventual target is twenty hours a week for 38 weeks per year and by 2010 fifteen hours are to be provided. Future pledges include 12,000 part-time nursery slots for disadvantaged two-year-olds and universal care for three to fourteen-year-olds from 8am to 6pm by a target date of 2010. The Working Tax Credit also supports childcare costs. *The government's efforts at childcare provision have, however, encountered problems with fragmentation and instability of services, especially in poor areas* (Lewis and Campbell 2007). The 'Sure Start' program has also encountered some difficulties (DJI, 2008).

In the UK as in the Netherlands, it should be pointed out that under-3s attend childcare almost exclusively on a part-time basis. Both countries are prime examples of a number of others where a high proportion of childcare facilities operate on restricted hours (less than 30 hours a week). This phenomenon is no doubt a reflection that a high proportion of mothers in these countries work almost exclusively part-time.

Throwing out the baby with the bath-water? Shortcomings of Parental leave schemes

Much of the empirical research conducted has assessed these schemes from a very critical stance. From the perspective of gender equality on the labour market, they can be viewed as something of "a poisoned chalice" when put into actual practice. The long duration of parental leave must be considered against the background of widespread research which has shown returning to employment is more difficult after extended absences and has a strong impact on career prospects (Fagnani, 2000).

Encouraging mothers to stop working for a long period of time (more than one year) might entail numerous side-effects. Bearing in mind that recipients are almost exclusively women (except in Nordic countries where the take-up rate among fathers is more substantial than elsewhere) research conducted in this field demonstrates that parental leave schemes:

- Maintain or reinforce the traditional gender division within the family: the mother who stops working (or reduces her working hours) feels less justified in asking for her husband's help.

- Contribute to the maintenance of gender discrimination in the labour market by establishing asymmetrical professional trajectories within couples, and wage differentials between men and women. When mothers resume their job after an interruption of three years, they are likely to suffer occupational downgrading.

- Contribute to reinforcing employers' prejudices towards female workers: i.e. that they would be less committed to their work and less willing to pursue a career. Many employers may be (and are) reluctant to hire young women because they anticipate future absences from work.

It is illustrative that, in Britain, there are currently controversies in this policy field because the government plans to enhance maternity rights. Interestingly enough, the Tory equality spokeswoman, Theresa May, said: "The government's plan to give mothers a year off work whilst still only giving the father two weeks of leave reinforces an outdated stereotype that it is women who do the caring and men who go to work. …there is a real danger that a huge disparity in maternity and paternity leave could have a negative effect on women's employment."

Assessing the family policy impact: the need for a comprehensive and systemic approach

Due to data limitations, as Gauthier (2007) pointed out, studies seldom include a comprehensive measure of the total support provided by government to families. It makes little sense to conduct cross-national comparisons on a scheme by scheme basis or to assess the impact of parental leave schemes in isolation. It is more relevant to look at the overall organisation and then place it in its respective institutional, historical and cultural context. Moreover, family policies can overlap with other policy initiatives (employment policies for instance). Therefore it is not always possible to disentangle their respective outcomes.

Indeed, what accounts for the variations between countries are the whole range of measures and services provided to parents and the cultural environment (that interacts with family policy) in which these take place. In other words, women's choices and preferences relating to the appropriate balance between work and maternity are hugely constrained by the values that society defines as appropriate to their situation (Table 1, p.11). Modernisation of child rearing norms is therefore necessary if they are to be brought into alignment with reforms whose aim is to support the "working mother" model. To better capture the impact of policies on fertility and women's labour force participation, it is important to see whether the premises of the family policy are actually in tune with the normative attitudes of women and men towards maternal employment and childcare arrangements outside of the home.

From this perspective, it is not surprising that over the last three decades, relatively high female employment and fertility rates have gone together. This is most apparent in Nordic countries and France where state support for working mothers is well developed and where early socialisation of young children is highly valued.

How family policies and labour market structures matter?

Clearly, birth rate acts as a variable of adjustment. For instance, a dearth of formal childcare provision (of both good quality and affordable) and lack of state support, will likely push women to reduce the number of children they have in order to stay in employment. This is especially so if childrearing norms imply that mothers with young children should stay at home to look after their child (see the case of Germany). McDonald (2000) makes a similar point in arguing that gender inequalities are responsible for countries' low level of fertility. This confirms that female labour force participation should be examined as an intermediate mechanism in the process linking policies and fertility (Gauthier, 2007, Sleebos, 2003, Castles, 2003).

As far as fertility outcomes are concerned, cash benefits are usually found to have a very small impact on fertility unless they are coupled with benefits in kind (as is the case of France). The reality is that family policies do not only serve, through the taxation system, benefits, and childcare provision, to encourage or, conversely, to thwart the employment of mothers. These policies are themselves the expression of the dominant value systems, as well as a reflection of the cultural context that plays a role in creating a more or less guilt-inducing environment for mothers who wish to work.

Interactions between transfer systems, social inequalities and poverty rates

Research has shown that financial support to families plays an undeniable role in reducing the proportion of children growing up in poor households (Bradshaw, 2006). A look at child poverty rates (see table in annex) however exposes the UK as the worst performer by a considerable margin, in this area. This would seem to fly in the face of the fact that it is one of the most generous countries when it comes to providing financial support for the working poor. It also makes clear that the goal of increasing social justice while decreasing child poverty depends on providing more than simple cash benefits, complimentary systems of support are needed. The

Nordic countries, where social inequality is less marked and child poverty is virtually non-existent, provide a perfect illustration of this point (see table 3). Financial support is relatively modest but benefits in kind such as community facilities and services are considerable. Additionally, they offer a coherent, generous and supportive set of provisions to dual-earner families, and this goes hand in hand with high employment rates for mothers with children.

Austria: an outlier

As for the total level of the family package (Fagnani, Math, 2008, Thévenon, 2008), Austria stands head and shoulders above other countries. Nevertheless, despite significant financial support to families, levels of fertility remain low resembling those of Germany and the southern European countries: Total Fertility Rates have fluctuated between 1.50 in 1993 and 1.41 in 2006 (see Table in annex). State policies that favour the work/family balance remain modest, particularly in the domain of public child care provision. Despite recent efforts to improve this situation, they pale in comparison to the vast array of measures which make up family policies in France and the Nordic countries. Also, in stark contrast to the Nordic countries, Austria performs rather poorly in terms of social inequalities and its poverty rate for children (Table in annex). These observations, along with those made of the UK, seem to confirm arguments in favour of promoting measures that place greater emphasis on benefits in kind over simple cash benefits (see the current controversies in Germany between the CDU and the SPD about this issue).

3. Identification of upcoming issues and the repercussions of changes

There is much ongoing academic controversy concerning the actual sources of the following changes:

- A growing diversity of family forms and living arrangements, despite large differences along geographical divides, is moving hand in hand with an increase in the complexity of regulation and legislation in policy fields. Frontiers between various forms of partnership are blurring. For instance, in the Netherlands and Germany, the importance of marriage as well as residence (sharing a home) for what constitutes "a family" has been successively weakened.

- An increase in the number of people, particularly mothers, living sequentially or periodically with different partners which follows the trend toward "living together apart" (non-co-resident).

- A reduction in unpaid family care labour ("care provider pillar")

- An enduring asymmetry in family involvement regardless of female educational attainment. This phenomenon is partly attributable to the fact that, across Europe (except in the Nordic countries), most of the family-friendly measures (despite being theoretically gender-neutral) target mothers more or less implicitly. Concomitantly childcare, both within the family and in the public sphere, remains a woman's prerogative.

- A growing divide between women with a high level of educational achievement and the less educated. The presence of children has a more pronounced (much less in Nordic countries than elsewhere in the EU) effect on the employment of women with low education than those with higher levels.

- Care migration processes: "global chains" of care to use A. Hochschild's formulation (2000).

- The development of precarious jobs[8] (Table 6. p. 18, tables 7 and 8, p. 19 and p.20): While fixed-term contracts are often the main form of precarious employment, other forms are developing across Europe and in Asian countries – in particular temporary agency work and involuntary part-time work – partly shaped by policies and employment-related (de)regulations. In some countries (Japan[9], South Korea, Germany, and Spain, for instance), these forms of employment are widely spread among women, in particular married women and lone mothers (see tables in annex). In Japan, nonstandard employment accounts for one-quarter of the total workforce, but more than half of women's total employment (Gottfried, 2008, Gottfried, 2003). Additionally, as Gottfried pointed out, "the definition of part-time employment is not simply a matter of working fewer hours than a full-time worker, but is clearly linked to an inferior employment".

When young women face daunting obstacles to consistent attachment to the labour force (and yet more to a career characterized by earnings growth and genuine economic security) the consequences are clear: they are more likely to postpone childbearing to a later age and this might partly explain the particularly low fertility levels of some OECD countries (in Japan, South Korea, Germany, Spain, respectively 1.27, 1.20, 1.3 and 1.36 by 2006, see table).

Young people (aged under 25)

- In France they are the *'babylosers'* - a term coined by sociologist Louis Chauvel, a sociologist at the National Foundation for Political Science - to contrast them with *'babyboomers'*. According to him, for the first time in recent history a generation of French citizens aged between 20 and 40 can expect a lower standard of living than the previous one.

- Intensification of (paid) work will be placing new demands on workers: it has made (and will make in the near future) work/care arrangements even more difficult for young couples. This has a strong impact on the perceptions of work/life balance. In an international survey[10], respondents were asked to answer the following question: "All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job". In 1994, 51 per cent of women in the UK did not agree with this statement, in 2002 this percentage decreased to 46 per cent. In the US, the decline was even more marked: in 1994, 51 per cent thought that family life does not suffer when the woman has a full-time job compared to 38 per cent in 2002.

What will be at stake? The repercussions of some economic, social and cultural changes

The implications of economic, social and cultural changes for family-related policies are manifold:

Dealing with conflicting interests within the family: France is an emblematic country as far as this issue is concerned. Fighting unemployment and promoting gender equality on the labour market has been given greater priority on the policy agenda. Successive governments and advisory boards of family allowance funds have placed strong emphasis on the promotion of childcare opening hours that are more in tune with the needs of working parents alongside the development of so-called 'flexible' child care arrangements. In order to

[8]As Leah Vosko (2006, p. 3) demonstrated "Precarious employment encompasses forms of work involving limited social benefits…job insecurity, low wages, and high risks of ill-health".

[9]In Japan, nonstandard includes part-time, day labour, agency temporary and direct-hire temporary employment not configured around an organizationally based career-track (a standard feature of the Japanese employment model) (for a parallel analysis of the Korean situation, see Peng and Mahon, 2008). Neither years of service nor employment experience accumulate to place nonstandard employees in line for in-house promotion, on-the- job training, or age-graded wage increases (Gottfried, 2008).

[10] Source: 'International Social Science Programme on Family and Changing Gender Roles', 2002 Survey.

accommodate flexibility in the workplace and in particular the development of non-standard work schedules, there has been, over the last decade, an increase in the number of childcare services (public or privately run but publicly subsidized) operating until late in the evening or 24 hours a day and 7 days a week to enable working parents to meet their professional needs (Fagnani, 2008a).

Against this background, French family policy is being forced to cope with conflicting interests within the family: on one hand, promoting children's welfare, ensuring that their biological rhythms are respected and allowing them to spend time with their parents while on the other providing women with the opportunities to adapt to the realities of the workplace, and to the demands of employers, so that they can keep their job or build a career. The clear conflict inherent in this arrangement means policy makers often draw a veil over the fact that the effects of the organizational changes in the workplace on family life and the children's well-being could prove to be at odds with the principles on which French family policy is founded.

Difficult trade-offs, hard choices: establishing a new hierarchy of objectives: Against the background of cost containment and, in some countries, even of Welfare retrenchment, policy-makers have to deal with a number of dilemmas and trade-offs and are confronted with difficulties in establishing a new hierarchy of priorities.

Employers might be encouraged to hire people without children: a new discrimination: In a context of an increase in the take-up rate of family-friendly measures among fathers, there is a real risk that employers may start discriminating against *all* parents, regardless of gender.

An increasing burden on young parents: Against the background of dramatic changes in the labour market and the evolution of new management principles one issue that has pushed its way to the forefront of the policy agenda is the pressure of increased demands on time (closely associated with the rise of the culture of long working hours). In his cross-national comparative study (including the US and Japan), Garhammer (2007) argued that time related pressure and increased overwork have led to a deterioration in quality of life, a broad concept combining both subjective and objective indicators. Hence young dual-earner parents when bearing in mind the tensions and difficulties linked to the management of everyday life, and the possible detrimental effects this could have on the welfare of the family, might postpone childbirth or reduce their number of offspring

The enduring gender asymmetry in family involvement: This represents a real challenge to policy makers who want to promote mothers' employment as well as enhance, and not pay mere lip service to, gender equality. Moreover there is one time honoured obstacle that needs to be overcome when tackling the issue of gender equality: the powerful tendency to marry within one's own social group (marital homogamy). This means that in such cases power-relationships between partners are more balanced and that gender division of care work and household tasks will depend much more on female partner's preference set.

4. The long-term prospects of an integrative approach to family policy to 2025/30

Identifying "sticking points" and "tipping points"

- How to tackle the issue of overstretched long-term care needs for the frail elderly and the "oldest old" populations: taking into account the significant reforms in the pension schemes of most of the OECD countries over the last years, how will families and the women in particular (who will be retiring at a later age than the former generations to offset the impact of pension reforms on their income) deal with

the problem of dependence[11]? *This issue is particularly salient in countries like Japan where restrictive immigration policies would seem to reflect a reluctance to rely on immigrants to take care of vulnerable or dependent sections of the population.*

- New migration patterns? To alleviate the strain placed on families caring for elderly dependants, could old people be encouraged to move to countries where labour costs relative to carers are much lower than in European or North American Countries? The current development of remote health monitoring could be an additional incentive.

- Implications for long-term care policy: will intergenerational transfers take on a new life with the state playing the main role in providing care for elderly? Or, will the state be rolling back and rely more heavily on solidarity within the family as a cost containment measure?

- Space/time constraints have been neglected issues. Urban segregation, specialisation of urban spaces, remote and poorly equipped neighbourhoods, and urban sprawl (the so-called "*rurbanisation*") have resulted in an increase in commuting times which make it more difficult than ever to balance work and family life.

- Childcare policies might be in a predicament if there is a macroeconomic downturn. In Sweden for instance, the economic crisis of the 1990s resulted in a fiscal crises that led to severe cuts in childcare spending. The outcome was an increase in child-staff ratios and larger group sizes. (Nyberg, 2004). In France, against the background of cost containment, policy-makers are trying to reduce the costs in childcare policies, a trend which could prove to be detrimental to the quality of care in public childcare provision. Recently, a report (written by the MP Michele Tabarot) to the French prime Minister (July 2008) made the following proposals: permission for registered childminders to look after 4 children instead of 3 and a regulation made more flexible in regard to the skills of the staff in *crèches*. Concomitantly childcare policies are increasingly under pressure of the market (Fagnani, 2008)

- The fact that the EC's guidelines and recommendations are not enforced in member states and do not involve any sanctioning mechanisms contributes little to driving countries towards more convergence.

- Despite its attractiveness and efficiency, the Nordic-style model is often viewed as too costly considering the current economic context. This puts a brake on the "race to the top" scenario.

We can, however, identify some move towards a more unified approach - involving more than one policy area or department especially in childcare policies and gender equality programmes.

The future of family policies: piecemeal measures or paradigmatic shifts?

Taking into account all the important changes that have been taking place over the last decade, an overall redesign of family policies is at stake. "Family mainstreaming" should also come to the forefront with the integration of the family perspective into every stage of the policy process (design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation). It should not be concerned with children only, but with the relationships between them and the parents.

[11] According to Eurostat, the number of people aged 80 years or over is projected to almost triple from 21.8 million in 2008 to 61.4 million in 2060 (Source: Statistics in focus, 2008, No. 72).

In Germany, for instance, current developments hint at a broader concept of social policy for the future German welfare state. The Family Ministry is increasingly assuming new roles: from benefit provider to regulator, motivator and moderator. At the same time other social actors, in particular companies, are being integrated in fields such as childcare and reconciliation policy.

Towards a more coordinated and integrated approach? Some clues

In the UK, France, Germany, and some other countries like the Netherlands and Luxembourg12, there is currently a move towards broader holistic approaches to policymaking at various levels of government. Across the globe, even Australia is on the verge of losing its status as one of the remaining two OECD countries without a paid maternity/paternity/parental leave scheme.

In the UK**,** long languishing at the bottom of European league tables in most aspects of family policy such as provision of parental leave or child care, the policies pursued by the Blair government have made a significant improvement in the work/family balance, particularly in child care provision while enhancing partnership with the "community" (Lewis and Campbell, 2007). For instance, the "core offer" of integrated services in Sure Start Children's Centres consists of: integrated early years education and childcare, family support and learning, outreach to isolated and vulnerable families, information and advice, links to Job Centre Plus, and Adult learning and leisure. Implementation and coordination is the responsibility of local authorities in partnership with local providers. Government expenditure has increased and all three and four-year-olds have access to some free provision. T. Smith qualified these early years services as "a quiet revolution" (Smith, 2007).

In Germany, in addition to the significant changes in the traditional fields of family policy, an additional trend has become visible: since the second period of the Red–Green government, much emphasis has been put on the involvement of other actors in the development of a family-friendly society. This hints at a new mix in this field of the Bismarckian welfare state.

The launching of the new initiative '*Alliance for the Family'* in 2003 is an example of the new policy orientation, bringing together a broad range of measures and activities intended to enhance the work/life balance. The project – initiated by the BmFSFJ in cooperation with the Bertelsmann Foundation – aims to coordinate the activities of different actors, such as employers' associations and trade unions, local governments, companies, etc. The main goal, as laid down in a consensus paper, is the development of a 'sustainable family policy' based on the three (normative) assumptions that: one, German society needed a higher fertility rate; two, the economy needed qualified workers and a higher labour market participation of women; and three, children needed (better) education and guidance in their early years.

Activities include the regular exchange of experiences between actors at different levels. Representatives of the institutions and associations involved built a 'competence group for balance' to work towards a consensus between vested interest groups. A scientific committee is responsible for the supervision of the process.

One project under the remit of the Alliance for the Family, by which the new approach can be illustrated, is the initiative '*Local Alliances for Family'*. Following the assumption that the local context is essential for families' living conditions and well-being, the initiative'Local Alliances for Family' was launched by the

[12]For deeper information about these two countries, see: Deutsches Jugend Institut (2008), *Die Entwicklung integrierter familienunterstützender Dienstleistungszentren. Expertisen aus Frankreich, Grossbritannien, Luxembourg und den Niederlanden*, Münich.

BMFSFJ in 2003. The aim was to initiate local round tables, or alliances, of the relevant local actors capable of helping to improve the context for family life in the municipalities. Such networks could include the local administration, the town council, companies, representatives of employers' associations and trade unions, churches, third sector initiatives, families and other actors. The number of Local Alliances for Family rapidly increased and reached 364 in January 2007 (Klammer, Letablier, 2007).

The Ministry has installed a service office to support municipalities running a "Local Alliance for Family". The focus is on different aspects of family life and work/life balance, according to the needs and resources identified in their local contexts. The topics treated cover a wide range which includes the organization of public care for children and the elderly; scheduling of flexible working time arrangements; creating family-friendly opening hours for the administration; and modifying timetables for public transport. A wide array of services and help is offered, with a focus on counselling and workshops on the spot.

The services offered are in line with the principle of *subsidiarity*, the idea being to assist engaged partners to elaborate their own, locally feasible strategies. Another aim of the service office is to bring different local alliances together for an exchange of ideas and experiences. The whole project is scientifically supervised and assessed by a research institute, the German Institute for Youth (DJI).

Multi generational Centres: an Action Programme of the Federal Government (BmFSFJ)

The programme´ s overall goal is to build a new mix of public services, involving non-profit organizations, the private sector and volunteers (the motto is "*Starke Leistung für jedes Alter*")[13].

Besides providing old and young people with opportunities to connect to each other (meals are provided, as are meeting rooms and childcare services) and to enhance intergenerational solidarity, the programme also serves to reinforce relationships and connections. Employed people are able to mix with people outside formal employment; professionals rub shoulders with volunteers; and otherwise fragmented service providers in the community have a convenient point of reference.

In France, there is also a trend towards a more holistic approach to family support

In regard to policies aiming at providing support to families, the current trend is to adopt a comprehensive and integrated approach by encouraging the multiple institutions involved in this area to collaborate and thereby to bridge families, schools and communities. The objective is to reinforce social cohesion, to tackle the issue of social inequalities, to ensure the well-being of children, and to guarantee equal opportunities to children.

Increasingly, priority education policy, in particular, is being linked to urban development policies. As part of the *politique de la ville*, mayors of big cities have signed seven-year contracts with the national government to improve the living conditions of families and foster social integration in disadvantaged urban areas (see also Annex). Schools which fall within the boundaries of a *Zone d'Education Prioritaire (ZEP)* (Priority Education Zone) will be granted the status of *Pôle d'Excellence Scolaire* (Centre of Academic Excellence) by the Ministry of Education when they are able form partnerships with cultural, educational and other local institutions.

The relationship between parents and educational institutions has also received attention and the former are more and more considered as "partners" rather than users "users". Institutional programmes to improve this

[13]For more information: Annemarie Gerzer Sass, Serviceagentur Mehrgenerationenhaeuser, annemarie-gerzer@mehrgenerationenhaeuser.de

relationship have been developed over the last two decades. Collective involvement by parents in the school system is seen as a way of encouraging a more "civic" approach. However this policy is a potential minefield as parents are encroaching into an area that is implicitly the domain of professionals.

For this trend toward a more integrated approach in family matters to continue however policymakers will have to cope with certain hurdles along the way, all of which have the potential to sap the will of the actors involved:

- Childcare policies are currently being driven more by labour market pressure and mothers' rights to paid work than couched in terms of the 'best interests' of the child (Fagnani, 2008).

- In family support services, responsibilities are all too often dissipated which leads to a lack of accountability for actions taken; no one is held responsible for the mismatch between supply and demand of childcare. Social inequality and spatial disparities also remain large and continue to hinder access to formal childcare.

- Despite huge public spending in socio-economically disadvantaged areas they are continually plagued by high unemployment which compounds the difficulties faced by policymakers and makes the full realization of national goals of 'social inclusion' (a typical French concept) troublesome.

- In work/life balance policies, the enduring centrality of the mother and mothering in raising children is at odds with the policies addressing the gender equality issue both in the family and in the labour market.

In the Nordic countries that exhibit a more integrated approach, there is a clear political will to further develop the already high level measures designed to support parents with children. As the Swedish Minister for Health and Social Affairs recently stated "The Government wants to increase families' *freedom of choice* by reducing national political control. A modern family policy must recognise that families are different, have different needs and wishes, and are of equal worth."[14]

In **Sweden** a gender equality bonus has been applicable since 1 July 2008 for children born after that date. The motivation for the bonus is a desire to improve the conditions for gender equality in both parental leave and participation in working life and is intended as an incentive for parents to share parental leave as evenly as possible between themselves. It will be calculated on the basis of how a child's parents divide parental leave and the number of days taken. Parents who share parental leave equally by each taking an equal number of days will receive the maximum bonus on condition that one partner works while the other takes leave. Parents who have joint custody of a child are also entitled to the gender equality bonus.

The new child-raising allowance, also applicable from July 2008, is intended to give parents the opportunity to spend more time with their children by facilitating a smoother transition between parental leave and work. Parents of children over the age of one but under the age of three are eligible. Actual availability will depend on the decision made at the municipal level of the families involved on whether to implement this benefit or not.

[14] See http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/10/63/28/d2968502.pdf

Making the case for going beyond: a plea for a more holistic and integrated approach

In most OECD countries public authorities have acknowledged, more or less explicitly, that the future wealth of any society is its children. States as well as other social actors have recognized that children represent a common good and that responsibility for their well being is far from being a strictly private affair. Indeed, investing in children might be a long term profitable strategy for society as a whole.

But guaranteeing the well being of the children as well as ensuring each has the opportunity to reach his or her full potential requires a multidimensional and systematic approach which extends beyond the simple provision of cash benefits, generous as they are, and branches out to include, limits on non-standard work schedules[15] and access to adequate housing.

Indirectly Castles (2003, p. 226) also argues in favour of a more integrated approach by concluding that: "fertility outcomes are a function not only of policies directly aimed at permitting women to combine work and maternity, but also of education and labour market policies that enhance the probability of women finding employment and staying in employment irrespective of their fertility behaviour".

Conclusion

Gauthier (2002) who examined the degree of cross-national convergence from 1970 to 1999 showed that family policies in 22 industrialized countries have been characterized by an increase in state support for working parents, and by a modest increase in cash support for families. Because these common trends had different levels of magnitude across countries, she concluded that divergence had consequently increased.

Since then, the pace of changes has, however, sped up as countries in the EU have been particularly responsive to the increases in female labour force participation. Family policies have been adjusted to account for the new demographic and economic realities, but whether these adjustments have reduced the gap between OECD countries remains to be seen. Hence the way to convergence is likely to be chaotic. Cross-national differences in the adoption of family-friendly public policy are still so large that it will take some time before a real and long-lasting convergence takes place.

Nonetheless, as far as Germany, France and Sweden are concerned, there is undeniably a convergence (Germany and France are trying to catch up with Sweden, see in annex, p. 23 extract from an interview with Professor H. Bertram).

But taking into account the controversies about this issue of convergence, commenting on the future of family policies and their potential degree of cross-national convergence, especially these days, remains an act either of faith or recklessness![16]

[15] Strazdins and al. (2006) have demonstrated that non-standard work schedules have detrimental effects on children's well-being and on the quality of interactions within the family.

[16] In a similar vein, Lutz (2006) concludes, after an exhaustive review of contrasting fertility theories that neither an upturn nor the continuation of current low levels can be predicted confidently.

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ANNEX

Chart 1 - State expenditure on benefits in kind in % of GDP: Comparison between SESPROS (Eurostat) and SOCX (OCDE) data



Source**:** J. Fagnani, A.Math and C. Meilland in collab. with A. Luci-Greulich (2008), *Comparaison européenne des aides aux familles*, Rapport de recherche, Paris, Caisse Nationale des Allocations Familiales

Chart 2 - Social protection spending on « family/children » in % of GDP – 2005 (2004 for Portugal)



Sources: ESSPROS (Eurostat) –in March 2008, many of these 2005 data were still mentioned as provisional or estimated values

Chart 3 - Family targeted social protection spending and cash benefits in Germany and France (in % of GDP): Evolution 1990-2005



Source: Eurostat (ESSPROS)

Chart 4 - % of people living with a partner according to sex and age in France

(1982-2030)



Source: Census 1982, enquête annuelle de recensement 2005 et projection, Insee.
Extract from: Alain Jacquot, Insee Première No.1106, octobre 2006

Table 1. % of respondents answering: "totally agree" to several statements concerning 'child rearing': selected countries (2006)

Women : Age group 15-39

	FRANCE	WEST GERMANY	EAST GERMANY	SWEDEN	AUSTRIA	DENMARK	NETHER-LANDS
A pre-school child is more likely to suffer if his/her mother works	14	21	6	9	23	6	23
Ideally, the woman should stay at home to look after the children	8	17	7	3	24	2	11
All in all family life suffers when the woman has a full time job	9	27	9	13	25	5	26

Source: Maria Rita Testa, 2006, Childbearing Preferences and Family Issues in Europe
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/events/2006/demog/eurobarometer_2006_fertility_en.pdf

Table 2. Family-targeted protection spending (Expenditure in Billion Euros and as a % of GDP) in France – 2005

	Montant des dépenses
Retraites (avantages liés aux enfants)	**17,6**
Prestations familiales	25,6
dont accueil jeune enfant	*9,5*
autres (allocations familiales surtout)	*16,1*
Fiscalité (avantages familiaux)	38,4
parts enfants quotient familial	*13,1*
autres avantages liés aux enfants	*1,4*
parts conjoints quotient familial	*23,9*
Minima sociaux (suppléments enfant)	0,8
Aides au logement (supplément enfants)	4,5
Action sociale	10,4
dont action sociale CAF	*3,3*
dont action sociale communes	*1,6*
dont action sociale départements	*5,5*
Enseignement préélémentaire	10,7
Total des dépenses	**108**
% PIB	***6,3 %***
Total hors parts conjoints quotient familial	**84,1**
en % du PIB	***4,9 %***

Source: DGI, Cour des Comptes, Comptes de la Sécurité sociale (2007), Conseil d'Orientation des Retraites, Social Actualité n°212-213 juillet-août 2008. Data provided by Antoine Math

Table 3. Activity rates of women aged 25-49 according to the number of children aged under 15 (2005)

	0	1	2	3
France	**86.0**	**84.5**	**76.2**	**54.6**
Germany	**87.9**	**75.6**	**63.4**	**47.4**

Source: Eurostat, 2007

Table 4. Employment rates of women aged 25-49 with or without children aged under 12

	Without children	With children	Difference
France	73,7	65,9	-7,7
Germany	80,3	62,7	-17,6

Source: Eurostat, LFS 2006

Chart 5 - Fertility rates in Germany, France and Sweden: Evolution 1950-2003



(Source: Eurostat)

Chart 6 - ECEC services in comparison to other family transfers in Germany - Total: 184,439 million Euros



(Source: DJI, 2008)

Table 5. Childcare arrangements for children aged under 3 in FRANCE (2006)

	Number of children under 3
Collective childcare facilities	327 600 30.1%
Kindergarten and Nursery schools	184 600* 17.0%
Registered childminders	535 000 49.3%
Nanny at home (publicly subsidized)	37 300* 3.4%
TOTAL	1 085 100 100% **46.4%**
Looked after by parents (with paid parental leave or not) or other people (relatives, friends..)	1 253 900 **53.9%**
TOTAL number of children 0-3 years	**2 339 000** **100%**

* Estimations

Source : Rapport de la Cour des Comptes, *Les aides à la garde des jeunes enfants*, July 2008

Chart 7 - Percentage of employees working more than 48 hours a week



Source**:** David Coats with Rohit Lehki, 2008, *How much 'good work' is there in the UK and Europe*? The Work Foundation

Figure 1.

Table 6. Increase in the number of "Mini-jobs" and in the total of standard jobs in Germany: 2002-2007

(in Millions)

	2002	2005	2007
Mini-jobs	**4,138**	**6,492**	**7,188**
Standard jobs	**27,261**	**26,178**	**27,250**

Source: Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2008 http://www.sozialpolitik-aktuell.de/grafik_aktuell.shtml

Table 7. Employment Trends by gender over time in Japan (Source: Gottfried, 2008)

	MALE	***Female***
Labour Force Participation[1]		
1990	77.2	50.1
2000	76.4	49.2
2005	73.3	48.4
Labour Force Participation by Age 1975 (2005)[2]		
20-24	76.5 (68.6)	66.2 (69.8)
25-29	97.2(93.6)	42.6 (74.9)
30-34	98.1(96.4)	43.9 (62.7)
35-39	98.1 (97.0)	54.9 (63.0)
55-59	92.2 (93.6)	48.8 (60.0)
65+	44.4 (29.4)	15.3 (12.7)
Part-time Employment Rate[3]		
1980	5.2	19.3
1990	7.5	27.9
2005	12.3	40.6
Part-Time Employment by Age[4]		
55-59	4.2	42.5
60-64	31.6	56.6
65-69	47.9	61.3
Temporary Employment as a percentage of total employment[5]		
1983	5.3	19.5
1994	5.4	18.3
2000	7.7	20.9

[1] Source: Japanese Working Life Profile (JWLP), 2007: 20-21.
[2] Source: Data for 1975 from the JWLP (2007: 17).
[3] Source: Japanese Working Life Profile (2007: 34). These figures cover short-hours part-time employment defined according to the threshold of 35 hours or less, excluding full-time part-timers.
[4] Data for 2004, JWLP (2007: 26)
[5]Source: 2000 data from OECD 2002, Labor Force Survey database; 2001 Japan data from Table 3-3, Employed persons by employment status, Japan Statistical Yearbook.

Table 8 - Gendered Patterns of Employment in Japan (Source: Gottfried, 2008)

Women's Share of Part-Time Employment[6]	
1990	70.5
2003	66.7
Part-time Employment as a Proportion of Women's employment[7]	
1990	33.4
2000	38.6
2004	41.7
Mother's Employment[8]	
Married 0-4 years (5-9 years)	70.0
% Full-Time Housewives	(60.0)
	20.0
% Working Full-Time	(15.0)
	10.0
%Working Part-time	(25.0)
% Lone Mother's Working Full-time[9]	**84.9**

[6]Source: JWLF (2007: 36).
[7] Source: Walby uses OECD data, note that part-time is less than 35 hours per week (2006: 39).
[8] Source: Data for 2002 from 12th Japanese National Fertility Survey (cited in Nagase 2006: 40-41).
[9] Source: Ezawa & Fujiwara (2003).

Table 9. Social inequalities, poverty rates for children and fertility rates: Nordic countries, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, UK

COUNTRY*	Social inequalities: GINI INDEX**	Poverty rate for children*** (around 2000)	Total Fertility Rates (TFR)° (2006)****	Completed Fertility Rates for women born in 1962****
Denmark	24.7	2.4	1.85	1.92
Sweden	25.0	3.6	1.85	2.02
Norway	25.8	3.6	1.90	2.09
Finland	26.9	3.4	1.84	1.94
Germany	28.3	10.9	1.34	1.60
Austria	29.1	13.3	1.41	1.67
Netherlands	30.9	9.0	1.71	1.82
France	32.7	7.3	2.01	2.08
Belgium	33.0	-	1.64 (2004)	1.82
Ireland	34.3	15.7	1.91	2.30
UK	36.0	16.2	1.85	1.93

*Countries are classed by levels of social inequality: from those with the lowest levels to those with the greatest.
** Source: World Bank. 2006. World Development Indicators 2006. Washington, D.C. The Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income diverges from equality, with 1 being the extreme value when a single individual has all the income.
*** Source: OECD, 2007
**** Source : EUROSTAT, 2008

Table 10. INTEGRATING FRAMEWORK OF MOTHERS' EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS AND DIFFERENT WAYS IN WHICH WORKING PARENTS COMBINE A JOB AND A FAMILY LIFE (FAGNANI, HOURIET-SÉGARD, G. (2004))

Trade-offs in regard to the number of children and duration of working hours

Country	Employment Patterns	**How to Combine Work and Unpaid Work: Strategies**
NORWAY SWEDEN **Egalitarian model**	Long part-time or full-time jobs. Short parental leave (one year)	Extensive use of Public schemes supporting Working parents (Subsidised child-care arrangements, paid parental leave, flexible working hours…)
FRANCE **Dual-earner model or the "working mother"**	Long part-time or full-time jobs. Long parental leave (3 years) for less qualified or low paid	Extensive use of Public schemes supporting Working parents (Subsidised child-care arrangements, paid parental leave, flexible working hours…)
UK NETHERLANDS GERMANY **Modified male breadwinner**	Short part-time jobs (as long as children are under school-age)	Reduction of Working time Kin/Voluntary/Market for child-care Family-friendly Flexibility at the Workplace
PORTUGAL **Dual-earner model**	Full-time jobs. Long working hours for both partners	Reduction of the number of children Kin/Market for child-care

Extract from an interview with Hans Bertram published in TAZ on August 15, 2008

http://www.taz.de/1/politik/deutschland/artikel/1/bei-maennern-brauchen-wir-harte-massnahmen/
- "Wir brauchen härtere Maßnahmen"

Wenn sie in die Zukunft blicken, vielleicht 30 Jahre, zu welcher Familienform wir uns entwickeln werden? Wie wird die Familie der Zukunft gestrickt sein?

Da gibt es mindestens drei Antwortmöglichkeiten. *Erstens werden wir uns stärker zum nordeuropäischen Modell hin entwickeln.* Dort hat man inzwischen häufig einen Partner, mit dem man Kinder bekommt -- ohne übrigens unbedingt verheiratet zu sein. Und später hat man einen anderen Partner, mit dem man älter wird. Man hat sozusagen eine sequenzielle Form von Beziehungen in unterschiedlichen Lebensphasen. Denn man kann nicht davon ausgehen, dass alle Menschen im Lebensverlauf sich immer gleich entwickeln. Zweitens wird die Ehe nicht mehr die Bedeutung haben wie heute. Drittens wird es wahrscheinlich immer einen großen Prozentsatz von Leuten gibt, die nicht in Partnerschaft leben, sondern alleine.

ANNEX III

Policy Frameworks for Youth

An exploration of (integrated) youth policies, with special attention to the Netherlands, Canada and Greece

Jo Kloprogge, september 2008

Introduction

OECD is preparing a project on the future of the family and the repercussions of changes in the family on other spheres of life. The project will include a section on integrated youth policies. In this paper we will explore the development of youth policies, paying special attention to variations in policies, central issues, effectiveness and underlying ideas. We will also briefly analyse how youth policies and family policies are related in the countries we describe. We will also give some examples of interesting and innovative youth policies. In the last paragraph we will present some questions that we consider crucial for further discussions on youth policies.

This paper is of an exploratory nature. We do not pretend to present a complete overview of youth policies worldwide or a comparison of youth policies over the world, but to give some examples of different policies and raise some topics for discussion about youth policies. Starting with the development of youth policies in the Netherlands, adding information about Canada and Greece and using more general studies and policy documents (e.g. of the European Union), we will try to give some insight in how policy makers pay attention to children and young people and with what kind of questions and dilemma's they are confronted in developing these policies. Greece is an example of a Mediterranean country where strong family ties are still very important. Canada is a progressive country in youth and educational policies, with a federal structure that has big consequences for the development of youth policies. The Netherlands seems to absorb influences from the United Kingdom, USA and Canada at one hand, but also from Scandinavia and middle Europe at the other hand. It is very active in developing new youth and family policies. We would like to thank the Greek expert in youth policy and youth matters Dora Giannaki and the experts of the Dutch Youth Institute (NJI, Ellen Meijer, Pink Hiverdink and Annemieke Kalsbeek) who were so kind to check the first draft and offer comments, suggestions and corrections.

Variation in youth policies

Youth policies have become an important theme on the political and social agenda of most countries. The international databases and descriptions of youth policies (see the paragraph on information, research and knowledge) give a good overview of youth policies in many countries. These sources also show how varied youth policies are. The age range of youth covered by the policies is hardly ever the same, the division of responsibilities is organised in many different ways, and the degree of integration of the policies varies greatly. This great variation is caused by the historical backgrounds of youth policies, the way in which political and administrative structures are organised, and the specific visions on what is really important for the present and future needs of young people.
A short description of the youth policies of the countries that have been selected for this paper, will illustrate this.

Youth policies in the Netherlands, Greece and Canada

In the Netherland explicit attempts to develop integrated youth policies started around 1996. In that year a "steering group for the development of preventive youth policies" was established in order to encourage municipalities to develop youth policies. As a follow up in 1999 the Dutch government, the provinces and the municipalities agreed to strengthen existing youth policies. The government promised to stimulate and finance local and regional youth policies, municipalities agreed to develop coherent policies on the local level. In 2003 the Government started "Operation Young" in which seven ministries combined forces to develop strong and efficient youth policies. In 2006 this resulted in a policy paper providing a series of 25 recommendations to the government. The main message was: put the child in the centre of the policies and put an end to the compartmentalization of the policies. Youth policies in the Netherlands cover a broad age range, from 0-24/25 years. Nearly all the recommendations were accepted by the government. After the elections of 2006 a new Ministry for Youth and Families was set up. This Ministry has the task to integrate the work of different Ministries involved in elements of youth policy and to tackle issues related to the upbringing of children through concerted efforts[1]. The Ministry has no staff of own. Its staff works under the responsibility of the "traditional" Ministries. Youth policies are based on agreements between the national government, provinces and municipalities. In these agreements, which are regularly updated, the responsibilities, actions and investments of each of the parties are specified.

Greece has a long history in youth policies. In 1983, a General Secretariat for Youth, (http://www.neagenia.gr/), within the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs was established in order to design, coordinate and implement national policies for youth (prior to 1983, a "Sub-Ministry of Youth" briefly existed within the Ministry of Culture). In 1998, an Interministerial Committee for youth issues was set up, which carries out the Action Programme "Greece under the age of 30" .This programme doesn't exist anymore and, in fact, the committee has been deactivated to a great extent. In this committee 6 Ministries and the General Secretariat participated. The committee recommended measures and policies on youth issues to the government and decided on youth policy for the short term or the long term. The General Secretariat operates as the public service with the mission to design, coordinate and implement youth policies. It also operates as a link with youth organisations and local authorities. Youth policy in Greece concerns the age group 15-30 years. An extensive overview of information about youth and youth policy in Greece can be found in the Database for International Youth Work[2].

Canada is a federal state where domains that are important for young people, such as health, social services, education and justice are largely within the jurisdiction of provincial and territorial governments. As a consequence, there is a wide range of policies, programmes and services for youth in Canada. Many of the governments invest in policy initiatives that focus on youth. These initiatives include financial investments and service coordination strategies. In a recent publication[3] of United Ways Toronto youth policies in various jurisdictions in Canada and in England, The United States (Federal Youth Development Council) and Victoria (Australia) are reviewed. This review confirms the enormous variety in

youth policies, in this case also within Canada. The lack of a national youth policy agenda in Canada has been criticized in a paper commissioned by Canada's National Children's Alliance[4]. It is argued that the federal government has a responsibility to negotiate federal, provincial and territorial accords that establish shared goals, standards and expectations and that provide a framework for monitoring progress. A debate in Canada on how to adopt more coordinated and integrated perspectives on youth was intensified in 2006 and is still going on.

Characteristics of youth policies

Even a limited study of a few countries indicates that the development of youth policies is very complicated, resulting in a great variety of models. Key issues are:

- The choice of the age range to be addressed by youth policies. In most countries youth policies cover an age range from 12-15 to 23-30 years. This does not mean that there are no explicit policies for younger children. In Canada e.g., youth policies start from the age of 12-15 years, but there is an Early Childhood Development Agreement for younger children. Under this agreement, the Government of Canada started providing $2.2 billion over five years, beginning in 2001-2002, to help provincial and territorial governments improve and expand early childhood development programmes and services[5]. In some countries, youth policies cover a broader age range, including young children. Examples are the Netherlands (0-23 years) and Great Britain. The British "Every Child Matters" approach covers children and young people from birth to age 19.

- Youth policies can be more or less centralised. In Greece the national youth policy is mainly dealt with by a well defined youth sector. In Canada (and in Europe in countries like Iceland, Denmark, Italy) there is no central body, nor an explicit national youth policy. In the Netherlands (as well in France and Finland) there is a partly specialised youth sector working alongside several other sectors, like education, health, poverty policies)[6].

- Youth policies require some kind of cooperation between national, regional, and local government levels but also between government levels and institutions and organisations working with and for youth. The number of voluntary and professional organisations that can be considered as partners in developing and implementing youth policies is certainly high, the more so when the policies cover a broad age range. Some of these partners can be directly influenced by policy makers, others are to a large extent autonomous. The organisational and steering processes for youth policies therefore require a good strategy and intensive communication with all stakeholders. In the Netherland many policies are based on elaborate agreements between policy makers at different levels on one hand (ministries, provinces, municipalities) and national or local authorities, non-government organisations and institutions at the other hand. At the municipal level, the local education or youth agenda was introduced in 2006, as a forum for policy making at the local level. Today nearly all Dutch municipalities have local youth agendas, including a more specific education agenda.

- There is a general tendency in policy making to define and specify the outcomes that are expected of policies. The outcomes may be described qualitatively or quantitatively. In the Netherlands new policies are often presented according to the following format:

  – What exactly do we want to achieve?

  – What exactly are we going to do to achieve this?

  – How much are we going to spend?

  Specifying outcomes in the social domains, including education and youth or family policies, is not easy and may even be impossible. It requires that policy makers know beforehand what goals can be achieved by using certain instruments and making specified investments. For example, a goal may be to improve the language skills of primary school pupils by 25% within 4 years, by transferring 100 mln. euro to municipalities and primary schools, which are free to choose what instruments to use to reach this goal. Of course this works only if one has evidence that it is possible to reach such a 25% goal in this period and that the investments are sufficient for reaching it. In Dutch youth policy goals are carefully formulated and sometimes quantified, but mostly they indicate what kind of results government would like to achieve in a certain period. Examples:

  – By 2011 we will have created a national network of youth and family centres and have merged relevant funding flows.

  – An electronic child database will be set up and running from January 1, 2008 and a register of at risk juveniles from January 1, 2009.

  The Greek youth policies are not operating in a framework of aims and goals, at least not explicitly specified. This may be explained by the type of Greek youth policy, where supporting the autonomy of young people is a main goal (but not very measureable) and by the still developing tradition of empirical research. In Canadian jurisdictions mechanisms for attaining and measuring outcome are, according to the United Way Toronto study, an integrated part of the youth policies. However, in most cases outcomes are stated at a rather abstract level, without quantification. We give some examples from the British Columbia Youth Policy Framework:

  – Improve physical health (e.g. nutrition, safe sex practices, dealing with injuries and disease)

  – Experiencing successful transition to adulthood, while achieving positive youth roles at school, work, community and within family

  – Increased self-reliance and self-sufficiency

  A very well crafted and elaborated outcome framework has been developed for the British "Every Child Matters" programme[7]. This is based on a scheme stating:

- Children's plan 2020 goals, e.g. child health improved with the proportion of obese and overweight children reduced to 2000 levels
- Outcomes, e.g. be healthy
- Aims, e.g. physically healthy, healthy lifestyles
- Strategic Objectives, e.g. reduce the harm caused by alcohol and drugs
- National indicators- quality of life, e.g. under 18 conception rate
- National indicators - Quality of service measures, e.g. self reported experience of social care users.

- Strong and weak points of youth policies.

  Data on children and youth are abundantly available in all countries where youth policies have been developed. They are for a large part available from the statistical services of the countries. Some countries use specific youth monitors. Also there is much research available, where the situation of youth is analysed. In many recent research projects, young people are asked about how they experience their lives, what problems they have, or what they expect of the future. Much scarcer are evaluations of youth policies or of specific parts thereof. There may be two explanations for this. One is that one has much faith in monitoring or in collecting statistical information providing indicators that show what changes and improvements occur over the years. Another is that youth policies tend to cover many instruments and interventions at several policy levels, which makes it difficult, expensive and complicated to evaluate youth policies as a whole. The United Way Toronto study was meant to detect features that make youth policy models more effective. The study concludes that the "range of youth policies and strategies represent a patchwork of agreements among various levels of government, ministries, departments, communities and stakeholders. Most youth service providers rely on short-term funding from multiple sources, which result in short-term or time-limited initiatives that are difficult to sustain or integrate with long-term planning and challenging to evaluate for effectiveness. The study found four features that help youth policies work better:

  - A shared vision for determining action
  - A strategy for measuring outcomes
  - Mechanisms for intergovernmental service coordination
  - Mechanisms for reviewing and realigning services based on the needs, aspirations and expectations of youth

These four elements may not guarantee that youth policies are of high quality and effective, but they can be considered as necessary for the development of mature and well- conceived youth policies for the short and long term.

- Integrated youth policies

  The concept of integrated youth policy seems recently to have lost some of its initial attractiveness. Even in the Netherlands where nearly every municipality has stated an integrated local youth policy, the emphasis on the integrated character of youth policy is not as strong as it was. Maybe the concept is too ambitious and policy makers become disappointed when they can only realise a part of their ambitions. Yet, if we look at the development of youth policies inside and outside Europe, it may be useful to list some indicators for the degree to which youth policies are integrated.

  a) Integrated youth policies should cover a broad age range, either 0-25, or 12-25.
  b) Integrated youth policies should cover all (or at least several) spheres of life of young people.
  c) Integrated youth policies should involve policy making at national, regional and local level as well as institutions and organisations that work with young people.
  d) Integrated youth policies should be developed in cooperation with children and young people and their parents.
  e) Integrated youth policies should not only address problems of young people, but also build upon a positive image of young people and their dreams and ambitions.
  f) Integrated youth policies should be preventive where this is possible.
  g) Integrated youth policies should guarantee that services for youth are consistent and demand oriented.
  h) Integrated youth policies should be of a structural and continuous nature, not project-based.
  i) Integrated youth policies should be based on a shared vision and on carefully stated outcomes, quantified where this makes sense.
  j) Integrated youth policy should include monitoring and evaluation procedures.

Perhaps not all of these indicators are relevant for all countries and perhaps one could add some indicators, but one could use these indicators to get a rough picture of the degree of integration of specific youth policies.

Characteristics of Youth policy	Low degree	Medium	High degree
Broadness of age range			
Spheres of life of youth covered			
Intergovernmental and external service coordination			
Involvement of young people and families			
Includes both problem solving and positive actions			
Consistency and demand orientation			
Preventive policy			
Continuous and structural			
Shared visions and outcomes framework			
Monitoring and evaluation			

We do not suggest here that more integrated youth policies are always better or more effective than less integrated youth policies. In fact, in September 2008 the Dutch Council for Social Development[8] presented an advice with the title "de ontkokering voorbij" (beyong integrating). The Council concludes that integration of policies has in practice very little positive results but often negative side effects. The obligations to cooperate and coordinate result in an emphasis on issues of steering and organisation, an accumulation of coordinating layers and less autonomy for professionals to do their work. Integrating in practice results in more policy makers, more organisation, more information, less contact with the real world.

We might consider that, depending on the scope of the policies, the quality of the social infrastructure and the availability of budgets, it sometimes may be wiser to choose for a limited or less integrated youth policy. But we do argue that in the long term the importance of providing a good future for young people for the social and economic development of a country may call for youth policies that are as integrated as is possible under the prevailing circumstances. When the pitfalls as described in the Dutch study can be avoided, integrated policies will on the long term be more cost effective, transparent and provide higher quality for the "clients" than segmented policies. However, these advantages will often be the result

of a complex and hazardous process of policy improvement, with possibly negative side effects.

Youth policies and family policies

This paper is part of the preparation of an OECD Futures Project on "the family in 2030". OECD wants to use the lens of the family to explore multifaceted developments in housing, health, work, welfare, leisure, migration, finance, economy, technology and so on. This may help policy makers to identify upcoming issues and to stimulate the debate on long-term policy strategies for society. In this paragraph we consider how youth policies and family policies are connected.

A first conclusion may be that family policies are about as complex and differentiated as youth policies. Comparing the family policies of five European countries, Gerzer-Sass[9] (2008) concludes that family policy in Europe is many-sided, that diverse goals are pursued, and that different instruments are used that sometimes strengthen, hamper, or neutralize one another. She characterizes the policies of:

- Denmark: no explicit family policy; family-related regulations are mainly the result of labour market policy goals.

- France: one of few countries with an explicit family policy. Family policy is one of the pillars of the social security system and funded through the Family Allowance Funds. In this way a large part of family-related public services are financed. An important goal of French family policies is the civic education of children.

- Netherlands: family-related policy does not aim to provide explicit family support. The focus is on labour market regulations.

- The United Kingdom: no explicit family-related policy. British family policy is characterized by a child-related policy, which is the responsibility of a Children's Ministry that has been created for this purpose. A central goal is to fight child poverty.

- Germany: family policy, adjusting to women's employment wishes and considering the problem of poverty in families, pursues the goal of getting mothers involved in working life.

Interestingly, Gerzer-Sass states that various options open up for young adults in countries with a particularly child friendly and family friendly atmosphere, as in the countries of Northern Europe: "Individual options are reduced however in countries that confront young people with an 'either–or situation' when they have to make decisions about their lives".

The most recent policy paper on families in the Netherlands dates from 2007[10]. Its mission statement gives the family[11] a crucial role in society: by ensuring that if their children are properly equipped for the future, they will benefit society as a whole. The government's job is to create the proper conditions for families to operate successfully and for parents to exercise their responsibility as carers and up bringers. If there are problems in a family which

require the involvement of more than one care or support service, the 'one family, one plan' model will be applied. One of the organisations will be responsible for coordinating the assistance provided. Special attention will be given to at-risk families. Ways of improving work-parenthood combinations will be examined and measures will be taken to alleviate the effects of divorce on children. Central in the family policy - and here is a direct link to the youth policy - is the creation of a network of youth and family centres by 2011 to give children, young people and parents prompt and effective support. In 2011 an extra 220 million euro will be allocated to the youth and family centres. Both family and youth policies start from the assumption that 90-95 per cent of children and families are leading happy, well-balanced lives. However, there are children who are experiencing or causing problems. Parents, professionals and the government should work together to give them full attention. The Dutch government states it will no longer accept a noncommittal approach to such problems. A consequence of this view on youth and families is that Dutch policies mostly focus on problems to be solved and on the 5-10% of the young people and families that experience or cause problems. A new family policy is at the moment under construction in the Netherlands. It will be discussed in the Council of Ministers in October 2008.

In Greece a new family law was enacted in 1983. It stressed the equality of sexes, the protection of children and the family, as well as the secularization of marriage. Population policy continues to be a major component of family policy and in recent years the reconciliation of work and family life plays an increasingly important role. Over time[12], Greek family policy has come to include measures providing economic aid to families with children (allowances, subsidies, tax exemptions and services). A main characteristic of Greek family policies is still its emphasis on selective policies, focused on the poor and disadvantaged. Traditional family roles and structures (familism) are still very strong in Greece and both nuclear family and kin networks are key elements in society. But Greece is moving clearly to more gender equality as shown in the increase in the level of educated females and a rise in the number of working women. These developments also tend to lead to changing family policy responses.

A survey among young people of 15-29 years by researchers of the Aegean University provides interesting additional information on recent developments in Greece[13]. A large number of young people of this age live in the family home. Like other Mediterranean countries, Greece has a large proportion of young people at risk of poverty. They have to rely heavily on their families and are not strongly supported by the state. The family's financial assistance is very important for young people, given that a welfare policy for the young is still developing.

Of the sample questioned in this research, 58% declared that their income comes exclusively from the family, 23% had a stable income from a regular job and 0,8% were supported by welfare benefits. Young people experience difficulties entering the labour market. Asked about relationships and supportive networks, 59% of the Greek youngsters state to receive significant help and support from family and – to a lesser degree – from friends. There was "a noted absence of any reference to the supportive role of the public sector." The public sector here does not include only the state, but also the church, the press and experts. The authors conclude that the family proves to be very important for Greek

young people. Public sector institutions play a minor role. The Greek welfare state is a familistic one, fitting in a distinctive Mediterranean type of welfare state.

An extensive overview – though partly outdated now - of policies that affect families with children, including taxes, social security contributions, child care provisions etc. is presented by Papadopoulos (2002)[14].

In Canada family policies are, the same as youth policies, for a large part specific for each jurisdiction. An overview of family policy in Canada is presented by Lefebvre and Merrigan (2003)[15]. They start from the same point as the Dutch, stating that "according to many experts, most children in Canada are physically, emotionally and socially healthy and a large majority perform well in school and have good academic outcomes. For some children, however, the trends are not so favourable". They defend the role of government concerning public support of families with the argument that children generate positive "externalities" or social consumption benefits. The childrearing services provided by families are of great importance and value for society as a whole. Public support of families should be designed so as to ensure the best possible outcomes for children in terms of the life cycle. Today's children are tomorrow's parents, employees, taxpayers, entrepreneurs.

Family policy received a boost in Canada in 1997, when the federal government increased its support to families through the Canadian Child Tax Benefit substantially. This came after a period from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s when public support to families was cut back. In real terms, the federal government spent almost 40% less in child tax and transfer benefits in 1997 than in 1974. After 1997 it started to catch up, but real benefits in 2000 were still 17% lower than in 1974. In 1998 the National Child Benefit (NCB) was introduced. Child benefits were increased several years around 2000. According to Levebvre and Merrigan, the merit of NCB lies in bringing the federal, provincial and territorial governments together to design programmes for low-income families with children, that are inspired by three objectives:

- To help prevent and reduce the depth of child poverty
- To promote attachment of families to the work force
- To reduce overlap and duplication between federal and provincial/territorial programmes.

NCB programmes vary over the provinces but may include, apart from child benefits and income supplements, early childhood and children at risk initiatives, training and job placement programmes, and family health benefits. The authors, after analysing in detail the NCB programmes, find that Canadian strategies are misguided and plead for a more integrated policy. They propose an alternative strategy where parents are not constrained in their dual role as economic provider and nurturer, and where a wide set of choices is made available to parents, e.g. to choose the type of care that best suits the need of their child.

Ingredients for a fundamental discussion on family policies in Canada (and elsewhere) are presented by Rianne Mahon[16]. She names thee important policy concerns:

- The activation agenda: making work pay, providing child care
- The reconciliation agenda: e.g. maternity/parental leaves, flexible work times for parents of young children
- Investing in human capital: life-long learning, investment in early childhood education

Central in adapting family policies to changing situations is the development of a national child care system based on quality, universality, accessibility and development.

Canada seems to be moving from a family policy that mainly is of economic nature and uses income policies and social security instruments to support families, especially poor families, towards a family policy with a wider scope, aimed at strengthening the economic and social structure of society and adapting to new developments, such as the ageing of the population, declining fertility, changing family structures, growth of flexible types of employment and polarisation of incomes.

A family policy with a wide scope is envisaged in the British "Every Child Matters" programme. The mission statement of this programme is that the government, in partnership with local agents, works to make sure that parents and families have access to the support that they need, when they need it, so that all children can benefit from confident, positive and resilient parenting, from birth right to the teenage years. This will be ensured by:

- Good quality universal support, available to all parents
- More specialised support at the local level to meet the needs of families and communities facing additional difficulties (parenting education groups, couple support, home visiting, employment and training advice)
- Efforts by schools to engage parents in children's and young people's education and to help parents understand what they can do at home to work with the school
- Development of a coherent set of services by children centres and extended schools in order to support parents and to involve them at all stages of a child's learning and development.

In this statement income policy/social security instruments are not mentioned, which may imply that family policy no longer focuses on financial instruments but on activating parents. Of course this does not imply that income policy/social security instruments are not applied.

Some comments on the family policies

- First of all, family policies and youth policies are closely interwoven. In fact, family policies mainly exist because governments wish to protect and further the interests of children and young people. Certainly when youth policies address the age range of 0-24, thus including young children, both types of policies are intensively related.

- Family policies always encompass a series of income policy/social security instruments, often of a very technical and complicated nature. They nowadays include in some countries instruments to activate (towards schooling, training, work) and to accommodate (work and family life). This tendency can be seen in all three countries studied here. Also the fight against child mistreatment/ child abuse is sometimes mentioned as becoming more important.

- Cultural differences (often combined with economic and social differences, e.g. the historically developed vision on the position of the family in society) give a specific colour to family policies in different countries. We mentioned already familism in Greece. But we may also refer to an article of Philip Girard[17] with the challenging title "why Canada has no family policy: Lessons from France and Italy." Girard claims that a historical view of the family law and family policy of English-speaking countries suggests that there is a tendency to value liberty and property at the expense of solidaristic and child-centred values. The French, on the other hand, have in their family policies aimed to support as much as possible, both economically and socially, the decision to have and raise children.

When looking at the many policy papers and other documents on family policies, taking into consideration the enormous budgets that are involved in these policies, and the numerous statements on the importance of families and raising and educating children in the 21st century, it is surprising that only sporadically attention is paid to future developments in family structures and family life. Of course such an analysis is very difficult and may touch upon emotions and sentiments about family life and the norms and values connected to it. The speed and intensity of changes in family life – for both young people and parents – in recent years nevertheless suggests that a look into the future would not be an expendable luxury.

Central issues in youth policies

The great variety in youth policy is of course reflected in the contents of policies. According to Bendit and Rink[18], the main themes in youth policies are: education, lifelong learning, employment, mobility, social disadvantages, integration, racism, participation, information, voluntary work and young people's independence. They developed a typology of youth policies for European countries:

- The universalistic model applies to Scandinavia (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden). There is no separate ministry or directorate for youth. Youth is seen as a resource and youth participation is a main topic. Goals are: autonomy, development and political involvement. The age range for youth policy is from 15-25 years.

- The protective model is typical for Central Europe (Belgium, Germany, France, Netherlands, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, Austria). These countries have youth ministries or directorates. Young people are seen as vulnerable and both as a problem and a resource. Participation, prevention of problems and social integration are important topics. To protect, promote and support young people are the main goals.

Here youth policies cover the entire generation of youth, from 0-21/27 years. Disadvantaged youth get special attention.

- The community-oriented model is found in Great Britain and Ireland. Here governmental participation in planning and implementing youth policy is limited. Youth is seen as a problem group. Topics are: participation, extended period of youth and social exclusion. Policy goals are: prevention of social problems and political involvement. Disadvantaged young people aged 0-19 years are the addressees of the youth policy.

- The centralistic model is the model of the Mediterranean countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain). Youth policies here are relatively new because churches and families were in the past mainly responsible for youth work. Youth policies are mainly the responsibility of the national government and local authorities. Youth are seen as a problem and as a resource. The main topics are: youth unemployment and an extended period of youth. Social inclusion of disadvantaged young people, social care, leisure time activities, youth information can be added here. Goals of the policy are: supporting the autonomy of young people, but also education and welfare services to support young people's safe and healthy transition to adult life, as well as leisure time activities. Youth policies are directed towards young adults from 13 to 30 years of age. The main target group however concerns young people from 15 to 25 years old.

Again the different age ranges for youth policy complicate a comparison of youth policies of different countries. A "clean" comparison should include an overview of policies for young children in those countries where youth policies are restricted to young adults. After all, that these policies are not categorized as youth policy, does not mean they do not exist.

Topics of youth policy in the Netherlands

An analysis of Dutch youth policy over a long period shows that five themes always find their way into policy, independent of political or strategic changes in the policies[19]. These five themes are:

- Reducing social disadvantages of (especially) young children. This is a classic theme in Dutch education and youth policies. In recent years, priority has been given to young children (aged 0-6 years) by developing Early Childhood Education and Care (ECEC) programs. The Dutch government is investing heavily in these programmes. The goal is to reach all children with disadvantages (about 20% of all children according to the most often used definition) with high quality programmes. Influential institutions like the Dutch Central Planning Bureau and the Ministry of Finance are convinced that the best investments are those in the education of young children (the Heckman motto).

- Combining care for children and young people inside and outside school by establishing (new) Centres for Youth and Family. In these Centres problems with children should be detected early, resulting in a coordinated intervention.

- Reducing early drop out in schools and providing all young people with a level of qualification that guarantees job opportunities on the labour market.

- Developing "all day arrangements" which means making it possible for parents to combine work and family life. Measures have been taken such as the Work and Care act, the Working Hours Adjustment Act and the Child Day Care Act. Primary schools are now obliged to offer care for children for some extra hours, outside regular school hours (before school starts, during the lunch break and after school). Stimulating the development of community school is closely linked to these policies.

- Increasing participation of young people. A new instrument is an obligatory social training placement during secondary education. These placements are designed to familiarise young people with the society they live in and to encourage them to contribute to that society. Another instrument are poverty policies for children. In 2008, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment made available 80 million euro for children from poor families. In 2008 and 2009, this budget will be given to the municipalities for buying computers or music instruments for the children or for paying contributions for e.g. sport clubs. The goal is to make it possible for poor children to participate in society. The way the money is spent, is the subject of an agreement between municipalities and the ministry.

A theme that has risen very much on the political agenda is child abuse. It is estimated that annually between 50,000 and 80,000 children in the Netherlands are victims of child abuse, with deadly consequences for 50 of them. A reporting code has been developed, providing a set of rules for conduct and instructions for citizens and professionals who suspect a case of child abuse. In addition, an electronic child database and a register of at-risk youngsters will be running from January 1, 2009. The database will allow professionals to identify risks more quickly and to monitor at-risk children. The register is meant to collect all indications that a youth is at risk. If more than one indication is entered in the register, the notifiers are sent each other's contact details, so they can discuss ways to coordinate their efforts.

We would also like to give an example of how, as part of youth policy making in the Netherlands, attempts are currently made to create a more child-friendly physical environment.

The government claims it will:

- By 2011 require all municipalities to have a means of consulting young people, partly with a view to creating a child-friendly environment

- Require the establishment of agreements between government and municipalities on how municipalities are to go about creating a child-friendly environment

- Monitor progress in applying the guideline which specifies that 3% of land in designated housing zones should be set aside for playing fields and playgrounds

- Will specify how neighbourhood approaches and the national Youth and Family Programme should interact through the charters that have been drawn up by the government and municipalities for the 40 most deprived neighbourhoods

- Conclude agreements to extend the role and responsibilities of housing associations in supplying and managing multifunctional housing, outdoor play areas and accommodation for young people in consultation with the federation of housing associations.

Dutch policy making for youth heavily leans upon agreements between central government, local authorities and locally or regionally operating institutions and organisations. This often seems to be an efficient approach, when there is a broad and genuine agreement on the subject at stake. When this is not the case, this kind of policy making easily turn into "dead letters". The "integrated (mixed) schools" policies are an example. Parents in the Netherlands are free in choosing a school for their children. This contributes partly to the phenomenon of segregation in schools. Some schools are mainly white middle class, others are predominantly black – low SES. Even when the neighbourhood is mixed, school populations are often not mixed. The government wants to promote integration and therefore obliges municipalities and school boards to discuss how to realize integrated schools. At the local level interest in intervening is slight and in most regions matters remain as they are, even when once a year the subject of segregation is put on the agenda. The integrated school policy is considered an important subject on the national political agenda and is a popular theme in the press, but in the past five years the situation in schools has hardly changed.

Topics in youth policy in Greece

As can be seen in the typology of Bendit and Rink, youth policy in Greek is quite different from Dutch youth policy. The themes addressed by Greek youth policy are:

Culture: this includes participation in the Biennale by young artists, Sunday afternoon film programmes for school children on Attica, theatre performances for young people in Northern Greece and the free distribution of cd's of young musicians produced by the general secretariat for youth.

Leisure time: organisation of three-day trips in Greece (alternative tourism), three-day sailing excursions, and city-by-bike trips for groups of young people, to make participants familiar with the nature and culture of Greek cities.

Employment: activities here consist of a youth entrepreneurship support structure, called "Youth Entrepreneurship Units" and a youth entrepreneurship observatory. The first is for young people who wish to start their own business but do not know how. The support structure is set up in every capital region. The general secretariat for youth seeks to approach young people actively, through visits and presentations in schools, productive use of the internet, competition and virtual enterprise games. The goal of this activity is to promote entrepreneurship and to support young people who wish to be involved in entrepreneurial activities. The youth entrepreneurial observatory aims to promote initiatives for informing young people as well as programme planning and implementation. The observatory can be

seen as an information and research project, closely connected to the entrepreneurship support structure. Other activities include Career Services Offices in Universities and Technological Education Institutes; School Bureaus of Educational and Career Counselling operating within the framework of secondary school units; Regional Educational and Career Counselling Centres (KeSyP) and Centres for the Promotion of Employment.

Participation: Local Youth Councils offer young people between the age of 15 and 28 the opportunity to participate actively and to take initiatives on issues of their own concern as well as on issues of public interest. A council size can vary from five to eleven members, depending on the size of the municipality. On the national level there is a Youth (or Juvenile) Parliament and a National Youth Council).

Volunteering: a holidays and volunteering programme has been created, enabling young people of 18 -25 years to combine holidays and voluntary work. A higher secondary school certificate and adequate command of at least one foreign language is required. The voluntary work can be done at a Hellenic Post Office of a tourist destination. This is intended to help meet the increased needs of popular regions (for tourists) during summertime. The Hellenic Post covers part of the overall costs for housing, food en travelling costs. Young people are also invited to become a volunteer to help sea turtles. Another option is to participate in programmes of the European Voluntary Service to become a volunteer elsewhere in Europe.

Support: here we can mention a "legal aid for juvenile delinquents from vulnerable social groups programme", in which young lawyers are asked to offer their services for free or for a symbolic fee. Another initiative is the national children's rights observatory, whose mission it is to monitor and promote the implementation of the provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child in Greece. The observatory does this by carrying out reports on the conditions and the situation of children in the country, by promoting scientific research and by taking initiatives to protect children's rights. The observatory covers all children under 18 and in particular vulnerable children, e.g. those who are deprived of their natural parents, as well as refugees and immigrants. For medical students there is a special programme to work as a volunteer as medical support staff in hospitals and clinics in the Aegean and Ionian Islands.

Information: Youth Information Centres operate in every prefecture under the auspices of the local authorities. The basic aim of the centres is to bring young people into contact with information and communication technology. These centres also organise, together with municipalities or other partners exhibitions, youth festivals and cultural and sports events. Several websites provide online information for young people. The general secretariat will improve its electronic services by an e –government project, which is co-funded by the European Commission.

Education: activities include a "Youth getting to know Europe" programme for 300 high school graduates and 30 professors, a dvd commemorating the anniversary of the Polytechnic uprising of 1974, and a loganalysis project to study Plato's Protagoras in detail.

Environment: includes the sea turtle project, the 'bike around the town project' and the 'nature's laboratory programme'. In nature's laboratory, children and young people (ages 8-30) explore nature, manufacture solar collectors and electricity generators, study recycling

and learn about the beauty and value of the Greek flora. Participation is free of charge. Special programmes on environmental issues and ecology are organised by the 29 Centers of Environmental Education all over Greece, under the supervision of the Ministry of National Education and Religious Affairs, for pupils of primary and secondary schools).

Greece participates intensively in activities at the European level. These activities include the youth card (for young people between 13 and 26 years) and provide special benefits in Greece and several other countries. Also important are the Youth in Action programme, offering youth exchanges, youth initiatives, youth democracy projects, the European voluntary programme (European Voluntary Service), direct cooperation with neighbouring countries of the European Union, youth support systems and structured dialogues between policy makers and young people.

Topics in youth policy in Canada

Because in Canada youth policies are mainly developed at the provincial level, it is difficult to detect common denominators in the topics they address. Each jurisdiction in Canada defines its own policy framework and topics, and thousands of activities, big and small, take place within these frameworks. The study by United Way Toronto provides a useful overview of the many variations in the Canadian youth policies.

Toronto

Toronto youth strategy: population-based youth policy[20].

Targets youth aged 12- 24 for improved outcomes in the areas of:

- Education, employment and income
- Families, communities, and neighbourhoods
- Engagement

Youth were involved in developing the strategy. A youth strategy panel will facilitate the implementation of the strategy. The panel began its work in June 2007.

Vancouver

Civic youth strategy: population-based youth policy

Targets youth aged 13-24 to promote the development, assessment and delivery of civil services with direct impact on youth. It seeks to:

- Ensure that youth have a place in the city
- Ensure a strong youth voice in local decision making
- Promote youth as a resource to the city

- Strengthen the support base for youth in the city

Ontario

Youth opportunities strategy and youth challenge fund

This is a risk prevention and resiliency approach for youth at risk. It targets youth aged 14-18 and aims at improving outcomes for marginalized youth in the areas of:

- Job readiness
- Engagement
- Access to information crime prevention and diversion
- Police youth relations

Specific initiatives are e.g. a youth outreach worker programme, summer jobs for youth, and a learn and work programme.

The Youth Challenge Fund is a targeted investment strategy for youth in poorly served areas. The province of Ontario has invested $ 15 million for programmes and services for youth (aged 11-24) and has provided another 15 million in matching funds. These matching funds have been set up to encourage donations from the private sector and individuals.

Alberta

Albert Youth Employment Strategy

The strategy is designed to support all youth aged 15- 24 years in seeking employment in the province, but pays particular attention to youth who are at risk of not finding work, including aboriginal youth and disabled youth. The four goals are:

- Creating opportunities for all youth to develop skills and knowledge needed for work
- To increase work opportunities for youth
- To help youth adjust to the changing nature of work
- To help youth address barriers that may prevent them from learning or working

The Alberta Youth Strategy includes a measuring process of expected outcomes in the strategy.

Each goal covers several subthemes and activities. These include e.g. help to pursue self-employment work opportunities and the development of entrepreneurial skills, a learning information system for on-line information and services on career, learning and employment,

and store front schools where students who have dropped out can continue their education in a non- traditional setting.

British Columbia

Youth policy framework and guidelines for the provision of youth services

This framework outlines the Ministry of Children and Family approach to youth services and guides policy and programme development. It is a population-based policy framework for youth aged 16-19. It is based on extensive research and developed through consultations across the sector. Priorities include:

- Meeting the basic needs of youth
- Reducing severity of problematic behaviour by youth
- Improved physical health
- Meeting the developmental changes of adolescence
- Successful transition into adulthood
- Increased self reliance and self-sufficiency

The youth policy framework is a common frame of reference for all activities related to youth in the province. The British Columbia Guidelines for the Provision of Youth Service is an accompanying document to the framework. It outlines standards for practitioners working in the youth sector, benchmarks for measuring progress and target outcomes. The framework is related to the promotion, prevention and early support policy framework for younger children. The policies in British Columbia in our view seem to go quite far in the direction of integrated youth policies.

Québec

Youth Policy and Youth Action Strategy

The Québec Youth Policy is a population-based policy document, which emphasizes the ideal that a mutually supportive society must assume its responsibilities toward current and future generations. This policy serves as the theoretical framework for all other policies in the framework and as such also is to a large extent integrated. Encouraging active citizenship for all young people in Québec is a central theme. The Youth Action Strategy is the accompanying action plan document. Actions are for youth 0-25 years of age. There are five orientations that guide government action:

- Improving the health and well being of young people
- Fostering the education success of young people

- Fostering young people's entry into the workforce
- Enhancing young people's participation in society
- Improving the support offered to young people

The Québec Youth Action strategy has some interesting international activities. One is fostering mentoring through the creation of junior Québec teams assigned to foreign trade missions. Another is supporting the 2008 World Youth Congress in Québec city. This congress will bring 600 young activists from 120 different countries to Québec. The theme of the Congress is sustainable development.

Province of New Brunswick

Youth services partnership

This partnership is a population-based service coordination network for youth aged 16 – 19. The partnership is a structured federal-provincial partnership. It aims to provide a collaborative network to facilitate effective and efficient delivery of programmes and services for youth. Rather than serving as a broad policy framework, the partnership aims at maximizing the use of existing community, provincial and federal resources directed toward youth services.

Again under this policy umbrella we find a large array of initiatives and activities for young people. One can mention the alternative schools, youth need assessment, youth telephone lines and information guides, outreach services and home visits[21].

We can add two specific federal youth policies to these provincial policies. One is the Youth Justice Renewal Strategy. The mandate of this YJRS is to establish a fair and effective youth justice system through a more targeted approach to youth issues. It addresses prevention and meaningful alternatives, meaningful consequences for youth crime and rehabilitation and reintegration. Pilot project have been facilitated by the strategy. Results from the pilots will be available for the whole of Canada.

Another federal policy is the Youth employment strategy to help young Canadians (15-30 years) to obtain career information, develop skills, find good jobs and stay employed. This national strategy offers a broad range of initiatives under three programmes: Skill Link, Summer Work Experience and Career Focus.

A short comment on the contents of youth policies

The variation in contents of youth policies over the three countries is clearly very wide. Of course in Canada alone we encounter several youth policies with provinces making mainly their own choices. Nevertheless, one can see some patterns in policy making for youth. The Greek policy is very concrete and makes use of partnerships and other resources that are available. At the same time it is very fragmented, because youth policy is articulated and implemented by a variety of Ministries and other state organisations without a satisfactory coordination. It is an inductive kind of policy, without too many references to theoretical

backgrounds, decision making processes and underlying research. The Canadian policies are much more deductive, referring to research and consultations before a course is determined. Often there are separate documents for the mission statements and for the planning of actions. Sometimes it is difficult to find out what actions are undertaken and whether they progress as foreseen. Dutch youth policies seem to offer a nice balance between theory and practice. On the other hand, whereas the Greek and Canadian vocabulary on youth is rather positive, viewing youth as an asset, Dutch policy makers seem to indulge in problems and have developed a rather gloomy language in youth policies.

Despite the great variety in content, there are also many common points. Preparing young people for entrepreneurship, involving young people in policy making, providing information on line on all kinds of subjects that are important for youngsters, trying to reduce school dropout, offering cultural and sport facilities are just a few of the themes we find everywhere. A problem is that it seems to be rather arbitrary what activities for youth are labelled as youth policy and what are not. Voluntary work may not be mentioned within the framework of a country's youth policy, but that does not mean there are no facilities for voluntary work. They may just be labelled differently. Remarkable is that some of the Canadian provinces are working hard to develop integrated youth policies. Dutch policies are also moving in this direction and there is certainly a degree of communication and coordination between the various levels of policy making for youth.

Discussions and reflections on the policies

In the preceding paragraphs we have explained the characteristics and contents of youth policies, often quoting official documents offering mission statements, arguments, decisions and action plans. Now we shall take a look at comments, criticisms and reflections on youth policies. A first impression is that youth policies are usually not very controversial. Criticism and comments are mostly stated quietly and positively. This may be partly explained by the interactive processes by which these policies are developed. Youth are often involved in developing youth policies, both on a national and on a local level. But also institutions and organisations are consulted and their views are taken very seriously. Often the policies are based on information from research or from statistical or monitoring systems. It seems that because of these careful processes in policy making, the resulting policies are generally acceptable for most of the stakeholders. But youth policies are certainly not yet fully developed and to make them workable and robust for the future will require much thinking, discussion and action.

Bendit and Marbach[22] use the data of Eurobarometers 1997 and 2007 to show whether and to what extent the European Union has made progress in its youth policies. This results in a number of critical statements:

- Education leaves a lot to be desired. In education and vocational training for young people, the EU has not made any progress during the last ten years and shows obvious weaknesses according to the Eurobarometer. Europe did not meet the goals it set itself regarding; increasing high school completion rates, improving reading levels, increasing education participation and decreasing school drop out rates.

- There is a growing negative influence of the housing market on the autonomy of young people, constraining also higher education graduates, in fact more often. In the Mediterranean countries leaving the parental home (hotel Mama) is delayed.

- The situation in the labour market has not improved for young people. In 2004, about 18% of young people in Europe aged 15 to 25 were unemployed (Poland even 40%). The advantage of a higher level of education seems to have declined during the last ten years.

- The establishment of an effective European labour market for young people has made no progress between 1997 and 2007. It has, on the contrary, regressed. The administrative hurdles when switching to a job abroad have not been lowered, nor has progress been made in the Europe-wide acceptance of national qualifications.

In the article mentioned earlier, Bendit and Rink make some evaluating comments about the goals and measures of European youth policy. They take the position that the goals are meaningful and go in the right direction. On the other hand, they are too noncommittal and action lines and measures are too broad. National governments and local authorities are obliged to translate these general goals into concrete policy measures on their own. In most EU member states there are numerous programmes corresponding to goals at the European level (as stated in the European Youth Pact). Examples from Germany are mentioned, where the Federal Ministry of Families, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth is currently focusing on strategies such as:

- Achieving compatibility between family and work

- Achieving improved cooperation between youth welfare services and schools

- Achieving social and occupational integration of young people in social hotspots or of young people with a migrant background

- Promoting offers and the utilization of possibilities for non-formal and informal learning

- Reforming the system of education towards all-day schools

- Modernising the vocational training system and curricula

- Modernising and Europeanising higher education

The authors complain that there has been no systematic coordination of these strategies and measures at the various levels of government and that there is no coordinating centre capable of integrating all these concepts that relate to young people. These critical remarks refer to the problems of developing integrated youth policies that we have also encountered in the Netherlands and Canada.

The Netherlands

Comments and criticism on youth policies have been limited so far. There have been many new initiatives recently and the Dutch government usually involves many experts and stakeholders in the policy making process, which may partly explain why there seems to be quite some public support for the policy decisions. On the other hand, one cannot observe great enthusiasm about the policies. The mainstream reaction seems to be: this is interesting, let us see what happens next.

There is general consensus that new policies were needed in some areas of youth policy. The youth care system in the Netherlands could not handle the problems it was confronted with. Waiting lists kept growing, care providers did not coordinate their activities. Some serious incidents with individual children received much media coverage and caused shocked reactions among the public and in politics. The government is now introducing the "One family, one plan´" approach, for families receiving help from multiple organisations. This approach applies to all situations, parenting, youth health care, youth care, education, housing, employment, debt or security. As soon as two or more organisations begin providing assistance to one family, they are required to come together to plan a joint strategy, with one agency in overall charge of the organisation. A national network of youth and family centres is now being created and should be fully operational in 2011. This idea has been challenged by directors of Bureaus for Youth Care, who fear that the distance between families and care providers will increase and that control, coordination and steering processes will take too much time. The centres might well become bureaucratic molochs, according to expert Micha de Winter[23]. We see here again a concern that an effort towards more integrated policies may have adverse effects.

More general criticism has been voiced by Boutellier[24], who points out that Dutch youth policies lack a vision on youth. Youth policy needs a vision on how young people can find a place in the social environment. The core of Dutch youth policies is that they lack a core. By accentuating the problem dimension of youth (the 15% who have or cause problems), the needs of "normal" youth receive too little attention. These comments are related to those of Kloprogge[25], who fears that Dutch educational disadvantage policies have reached their limits. These policies should not only aim at tackling deficiencies, but should also have an open eye for talent and talent development. Hermanns, one of the leading Dutch experts in young care, remarks[26] - with a touch of irony - that Dutch youth policy distinguishes three kinds of citizens:

a. Those with problems, who are in need of much care
b. Those at risk to have problems and to need care, who therefore must receive preventive help
c. Those who do not have problems and do not need attention. They have to be watched carefully to see if problems will develop.

Education expert Jozef Kok[27] takes a positive stand towards youth policy and gives some recommendations for improving policies, including:

- Invest in the quality of professionals. Teachers and youth workers are required to do what has been prescribed by non-professionals and they spend much of their time in accounting for the way they execute these external instructions. Give them more space in their work and the opportunity to become even better professionals.

- Do not treat institutions and organisations working with young people, as if they are working directly in service of the government. Let them take their responsibilities and make their own strategic choices

- Stimulate the development of talent in young people, of creativity, entrepreneurship, technology and social intelligence.

- Develop a system of multiple public accountability, where institutions account for their work towards stakeholders in their environment.

- Strengthen coherence of education, general youth policy and youth care. Reduce the fragmentation in current youth policies.

In the present stage, comments and criticism of Dutch youth policy concentrate mainly on the lack of an integral vision on youth, the ever growing bureaucracy connected with e.g. accountability demands, and the problem-oriented nature of the policies. As is often the case in the Netherlands, policy makers are happy to accommodate criticism by opening some opportunity for alternatives. For example, five universities have been facilitated by the Dutch government to start a major new programme on talent development of young children, called Curious Minds[28]. This involves research into what children between the age of three to six years know and do in the domains of science, technology, engineering and mathematics.

Greece

The rather scarce comments regarding youth policies in Greece all point in the same direction. There is much worrying about the situation of youth in Greece and the lack of welfare and social policies, but there are few critical remarks on the concrete actions that are taken by e.g. the Greek Secretariat-General of Youth. In its pages on Greece, the Clearinghouse on international developments in child, youth and family policies at Columbia University points out that youth unemployment remains very high in Greece. Youth unemployment in Greece - the number of unemployed in the age group 15-25 as a percentage of the total population- during the first six months of 2008 has reached 27.1 per cent, one of the highest rates of youth unemployment in Europe. Many unemployed youngsters resort to the family network in order to obtain a job. An expert is quoted as stating that "Greek social policy has always relied on the family for welfare services to its members". This resembles comments from other authors, like Matsaganis[29], who claims that a social and welfare infrastructure is almost non-existent in Greece. Chtouris (o.c.) and his colleagues add that only recently fledgling policies specifically targeted at young people have started to be implemented in Greece. Indeed a variety of social services is provided to young people in Greece today, such as prevention and therapeutic programmes for drug addicted young persons and their families and youth unemployment support programmes initiated by the Greek Manpower Employment Organisation. Chtouris concludes that Greek youth expect no

assistance from the public sector or formal institutions. Their data, together with other official European reports, indicate that young people in Southern European countries face such huge pressure to secure a job that other important aspects of their lives are under-developed. Greek youngsters express no particular interest in politics, they are not often involved in voluntary work. They also do not feel confident or able to influence larger social, political and environmental problems. Chtouris and other sources also mention that major difficulties exist in the transition from school and education to work. According to the most recent large-scale survey, *H Nea Genia stin Ellada Simera* (Youth in Greece Today), commissioned by the Secretariat- General for Youth and conducted by the Institute of Applied Communication (University of Athens) in 2005, the great majority of young people (59.4%) claims that it does not participate in any group or civil society organization.

Summarizing, we may comment that the fact that a youth policy in Greece has come into being and is developed further is very positive. On the other hand, the policy is rather restricted in its scope and resources and can only play a secondary role in improving the economic and social situation of young people in Greece.

Canada

In Canada the discussion on youth policies concentrates less on specific youth policies than on the question how the responsibilities for youth policies should be organised over the several administrative levels. A paper of the Canadian National Children's Alliance, entitled "Why Canada needs a National Youth Policy Agenda" is often referred to on the internet and in publications[30]. Its authors argue that Canada does not have a comprehensively national adolescent development or adolescent health policy. Adolescents need a broad spectrum of support that cross multiple domains, including health, social services, education, and justice. These domains are in Canada largely within the jurisdiction of provincial and territorial governments. The federal government should negotiate federal, provincial and territorial accords and agreements that establish shared goals, standards and expectations and that provide a framework for monitoring progress.

Particularly interesting in the paper is the reference to the Early Childhood Development Agreement as demonstrating the potential of these agreements to generate momentum across the country around particular issues. The National Children's Alliance offers to play a positive role in generating the political will to organise this. In the paper several determinants of healthy development of young people are discussed, such as:

- Social and economic determinants, in particular issues related to bullying and exposure to violence
- Personal health practices, including physical activity, nutrition and obesity, risk taking behaviours, and sexual and reproductive health
- Individual capacity and coping skills, including issues related to mental health and spiritual wellbeing

- Community institutions, including issues related to school environments, community policing and justice

Also youth engagement is discussed, where the conclusion of the authors is that Canadian youth are missing critical opportunities to learn the skills that are required to become productive and community-oriented democratic citizens.

A seminar on youth policy and research was organised in 2006 by the Canadian government[31]. The background document for this conference points to the need for: framing the concepts for more integrated youth policies, consolidating available evidence related to youth trends and challenges, and gaining more knowledge on advantages and limitations of new policy approaches and practices.

In the recently published inter-jurisdictional review on youth policy in Canada by United Way Toronto, five key lessons are identified:

- There exists no multi-level policy framework in Toronto or Ontario that adopts a comprehensive outcomes-based approach to youth development.

- Policy responses to youth issues are increasingly being aimed at connecting various youth policy sectors and departments.

- A number of youth policies have narrow mandates and limited target populations.

- There is no single theoretical approach to youth policy that is clearly more effective than another. However, stakeholders employing differing approaches to helping youth can better collaborate when they are working toward the same overarching goals and long-term youth outcomes.

- Creating a common vision is the first step in developing an effective policy framework.

Comment on the comments and discussions

The discussions and comments about youth policies indicate that the complexity of these policies poses many questions for the future. Youth policy touches on so many spheres of life and involves so many stakeholders that it is very difficult to develop an integrated approach. It is therefore understandable that critical remarks are made on the lack of a common or central vision and that the need for more coordination and collaboration is emphasized. Of course high standards in this are not easy to achieve, even when the political will is there. There seems, however, to be much agreement on what are important contents of youth policy. The themes addressed are the same in many countries, so it seems. Certainly the concept of youth involvement in policy making receives wide support and there is ample evidence that the ideas and hopes of young people are increasingly taken seriously by policy makers.

What is surprising is the absence of analyses about future developments that can be expected. The lives of young people are changing rapidly[32], which implies that opportunities and problems that young people experience probably are not stable. The absence of views

about the future, combined with the relatively small amount of research on the effectiveness of youth policy, raises questions about the robustness and stability of these policies over more than a short period.

Good practice in youth policy

Of course countries can learn from each other in developing and improving youth policies, just as young people learn from each other through the internet, YouTube, Hyves and other media. It is a pity that interventions or activities within the framework of youth policies are only sporadically evaluated. A book about "What works in Youth Policy" would probably be still rather thin. Nevertheless, examples can be inspiring, even when it is not sure if an activity really works. Below, we present some "interesting practices" that refer to aspects of youth policy we encountered in several countries. The selection of what is interesting here is rather arbitrary, because there is not much evidence on the effectiveness of any of the practices we selected. But they certainly show how much variety in strategy and content we encounter in youth policies.

1. The Netherlands, community schools

Community schools are a way of integrating education, community-based activities and services, such as education support, childcare, libraries, health centres, cultural activities etc. By combining these services in a multi-functional building, they become more accessible and can be made compatible with each other. The community school concept stimulates participation of pupils and of parents. The various activities encourage children and young people to enhance their social skills and to learn interactively through participation. In 2007 the number of community schools in primary education had reached 1,000 and in secondary education 350. There is no blueprint for community schools, so there are many different varieties. Community schools were started in underprivileged areas, but are rapidly spreading towards other neighbourhoods. The concept of community schools has become very popular in a short time, but evidence about effects on the children is still scarce, but more research will be committed in the next years. Some English studies are rather positive on the results of this kind of schools[33].

2. The Netherlands, pupil support advisory teams

In pupil support advisory teams (ZATs in Dutch), professionals from a wide range of disciplines work together: teachers, pupil counsellors, social workers, youth health care services, youth care, school attendance officers and the police. They make arrangements to help young people who have – or might develop – emotional, behavioural, developmental or school-related problems. Often there are small ZATs concentrated around one school and more extended ZATs covering more schools. The ZATs are meant to relieve primary and secondary schools from having to deal with all the social problems they are confronted with. Research into the ZAT system indicates that good cooperation in ZATs results in improved problem identification and support provision. In future, ZATs will cooperate intensively with the Centres for Youth and Family to guarantee swift and effective support for children and young people.

3. The Netherlands, non-profit placements (a.k.a social job experience programmes)

Examples of how young people can participate in society include district youth councils, neighbourhood events organised for youth, voluntary work and participation in debates on discrimination and intolerance. Non-profit placements ('maatschappelijke stages') are a new addition to these instruments. These placements, which take place during school hours, are designed to familiarise young people with the society in which they live and to encourage them to make a contribution to it. In 2011 all student at secondary schools will be obliged to do a placement for a total of at least 72 hours. The placement is part of the regular school programme. The initiative will be taken by the student. The school will offer guidance and local authorities will support the cooperation. Placements will have to be arranged for 195,000 students each year, which requires massive support from private and public institutions to offer places. Some specific options will be included in the non-profit placement policy. One idea is to offer combined placements for pairs of Dutch and ethnic minority students. Another idea is to have students on placement teach the Dutch language to migrants. Both these additional ideas will be tried out in pilots and aim at contributing to integration processes.

4. Canada - New Brunswick, Mentoring initiative

This intervention has a client-centred approach that gives young people an opportunity to be placed in a positive working environment where they will receive guidance, encouragement and support from a mentor. The intervention includes outlining and demonstrating the advantages of post-secondary education to youth and raising their awareness of the current labour market. This helps the young people to plan for their future. The duration of the intervention is based on the client's needs. Key partners in this intervention are the mentee, mentor, family and community service staff, employer, training and employment development staff. The mentee will be eligible for financial support under the Training and Skills Development Program or receive a $1000 bursary if they complete a mentoring intervention as set out and return to school afterwards.

5. Canada - Vancouver, Youth awards/Connecting learning through art

The City of Vancouver Youth Awards is an initiative of the city's Youth Outreach Team, intended to reward youth, adults, programmes and organisations for their contributions to Vancouver. One of the award recipients is the Connecting Learning through Art programme. In response to the desire of youth in the community for a summer art programme in which young people could create freely without worry of expense, the Broadway Youth Resource Centre launched this programme in 2008. The programme succeeded in providing a safe drop-in environment to explore art through different media twice a week through the summer. Activities included creating a mural that depicts the feeling of loneliness and the joy of finding community and an exhibit displaying and selling participants artwork.

6. Greece, Local Youth Councils[34]

The General Secretary for Youth, in cooperation with several Ministries, has started to create Local Youth Councils in order to enable all young people to become active citizens. To reach young people, the General Secretary has organised a huge information campaign,

involving events at national level and meetings at local level throughout the country. Information brochures were distributed in all municipalities. Media were involved, such as national and local newspapers, national, regional an local television and radio broadcasts. In June 2007, local registers of young members between 18 and 25 years of age were set up. The first Local Youth Council elections take place in 2008.

7. Greece, volunteer kit for young people in schools and universities

In Greece several programmes have been developed to enable young people to engage in volunteering activities. The volunteer kit aims at promoting the values of volunteering in schools and universities. The kit contains basic information about volunteering, a handbook, a dvd, and best practice examples of the participative empowerment of young people through volunteering. This activity is mentioned as a good practice on the European site http://www.youth-partnership.net/youth-partnership/jsp/goodpractices/gp_library.jsp

8. Canada – British Columbia, Youth Taking Action

Youth Taking Action is a province-wide violence prevention initiative for young people aged 13 -19. Each workshop includes teams of six to eight young people and one adult (teacher, administrator, counsellor or police officer) from the school district. Workshop participants learn about the issues facing youth and receive training in leadership, presentation and facilitation. They learn how to work with partners and to identify and take action on the issues that affect them in their school or community. During the workshop teams begin to develop their own interactive presentations for other youth. Teams have used many different approaches, including dance, theatre, music, journalism and video to communicate with their peers. They address topic such as peer pressure, bullying, racism, youth violence, drugs and alcohol, sexuality, suicide, prostitution, poverty and employment.

9. Theme: Media awareness

Media awareness receives increasing attention in several countries and may be of great importance within youth policy frameworks. Both in the Netherlands and in Canada we see a number of activities in this area, even when these are not always mentioned as part of youth policies. In Canada the media awareness network provides resources and support for parents and teachers interested in media and information for young people. In 2000, the network initiated a wide-ranging study into the behaviours, attitudes and opinions of Canadian children and youth with respect to the internet. In the Netherlands several websites on media awareness are available[35] and in 2008 an expertise centre for media awareness for youth will be established.

10. Theme: Supporting entrepreneurship among youth

We encountered several interesting initiatives to stimulate and support young people to start a business of their own in Greece and Canada. In the Netherlands initiatives of the same kind exist, but they are not part of official youth policies. Mostly they are initiated by entrepreneurial or educational organisations. As the economic and professional future of

young people is always mentioned as one of the great challenges for youth and youth policies, actions to support entrepreneurship among youth seem crucial, both for the youth themselves and for the social en economic development of the countries they live in.

Youth policies and children from migrants in Germany[36] and the Netherlands

Several European countries are faced with the challenge of integrating migrant children and migrant youth. Even though most of these children were born in the country where they are living, this does not mean that they find their place in society. Especially a combination of difficulties in the cultural, language, social and economic domains can cause problems. These problem can become manifest in education, in health, in participation in society, in access to the labour market.

Germany and the Netherlands are two countries where this situation occurs and where policy makers are looking for solutions. Youth policies provide an important framework for addressing part of these problems.

Despite many differences between the two countries, there is ample similarity in some of the approaches that have been chosen. One important priority is that support must be provided as early as possible, to both children and families[37]. In the Netherlands all children at risk (including many children with a migrant background) aged 2,5- 4 years will be offered high quality educational programmes (including language stimulation) in child care or in playgroups. These programmes will be continued in the first years in primary school. An extensive system of parenting support and integrated care in Centres for Youth and Family is another important provision for migrant groups. In Germany, programmes for family education in family homes (e.g. the Dutch Opstapje project) are tried out, aiming at strengthening parent-child interaction. In the Netherlands, these programmes have lost some momentum, partly because of the costs involved, even though they showed positive results in evaluations.

Other interventions in Germany are:

- Strengthening non-school related educational provision
- Improving socio-integrative work in schools
- Ensuring vocational education

In the Netherlands, much work has been made of stimulating language development for young children. The Language Route (Taallijn)[38], a very successful training and coaching programme for professionals who work with young children aged 3-7 years, combining training with support from nationwide children´s television, is one of the central instruments and will have a follow up for children 6-9 years. It is also being introduced in Germany at the moment.

The Dutch government has very recently explicitly stated as its aim[39] to develop a youth policy in which migrant children and their parents will be reached by general youth service and parenting support. Referring to the problems of children and youth from migrant groups,

such as language problems, mental problems, school dropout, unemployment, overrepresentation in non-voluntary youth care and delinquency, the government draws the conclusion that present youth policies often reach migrant parents and children too late and interventions are not effective enough. By providing youth policies with instruments to deal with diversity, improvements can be made. These instruments will be developed by initiating a research programme about "what works for reaching and supporting migrant groups", and striving for a higher level of professionalism in working with migrants in health care, youth work and youth care. Several concrete activities have been announced for the period 2008-2011, including publications, training programmes, conferences and a research agenda. How this will relate to the very recent decision (september 25, 2008) to introduce a zero tolerance policy against Moroccan youth who cause problems in a number of neighbourhoods (it was even suggested to use the army for this), is at the moment not very clear.

Information, research and knowledge

Much information on youth and youth policy is available from international organisations and individual countries, both statistical and demographic information and specific information on youth policies. The United Nations is e.g. very active in this field, see http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unyin/.

The Youth Unit of the UN manages the UN Youth Information Network (UNYIN), which is an information data base for youth policies and programmes worldwide. This Network service is available to member States, UN agencies and NGOs.

For youth policies in Europe, the database of the Youth Partnership offers a lot of information, including specific information on Greece (2006) and the Netherlands (2007). A study on the socio-economic scope of Youth Work can be downloaded, including information on Greece and the Netherlands.

Other interesting sites are the European Youth Portal[40] and Eurodesk[41], the first offering information for young people, the second offering several links for more specific information on youth policies and youth research. Of course, the Eurobarometer[42] and its regular studies on youth are an important source of information on children and youth in Europe.

An interesting international site, not confined to Europe, is the Clearinghouse on international developments in child, youth and family policies at Columbia University[43]. This site covers the countries Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Uganda, United Kingdom and United States.

Even more countries are covered by the Datenbank für Internationale Jugendarbeit, a German website of the International Youth Service of the Federal Republic of Germany[44]. Descriptions are available of Argentina, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania,

Russian Federation, Sweden, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Czech Republic, Turkey, Ukraine, USA and United Kingdom. Sometimes information is available in several languages, sometimes only in German.

Also, the "Greenwood Encyclopaedia of children's issues worldwide, by Greenwood Press, provides overviews of a large number of countries.

Specific information on the Netherlands

In addition to "regular" information of the Central Bureau of Statistics, the National Youth Monitor[45] is an important source of information on the Netherlands. Users can adapt tables to their own preferences. The information is in Dutch only. A data book about children and youth, providing information for each municipality, is published each year by the Verwey Jonker Institute[46]. This database includes information on health, crime, unemployment, growing up outside the family, children in problem areas, poverty, child abuse, education, playgrounds, teenage pregnancy, leisure time, and youth participation. It is only in Dutch. Descriptive information on youth, family and youth policies in the Netherlands in English can be found on the website of the Dutch Youth Institute[47].

Information on education is available in English on the website of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science[48].

Specific information on Greece

Relevant information on Greece can be found in the country information of the German DIJA and the Clearinghouse at Columbia University. Much statistical information and information on policies regarding families with children is included in a study on family policy in Greece by Papadopoulos[49], published in 2002. Relevant statistical information in English is available on the website of the National Statistical Service of Greece[50]. A very interesting document, unfortunately only available in Greek, is a qualitative research report of the university of Athens on the 'Youth in Greece Today' (2005)[51].

Specific information on Canada

A wealth of information can be found on the website of Canada's national statistical agency[52] under the heading "children and youth". This part of the website includes links to other sites with statistical data. Also information on research papers and projects is presented. Another important source is the National Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth. This survey follows a representative sample of Canadian children from birth to early adulthood. The data collection occurs at two-year intervals. The first collection took place in 1994/1995. In addition to the original panel of children – now aged 10 to 21 years – a new sample has been added for children aged 4/5 years.

Another very informative source for Canada is the website for Canadian Youth: www.youth.gc.ca which also includes the publication *Canadian Youth: Who are they and what do they want?*, with qualitative and quantitative data on all aspects of the lives of young Canadians.

Information on family policy

Some interesting information on family policies should be mentioned here, in addition to the sources mentioned above. One is the Canadian study "Assessing Family Policy in Canada" by the Institute for Research on Public Policy in Quebec. In the Netherlands a comparison of family policy in ten countries was published in 2008[53] by Regioplan. The study analyses family policies in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom, the United States and Sweden. The study was commissioned by the Ministry of Youth and Family. The ministry will use the results to see how Dutch family policy compares with family policies in other countries and to discover options and opportunities for a new policy paper on family policy. Comparative information on family data of many countries is available from the OECD family database[54].

Comments

In order to build knowledge about youth and families, a great deal of work has been done and is being done in the domain of statistical information, monitoring systems etc. Policy makers wish to use this kind of data to see if their policies reach the intended outcomes. Of course this strategy is not without risk, because it is difficult to link changes in indicators to the processes resulting from policies. There seems to exist a gap between the monitoring systems and policy making processes. The policy making processes are only very partially related to databases and monitoring systems.

Specific research into children, youth and families seems much scarcer, though research on interesting issues is being done in many countries. Only a small part of this is of an evaluative nature.

Very little is written on future developments concerning children, youth and families, even though rapid changes in children's lives and in society at large are taking place and can be expected in the near future.

Topics for discussion

Age range

Youth policies of different countries cover different age ranges. The most common age range is 12/15 to 24/30 years. Countries using this restricted age range for youth policy also have policies for younger children, but these are kept more or less separate from youth policies. Some countries, such as Great Britain and the Netherlands, use an age range of 0 - 23 years. There are valid arguments for both variants. Nevertheless, the 0-23 variant seems to provide more opportunities for developing youth policies that are consistent and of high quality: it incorporates the domain of early childhood care and education (the crucial role of which for the development of children and youth has become ever more clear in the recent past); it offers more opportunities to link youth policies and family policies; and it opens the road to develop longitudinal youth policies, following the life course of individuals. It also seems to fit better within the convention of the rights of the child[55].Moreover a fundamental vision on youth and youth policies can hardly be come into being when it is restricted to the

age range of 12/15 – 24/30. It would be like designing the second floor of a building without paying attention to the first floor.

Contents

There is a discrepancy between activities that are presented within the framework of youth policies and other activities relevant for youth. It often seems rather arbitrary if an activity is considered as a product of youth policy or not. An international comparison of youth policies (and family policies, where this also seems to be the case) would benefit from a thorough inventory of youth policies. A discussion on how to reduce the gap between youth policy activities and other relevant activities for youth (within other policy frameworks or initiated outside policy circles) would make a lot of sense. The country reports by DIJA in Germany are a good step on the road to reducing this gap.

Responsibilities

The division of responsibilities regarding youth policies depend to some degree on the administrative organisation and tradition of a country. But always the question arises, what should be done at the national level, and what at the regional or local level. Also the way in which government or local authorities relate to or cooperate with public or private services may partly determine how the development and execution of youth policies is organised. There is of course not "one best practice". It seems very advisable however to make a careful decision about at which level a basic vision of youth policies is stated. In Canada this has been done on the provincial level, in the Netherlands and Greece on the national level.

Starting from this basic vision, an agreement between national government, regional and local authorities and other stakeholders on the main lines of the policies and of the division of responsibilities can be discussed. An adequate system of mutual accounting is probably needed to keep all participants together for a longer period of time.

Information

There is a lot of statistical and monitoring information on youth policies and e.g. on child- and youth well-being. Monitoring systems are also used to measure the outcomes of youth policies. Qualitative research into youth policies and youth activities is scarce and evaluations of youth policies or activities within youth policies are lacking. In a time where an evidence based approach to policy making is considered important in many countries, this makes youth policies vulnerable. It is true that evaluation of youth policy (activities) is complicated and costly, because of the complexity of these policies and the sheer number of often small activities within youth policies. It would therefore be advisable not only to discuss how research into youth policies can be stimulated, but also what evaluation strategies can be used in this field. The question would be what evaluation strategies yield reliable and acceptable results at reasonable costs. This could also contribute to a better linking of data on youth and research results on one hand and policy making processes on the other hand.

Looking into the future

Changes in the life of young people and in family life have been manifold and rapid in the last decades. One may expect that we will see further changes in the future. Globalisation, new technologies and life styles will affect how children are raised, how families are structured, how families function and how young people define their lives and their future. It will be interesting and useful to watch closely how these patterns develop, to analyse what developments one may expect for the future and to consider what consequence this may have for youth or family policies and for the institutions working with and for youth and families. The expected decrease of the population in

Europe and changes in the structure of households should certainly be analysed on its impact on youth and youth and family policies. Such an operation might best be set up in an international context, because these patterns and trends are for a large part similar in many countries.

Integrated youth policy

There seems to be a "natural" trend for youth policies to become as integrated as possible. Youth policies cover so many contents and are related to so many different types of policy making that integration is the only direction it can take. Youth policies of individual countries have reached different stages in the degree of integration. Some Canadian jurisdictions have made much progress in realising integrated policies. Also the "Every child matters" policy in Great Britain is at the moment a good example of a youth policy that has developed rather far in this respect. Certainly many countries are watching the British policies closely. It would be worthwhile to chart this road to integration and the stages within it, so countries can see where they stand and where they can go. This seems quite well possible because the contents of youth policies, the activities of youth policies and even the way in which youth policies are developed are not very different[56]. We should however also be cautious about introducing integrated policies. The warnings of the Dutch Council for Social Development – based on some research projects specifically committed to see if integrated policies have better results than segmented policies – that integrated policies have very negative side effects and often result in accumulation of bureaucratic layers and less autonomy for professionals, should be taken seriously. Integrated policies are expected to be more cost effective, transparent, and provide higher quality services for the "client". This should however not taken for granted. During the process towards integrated services and in organising them, the dangers of negative side effects should be carefully taken in consideration.

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[38]The language route (2007), Integrated language stimulation for 3-7 –years old, Utrecht: Sardes

[39]Ministerie van Jeugd en Gezin, 11-juli 2008. Brief diversiteit in het jeugdbeleid.

[40]See http://europa.eu/youth/index.cfm?l_id=en

[41]See http://www.eurodesk.eu/edesk/Infocentre.do?go=12

[42]See http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_202_sum_en.pdf

[43]See http://www.childpolicyintl.org/

[44]See http://www.dija.de/wai1/showcontent.asp?ThemaID=18

[45]See http://jeugdmonitor.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/home/default.htm

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[50]See http://www.statistics.gr/Main_eng.asp

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[55] http://www.unicef.org/crc/

[56]E.g., the idea that youth should participate in defining youth policies seems to be widely accepted and also brought into practice.

ANNEX IV

Selection of recent (2003-2008) events related to the "Future of the Family" theme, organised by major research institutes and foundations.

The Young Foundation (UK)
Valuing Family, Valuing Work: British Muslim Women and the Labour Market

London, 24 November 2008

http://www.youngfoundation.org.uk/past-events

This event will launch the London Development Agency's "Valuing Family, Valuing Work: British Muslim Women and the Labour Market" report, written by Zamila Bunglawala, fellow of the Young Foundation.

IFO (DE)

CES Lectures:
The Economics of Marriage, Part I and II

Munich, 12-13 March 2007

The Welfare State as a Remedy to Family Inefficiencies, Part I, II and III

Munich, 7-9 September 2004

IFO Seminars:
Familienpolitische Maßnahmen und Fertilität

Munich, 15 June 2005

Balancing work and family life: A life-course perspective

Munich, 24 January 2005

http://www.ifo.de/portal/page/portal/ifoHome/c-event/c1eventcal#current

Bertelsmann Foundation (DE)
Forum Demographischer Wandel des Bundespräsidenten is a research program of the government in cooperation with the Bertelsmannstiftung about the demographic future of Germany and its families. A large number of conferences has been organized and are planned.

The second annual conference on 6december 2006 in Schloss Bellevue had as its Motto:
"Familien stärken - Zukunft gewinnen. Im Blick: die Generation´90".

The third annual conference on 29 November 2007 also at the official residence of the Bundes President was organised around the theme of challenges facing the German education system in a period of demographic change: "Education full of life – Life full of education"

http://www.forum-demographie.de/Konferenzen.44.0.html

Urban Institute (USA)
Should the Government Promote Marriage?

Washington, 18 June 2007

http://www.urban.org/Pressroom/otherevents/vsmarriagegovt.cfm

Brookings Institution (USA)
Healthy Marriage, Strong Families and Child Wellbeing

Washington, 16 May 2008

http://www.brookings.edu/events/2008/0516_healthy_marriage.aspx

The Future of the Hispanic Family

Washington, 15 November 2007

http://www.brookings.edu/events/2007/1115family.aspx

Our Families, Our Country, Our World

Washington, 30 May 2006

http://www.brookings.edu/events/2006/0530global-economics.aspx

Can Gay Marriage Strengthen the American Family?

Washington, 1 April 2004

http://www.brookings.edu/events/2004/0401children---families.aspx

Housing and Working Families Convening

Washington, 19 June 2003

http://www.brookings.edu/events/2003/0619metropolitan-policy.aspx

European Centre for Social Welfare Policy and Research (EU)
Gender Inequalities and the Allocation of Market Work within Households
Vienna, 3 July 2008

Despite large increases in female employment rates across OECD countries, the trend towards reduced employment and earnings gaps has been uneven, with large gender differences remaining in a number of countries. The processes driving these changes are complex and interrelated. Too little is known about the relative work incentives of men and women sharing the same household, how this differs across countries, and which types of policy configurations dampen or exacerbate incentives for an unequal sharing of market and household work.

http://www.euro.centre.org/detail.php?xml_id=1221

Bosch Foundation (DE)
The Demographic Future of Europe (in cooperation with the German Institute for Population Research)

Stuttgart, 16 November 2005

The current results of a major European survey on demographic trends will be presented for the first time at this event. The discussion will focus on the following themes: Attitudes to the family; Partnership issues and the desire for children; Expectations from family and equal rights policies; Men's and women's perspectives on work and the family; Homemaking and careers; Attitudes to the elderly; and expectations from senior citizen policies.

http://www.bosch-stiftung.de/content/language2/html/4460.asp

European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions
EUROFOUND (2004), *Living to work - working to live, Tomorrow's work-life balance in Europe*, background paper for Foundation Forum held in Dublin, 3-4 November 2004

http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/htmlfiles/ef04121.htm

EUROFOUND (2005), *Changing Europe: better work, better life (four year work programme 2005-2008)*

http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/pubdocs/2004/103/en/1/ef04103en.pdf

Summary: The Foundation's eighth four-year programme looks ahead to the opportunities and challenges facing the new EU. It highlights future challenges for social policy in Europe and pinpoints the knowledge gaps to be addressed by the Foundation and its research activities in

the period following EU enlargement in May 2004. It is designed to support the work of the main social actors charged with the responsibility for planning and establishing better living and working conditions in Europe.

The Social Capital Foundation (BE)
The future of family – decomposition ou recomposition

Bruxelles, 11 may 2004

http://www.socialcapital-foundation.org/conferences/2004/TSCF%20Brussels%20Conference.pdf

Irish Social Policy Association (IR)

Families, children and social policy. (inc future challenges and policies)

Dublin, 16-17 September 2004

http://www.ispa.ie/newsevents/2004conference/

Friends of Europe
European Policy Summit

Europe's Looming Demographic Crunch - The Search for New Labour and Welfare Policies

Brussels, 31 January 2008

http://www.friendsofeurope.org/Events/tabid/452/EventType/EventView/EventID/225/PageID/606/Default.aspx

MacArthur Foundation (USA)
The MacArthur Foundation has a research program called "the family and the economy" which focuses on the changing role of the family and its role of the economy. Its latest meeting was in 2000 though.

http://www.olin.wustl.edu/macarthur/

Volkswagen Stiftung (DE)
Currently the Volkswagen Stiftung is funding a project on 'future issues of our society'. This funding initiative is designed to face up to the fundamental changes at the beginning of the 21st century which affect Germany, its European neighbours and most other member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Most of the research is not forward looking though and not on families specifically. It is currently in progress but since 2003 multiple grants have been awarded.

http://www.volkswagenstiftung.de/funding/social-and-cultural-challenges/future-issues-of-our-society.html?L=1

BMW Herbert Quandt Stiftung (DE)

In cooperation with, among others, the Bosch Foundation, the BMW Herbert Quandt Stiftung has a report on Europe's demographic future, of which a summary is available for free. It has been made by the Berlin Institute for Population and Development.

http://www.berlin-institut.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Europa/Kurz_Europa_e_Map.pdf

The Lawson Foundation (CA)

Family, families matter & why they matter

October 18, 2007

http://www.vifamily.ca/commentary/lecture10182007.pdf

ANNEX V

Recent OECD publications related to the Future of the Family

OECD (2002), *Babies and bosses – Reconciling work and family life (Vol. 1): Australia, Denmark and the Netherlands*, OECD, Paris

OECD (2003), *Babies and bosses – Reconciling work and family life (Vol. 2): Austria, Ireland and Japan*, OECD, Paris

OECD (2004), *Babies and Bosses - Reconciling Work and Family Life (Vol. 3): New Zealand, Portugal, Switzerland*, OECD, Paris

OECD (2005), *Babies and Bosses - Reconciling Work and Family Life (Vol. 4): Canada, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom*, OECD, Paris

OECD (2007), *Babies and Bosses - Reconciling Work and Family Life: A Synthesis of Findings for OECD Countries*, OECD, Paris

OECD (2007), *Women and men in OECD Countries*, OECD, Paris

OECD (2007), *Modernising Social Policy for the New Life Course*, OECD, Paris

OECD (2007), *Understanding the Social Outcomes of Learning*, OECD, Paris

OECD (2008), *Higher Education to 2030 (Vol. 1)*, OECD, Paris

OECD (2008), *The Looming Crisis in the Health Workforce - How Can OECD Countries Respond?*, OECD Health Policy Studies, OECD, Paris

OECD (2008), *Live Longer, Work Longer, OECD Ageing and Employment Policies*, OECD, Paris

OECD (2008), *Trends shaping education*, OECD, Paris

OECD (2008), *The OECD factbook*. Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics, OECD, Paris